Mees v. Hurley

• Decision Date: 23 May 2016
• Docket Number: No. 4:13 CV 1204 SNLJ / DDN,4:13 CV 1204 SNLJ / DDN
• Parties: MATTHEW J. MEES, Petitioner, v. JAMES HURLEY, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

MATTHEW J. MEES, Petitioner, v. JAMES HURLEY, Respondent.

No. 4:13 CV 1204 SNLJ / DDN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION

May 23, 2016

ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION

This action is before the court upon the petition of Missouri state prisoner Matthew J. Mees for a writ of habeas corpus and an evidentiary hearing pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Docs. 1, 24.) The matter was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for a report and recommended disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

On October 27, 2014, the court appointed counsel for petitioner Mees for the limited purpose of determining whether or not the statutory limitations period of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) should be equitably tolled.¹ (Docs. 15, 17.) For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned denies an evidentiary hearing and recommends that the petition for habeas corpus be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

On March 15, 2006, in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County petitioner Mees pled guilty to three counts of first degree child molestation. (Doc. 13-1 at 3.) On April 27, 2006, the circuit court sentenced petitioner to concurrent terms of fifteen years imprisonment on each of the three counts. (Doc. 13-1 at 3-4, 8-9.) Additionally, thecourt sentenced petitioner to shock incarceration for 120 days pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. § 559.115. (Id.) He successfully completed the shock incarceration and execution of his three fifteen year sentences were suspended. (Id.) On July 28, 2006, the Circuit Court released petitioner to five years probation. (Id. at 4.) During the period November to December 2008,² the court revoked petitioner's probation and ordered the execution of the fifteen-year sentence of incarceration. (Id. at 5.)

Petitioner Mees did not appeal his original convictions and sentences or the revocation of probation. (Doc. 1 at 2.)

On July 10, 2012, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under Missouri Supreme Court Rule 91 in the Circuit Court of Washington County. Mees v. Steele, Case No. 12WA-CC00319.³ On February 4, 2013, after considering the pleadings, the Circuit Court denied the petition. Id. On April 1, 2013, petitioner filed a Rule 91 petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Missouri Court of Appeals. Mees v. Hurley, Case No. ED99759.⁴ That petition was denied on April 18, 2013. Id.

On June 25, 2013, petitioner Mees filed the instant federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.) On October 27, 2014, this court issued an order: (1) appointing counsel to address only the issue of equitable tolling for petitioner Mees; and (2) ordering respondent to file a copy of the transcript of the probation revocation hearing and sentencing as well as the order revoking the probation, issued by the Circuit Court of St. Louis County in Case No. 2104R-00587-01. (Doc. 15.) On December 11, 2014, respondent filed a copy of the order revoking petitioner's probation but, after a diligent search, could not locate the transcript of the probation revocation hearing and sentencing. (Doc. 22.)

On January 8, 2015, petitioner, through counsel, filed a memorandum and motion arguing that the time to file a federal habeas petition should be equitably tolled due to petitioner's mental impairments. Additionally, petitioner requested an evidentiary hearing. (Doc. 24.)

II. PETITIONER'S GROUNDS FOR FEDERAL HABEAS RELIEF

Petitioner alleges four grounds for federal habeas relief:

(1) The trial court erred by accepting petitioner's guilty plea because the plea was "unknowing, involuntary, and unintelligent."

(2) His trial court counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to investigate the facts of the case and petitioner's history of mental illness before advising him to plead guilty.

(3) His trial court counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the charges as a violation of double jeopardy.

(4) His trial court counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by requesting that petitioner sign an admission of guilt and then using the statement to convince him to plead guilty.

(Doc. 1 at 5-11.)

Respondent contends (1) petitioner did not file his federal habeas petition within the time required by the applicable federal statute of limitations, and (2) his grounds for relief are without merit. (Doc. 13.)

III. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

To obtain federal habeas relief, state prisoners must apply for habeas corpus relief within one year of the latest of:

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

Congress has also provided, "The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).

All of petitioner's grounds for relief relate to his guilty plea, conviction, and original sentence. Only the event described in § 2244(d)(1)(A), above, applies to these proceedings and it occurred on April 27, 2006. (Doc. 13-1 at 3-4.) Petitioner had ten days thereafter, until May 7, 2006, to directly appeal the judgment and sentences, Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 81.04(a), but he did not do so. Therefore, the one year federal habeas limitations period began to run on May 7, 2006 and ended on May 7, 2007.

By the time Mees filed his petitions for habeas corpus relief under Missouri Supreme Court Rule 91 on July 10, 2012 in the Circuit Court of Washington County and on April 1, 2013 in the Missouri Court of Appeals, his federal statutory limitations period had long since run. Therefore, no statutory tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) of the one-year federal limitations period occurred. This court considers whether there are circumstances that establish that equitable tolling is appropriate. Gray v. Gammon, 283 F.3d 917, 918 (8th Cir. 2002) (per curiam).

IV. EQUITABLE TOLLING

Mees argues the federal limitations period was equitably tolled. Equitable tolling is applicable to the § 2244(d)(1) limitations period in appropriate cases. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 646 (2010). Equitable tolling may be available "only if [a habeaspetitioner] shows (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing." Id. at 649 (citations omitted); see also Walker v. Norris, 436 F.3d 1026, 1032 (8th Cir. 2006); Gray, 283 F.3d at 918 (holding "that the one-year limitations period is equitably tolled when 'extraordinary circumstances' have made it impossible for the habeas petitioner to file a timely federal petition").

Mees alleges two factual circumstances that establish his entitlement to equitable tolling: first, the statement by the circuit court at his guilty plea that he could not seek appellate court review; and, second, his mental condition. As previously discussed by this court, petitioner Mees's first reason for equitable tolling does not have merit. (See Doc. 15 at 4-5.) As a second circumstance for equitable tolling, petitioner argues that during the federal habeas corpus limitations period he suffered from mental illnesses that prevented him from understanding the need to file the federal petition before May 7, 2007. Adopting the words of his prison advisor, Mees alleges:

It was through no direct fault of petitioner that he did not understand the post-conviction remedies available to him including filing in the Federal Court within the 1 year time frame following his convictions. Petitioner has a history of mental illnesses which have an effect on his ability to understand.

(Doc. 1 at 13.)

The court believed that Mees's second reason, his mental condition, was not adequately briefed for this court to make a determination, and, therefore the court appointed counsel and ordered additional briefing. Although petitioner Mees suffers from diagnosed psychiatric conditions (Doc. 24-2 at 9), after careful consideration of the record filed by counsel for both parties, for the reasons set forth below, the undersigned concludes that Mees's psychiatric conditions did not affect his ability to timely file a federal habeas petition in this case.

To toll the federal limitations period, a federal habeas petitioner must establish he pursued his rights diligently, but suffered from a mental condition that limited his ability to file his federal petition within the limitations period. Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S.327, 337 (2007); cf. Collins v. Scurr, 230 F.3d 1362, 1362 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (finding "bald and unsupported assertions" insufficient because they related to the time of his guilty plea, not to the time he filed his federal petition; no entitlement to equitable tolling where petitioner had not made a showing that he diligently pursued his federal habeas relief after the state courts denied him post-conviction relief "and still could not have completed it on time due to mental incompetency."). The mere diagnosis of a psychiatric disorder is not enough to warrant tolling; the disorder must interfere with a petitioner's ability to file a timely petition. See Nichols v. Dormire, 11 F. App'x 633, 634 (8th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (dismissal of habeas petition affirmed even though petitioner was diagnosed with...