Mei Kum Chu v. Chinese-Am. Planning Council Home Attendant Program, Inc.

• Decision Date: 11 July 2016
• Docket Number: 16-cv-3569 (KBF)
• Parties: Mei Kum CHU, Sau King Chung, and Qun Xiang Ling, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. CHINESE-AMERICAN PLANNING COUNCIL HOME ATTENDANT PROGRAM, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

194 F.Supp.3d 221

Mei Kum CHU, Sau King Chung, and Qun Xiang Ling, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,

v.CHINESE-AMERICAN PLANNING COUNCIL HOME ATTENDANT PROGRAM, INC., Defendant.

16-cv-3569 (KBF)

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed July 11, 2016

Carmela Huang, Urban Justice Center, Michael Taubenfeld, Serrins Fisher LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiffs.

Jose Francisco Irias, Kenneth Harold Kirschner, Hogan Lovells US LLP, New York, NY, for Defendant.

OPINION & ORDER

KATHERINE B. FORREST, District Judge

Plaintiffs Mei Kum Chu, Sau King Chung, and Qun Xiang Ling commenced this action, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, by filing a summons and complaint ("Complaint") in the New York Supreme Court, New York County, on April 11, 2016. The Complaint allege claims against plaintiffs' former employer, defendant Chinese-American Planning Council Home Attendant Program, Inc. ("CPC"), under the New York Labor Law ("NYLL"), as well as claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment arising from CPC's alleged violations of the New York Home Care Worker Wage Parity Act ("Parity Act") and the New York City Fair Wages for Workers Act ("Fair Wages Act"). (Compl., ECF No. 1-1.) Plaintiffs were employed by CPC as home care aides to care for disabled and elderly individuals in and around New York City, and allege that CPC failed to, inter alia, pay them minimum wages, overtime wages and spread-of-hours wages, and furnish proper wage statements. On May 13, 2016, CPC removed this action to this Court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, on the ground that all of plaintiffs' claims are completely preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185. (Notice of Removal ¶ 4, ECF No. 1.)

Shortly before plaintiffs commenced this action, this Court addressed a similar lawsuit in which current CPC employees brought claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207, and also brought New York state law claims. See Chan v. Chinese-American Planning Council Home Attendant Program, Inc. ("Chan"), No. 15-cv-9605 (KBF) (S.D.N.Y.). That action is currently stayed following the Court's grant of CPC's motion to compel arbitration based on a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA"), as supplemented by a Memorandum of Agreement made effective December 1, 2015 ("2015 MOA"), that was executed by CPC and the bargaining representative for CPC's employees, 1199 SEIU United Healthcare Workers East ("1199"). Because the operative complaint in Chan asserted a federal law claim under the FLSA, there was no dispute that the Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate that motion.

Now pending before the Court are two threshold motions—a motion to compel arbitration by CPC (ECF No. 5), and a motion to remand this action to state court by plaintiffs (ECF No. 15). In its motion, CPC contends that all of plaintiffs' claims are subject to mandatory arbitration because such claims are expressly covered by the grievance and arbitration provisions contained in the 2015 MOA. (See Kirschner Aff., Ex. 2 ("2015 MOA"), ECF No. 24.) Plaintiffs oppose CPC's motion on the ground that they are not covered by the 2015 MOA, which contained new mandatory arbitration provisions, because they were no longer employees at the time that the 2015 MOA became effective. Plaintiffs also argue that the prior Memorandum of Agreement, dated June 6, 2014 (see Kirschner Aff., Ex. 3 ("2014 MOA")), does not require the parties to submit to binding arbitration for these claims. With respect to their motion to remand, plaintiffs argue that LMRA preemption does not apply because their state law claims do not depend on the CBA and the Court need not interpret the CBA to adjudicate them. CPC counters that resolution of plaintiffs' claims will require substantial interpretation of the CBA.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that LMRA preemption does not apply and, as a result, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action. Accordingly, plaintiffs' motion to remand this action to state court is GRANTED. In light of that determination, CPC's motion to compel arbitration is DENIED as moot.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND¹

Plaintiffs Mei Kum Chu, San King Chung and Qun Xiang Ling were each previously employed by CPC as home care aides. Chu's employment concluded on approximately October 14, 2013; Chung's employment concluded on approximately January 18, 2013; and Xiang's employment concluded on approximately June 1, 2015. (Compl. ¶¶ 24-26.) Plaintiffs' putative class consists of all home care aides employed by CPC to provide care services in clients' homes between April 1, 2008 and June 1, 2015. (Compl. ¶ 16.) CPC is a not-for-profit corporation that provides home health care services to elderly and disabled residents of New York City. (Compl. ¶¶ 13, 23.) As detailed below, the Complaint alleges that CPC engaged in a number of unlawful wage and hour practices vis-à -vis plaintiffs and the putative class members.

The Complaint alleges that CPC had a "policy and practice" of paying plaintiffs "one hourly rate of pay during weekdays and a slightly higher hourly rate during weekends." (Compl. ¶ 29.) The Complaint also alleges that CPC regularly assigned plaintiffs to work 24-hour shifts (without receiving at least five hours of uninterrupted sleep time or three hours of meal and other break time), which required plaintiffs to "remain in the client's home or by the client's side for the entire 24-hour period to provide services, to monitor the client's location, and to be ‘on call’ to immediately provide services to the client as needed." (Compl. ¶¶ 30-32.) CPC also had a "policy and practice" of paying plaintiffs "their hourly rate for only 12 hours of work during a 24-hour shift, plus a flat, per diem amount set at $16.95." (Compl. ¶ 34.) CPC also had a "policy and practice" of not paying plaintiffs "their regular rate for all hours up to 40 in weeks during which [p]laintiffs ... worked overtime hours." (Compl. ¶ 36.) Additionally, CPC failed to provide notices required by NYLL § 195 and 12 N.Y. C.R.R. § 142–3.8 on pay statements that it distributed to plaintiffs. (Compl. ¶ 61.) Based on the aforementioned alleged conduct, the Complaint asserts seven state law causes of action—five claims pursuant to the NYLL and two common law claims. These claims are as follows.

Starting with plaintiffs' NYLL claims, Count I alleges that CPC failed to pay the statutorily required minimum wage in violation of NYLL § 652 and 12 N.Y.C.R.R. § 142–3.1. (Compl. ¶¶ 68-73.) Count II alleges that CPC failed to pay the statutorily mandated overtime rate for all hours worked in excess of 40 per week, in violation of NYLL Article 19, § 650, et seq., and 12 N.Y.C.R.R. § 142–3.2, because CPC did not pay plaintiffs their regular rate for all hours up to 40 hours in weeks in which they worked overtime when plaintiffs were assigned to work 24-hour shifts. (Compl. ¶¶ 74-78.) Count III alleges that CPC failed to pay an additional hour of pay at the basic minimum hourly wage rate for every day that plaintiffs worked a spread of hours that exceeded 10 hours (or a shift in excess of 10 hours), in violation of NYLL §§ 190, et seq., and 650, et seq., and 12 N.Y.C.R.R. § 142–3.4. (Compl. ¶¶ 79-82.) Count IV alleges that CPC failed to pay plaintiffs all wages which they were owed whenever plaintiffs were assigned to work 24-hour shifts, in violation of NYLL § 191 (Compl. ¶¶ 83-86.) Count V alleges that CPC willfully failed to provide plaintiffs with the requisite paystubs as set forth by NYLL § 195 and 12 N.Y.C.R.R. § 142–3.8, which prejudiced plaintiffs' ability to ascertain and assert their legal rights. (Compl. ¶¶ 87-88.)

In Counts VI and VII, plaintiffs assert common law claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, respectively. Count VI asserts that, during at least the latter period of plaintiffs' employment, CPC was required to certify and did certify that it paid plaintiffs wages as required by the Parity Act and the Fair Wages Act. (Compl. ¶¶ 90-91.)² Count VI further alleges that CPC entered into contracts—of which plaintiffs were third party beneficiaries—with government agencies to pay plaintiffs the wages required by the Parity Act and the Fair Wages Act, but that CPC breached those contracts whenever it assigned plaintiffs to work 24-hour shifts and did not pay all wages due. (Compl. ¶¶ 92-95.) Finally, Count VII alleges that CPC was unjustly enriched at plaintiffs' expense by failing to pay all minimum wages due under the Parity Act and the Fair Wages Act because CPC received the benefits of the work that plaintiffs performed without paying all wages due. (Compl. ¶¶ 96-98.)

As is apparent from the above, the Complaint does not assert any violation of any collective bargaining agreement, nor does it even make a reference to the existence of one. In other words, no claim, at least on its face, purports to rely on any term included in a collective bargaining agreement or other labor agreement entered into by the parties.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion to Remand

A defendant may remove an action from state to federal court by filing a notice of removal in the federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). The notice must contain "a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal," id.§ 1446(a), and "be filed within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant ... of a copy of the initial pleading," id.§ 1446(b)(1). Removal is proper in "any civil action ... of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction." Id.§ 1441(a). A federal district court has federal question jurisdiction "of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Id.§ 1331.

Generally, removal jurisdiction must be "strictly construed," Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32, 123 S.Ct. 366, 154 L.Ed.2d 368 (2002), and...