Meetze v. Associated Press

• Decision Date: 11 December 1956
• Docket Number: No. 17234,17234
• Parties: Troyce Brindel MEETZE, by her Guardian ad litem, Harvey Golden, Appellant, v. The ASSOCIATED PRESS, Respondent. Lewie Herman MEETZE, by his Guardian ad litem, Harvey Golden, Appellant, v. The ASSOCIATED PRESS, Respondent.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Page 606

95 S.E.2d 606

230 S.C. 330

Troyce Brindel MEETZE, by her Guardian ad litem, Harvey

Golden, Appellant, v. The ASSOCIATED PRESS, Respondent.

Lewie Herman MEETZE, by his Guardian ad litem, Harvey

Golden, Appellant, v. The ASSOCIATED PRESS, Respondent.

No. 17234.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Dec. 11, 1956.

Kale R. Alexander, Charles D. Davis, Columbia, for appellants.

Boyd, Bruton & Lumpkin, Columbia, for respondent.

OXNER, Justice.

These are actions to remover damages for invasion of the right of privacy. The appeal in each case is from an order sustaining a demurrer to the complaint. Both appeals involve the same legal question and were argued together.

Plaintiffs Troyce Brindel Meetze and Lewie Herman Meetze are approximately 12 and 20 years of age, respectively. They were married on March 13, 1955. On March 13, 1956, a son was born to this couple at a hospital in Columbia. Two days later the Associated Press caused to be published in The State, a Columbia newspaper, the following article:

'A chubby, blonde 12-year-old mother of a day-old healthy baby boy greeted visitors cheerfully yesterday, but declined to have her picture taken or talk generally with reporters.

'Her young husband, Lewis Herman Meetze, a West Columbia construction company worker whose age could not be learned, also declined to see newsmen or let his wife talk with outsiders after an Associated Press reporter talked to her briefly.

'Mrs. Meetze, in the brief visit she granted the news service reported, was cheerful but uncommunicative.

'She had just concluded a nursing visit from her young son. At her orders, the baby was placed in the obstetrical ward nursery at a point where he cannot be seen by outsiders through the viewing window.

'Occupying a choice private room, she would say only that she had read The State lying on her bed.

"I just don't want any publicity,' she said pleasantly. She agreed to reconsider the matter in a later talk with her husband, but both stood by her original decision, hospital attendants said.

'The hospital said the six pound, 14-ounce baby was 'fine and healthy.' He was seen as he was carried by a nurse from the room to the nursery and his appearance bore out the hospital judgment.

'Mrs. Meetze's family--her father is listed as Oliver Brindeis from Georgia, but from what place could not be learned.'

In both the complaint by Mrs. Meetze and that by her husband it was alleged that the Associated Press, despite the wishes and requests of the plaintiff, spitefully and maliciously caused said article to be published not only in the Columbia State but in numerous other newspapers and thereby exposed the plaintiff 'to an unwanted public light' and 'public gaze', and made the plaintiff 'an object of scorn and ridicule' because of the youth of the mother at the time of the birth of the child. It was further alleged in each complaint that the plaintiff suffered 'extreme embarrassment, humiliation, mental anguish, mental agony, wounded feelings and loss of privacy.'

Two questions are presented: (1) May an action be maintained in South Carolina for violation of what has been termed as the right of privacy? (2) If so, does the complaint state such a cause of action? The Court below did not pass on the first question but held that even if recognition be given to the doctrine of right of privacy, the allegations of the complaint were insufficient to state such a cause of action. In the determination of these issues, we have been greatly aided by the excellent briefs of counsel.

The 'right of privacy' has been defined as the right of an individual to be let alone, to live a life of seclusion, to be free from unwarranted publicity. 77 C.J.S., Right of Privacy, § 1; 41 Am.Jur., Privacy, Section 2. The following has been suggested as a fairly comprehensive definition of what constitutes an actionable invasion of the right of privacy: 'The unwarranted appropriation or exploitation of one's personality, the publicizing of one's private affairs with which the public has no legitimate concern, or the wrongful intrusion into one's private activities, in such manner as to outrage or cause mental suffering, shame, or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities.' 41 Am.Jur., Privacy, Section 2; Continental Optical Co. v. Reed, 119 Ind.App. 643, 86 N.E.2d 306, 14 A.L.R.2d 743; Smith v. Doss, 251 Ala. 250, 37 So.2d 118. The existence of a legal right of privacy is recognized by the American Law Institute in the following language: 'A person who unreasonably and seriously interferes with another's interests in not having his affairs known to others or his likeness exhibited to the public is liable to the other.' 4 Restatement, Torts, Section 867.

The right is distinct in and of itself and not merely incidental to some other recognized right for breach of which an action for damages will lie. Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equipment Co., 138 Cal.App.2d 82, 291 P.2d 194. A violation of the right of privacy is a tort. Truth is not a defense to an action of this kind. 41 Am.Jur., page 935.

The pioneers in the enunciation of the doctrine of right of privacy were Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis (later Justice Brandeis) who published an article in 1890 entitled, 'The Right to Privacy.' 4 Harvard Law Review 193. It was there defined as an independent right and the distinctive principles upon which it is based were formulated. Later the doctrine was advocated by numerous other writers and statutes relating to it were adopted in several States. The first appellate court to recognize the doctrine was the Supreme Court of Georgia. Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68, 69 L.R.A. 101, decided in 1905. That decision has been followed by most of the courts of this country. In fact, the doctrine has been rejected in only four or five jurisdictions.

We think this Court in Holloman v. Life Insurance Co. of Virginia, 192 S.C. 454, 7 S.E.2d 169, 171, 127 A.L.R. 110, clearly aligned itself with those jurisdictions recognizing the existence of a right of privacy. It was there stated: 'The right of privacy is one which was not definitely recognized by the law until comparatively recent times. But we find ourselves in agreement with a number of authorities to the effect that the violation of such a right is under certain circumstances a tort which would entitle the injured person to recover damages.'

Excellent annotations on the subject will be found in 138 A.L.R. 22, 168 A.L.R. 446, and 14 A.L.R.2d 750.

Having concluded that an action for interference with right of privacy may be maintained in this jurisdiction, the question remains as to whether or not the allegations of the complaint are sufficient to constitute an unwarranted invasion of such right.

The right of privacy is not an absolute right. Some limitations are essential for the protection of the right of freedom of speech and of the press and the interests of the public in having a free dissemination of news and information. None of these rights are without qualification. Courts have encountered considerable difficulty in seeking to balance these conflicting interests. In almost every case involving assertion of a right of privacy, the court is called upon to resolve a conflict between the rights of the individual on the one hand and the interests of society on the other.

One of the primary limitations placed on the right of privacy is that it does not prohibit the publication of matter which is of legitimate public or general interest. 'At some point, the public interest in obtaining information...