Meier v. Thiemann

• Decision Date: 18 March 1884
• Citation: 15 Mo.App. 307
• Parties: ALVINA MEIER, Appellant, v. HENRY THIEMANN, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

15 Mo.App. 307

ALVINA MEIER, Appellant,

v.HENRY THIEMANN, Respondent.

St. Louis Court of Appeals, Missouri.

Mar. 18, 1884.

APPEAL from the St. Louis County Circuit Court, EDWARDS, J.

Affirmed.

M. F. TAYLOR, for the appellant: One holding under a lease can not dispute a landlord's title, or show that it has expired, without first surrendering the possession obtained under the lease.-- Pentz v. Kuester, 41 Mo. 447; Stagg v. Eureka Tanning Co., 56 Mo. 314.

MITCHELL & HAWKEN and A. M. GARDNER, for the respondent: A permission to occupy for an indefinite time, no rent being reserved, does not create a tenancy that can be conveyed.-- Williams v. Desair, 31 Mo. 13. If it was true, as claimed by the plaintiff, that the defendant was the tenant of her husband, or that her husband was a tenant at will of Adolphus Meier, or had some interest in the premises at the time of the execution of the lease in question, which defendant denies, it was nevertheless competent for defendant to show that his tenancy, in interest or title, whatever it might be, had terminated, either by its own limitation or by operation of law.--Taylor's L. & T., sects. 929 and 708. Jackson v. Davis, 5 Cow. 123; Den v. Ashmure, 22 N. J. 261; Langford v. Selmes, 3 K. & J. 220; Jackson v. Rowland, 6 Wend. 670; Bowser v. Bowser, 10 Hump. 49; Binney v. Chapman, 5 Pick. 124; Camp v. Camp, 5 Conn. 291; Stagg v. Eureka Tanning Co., 56 Mo. 317. The most that plaintiff could claim for her husband, in any view of the facts in the case, would be that he was a tenant, or had been a tenant, at will of Adolphus Meier, the owner; that tenancy he could not assign or lease, as it would have terminated at his death.--1 Hilliard on Real Prop. 386, 388; Rasin v. Stannard, 17 Mass. 284; Bigelow v. French, 11 Barb. 498. The plaintiff's own evidence showed that her husband, long before the execution of the lease in question, had moved from the premises and abandoned the possession thereof without the knowledge or consent of the owner, so that whatever right he might have had if he had remained on the premises was lost and possession reverted to the owner.-- May v. Tuckett, 48 Mo. 472.

BAKEWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

This was an action for six months' rent of a farm in St. Louis County. There was a finding and judgment for defendant.

It appeared from the evidence, that Thiemann had been in possession, paying rent for the place to one Thomas J. Meier, for a year or two before March 1, 1882. At that date, Meier gave to Thiemann a written lease, not under seal, for a term of three years. Meier died in the spring of 1882, after which Thiemann attorned to one Adolphus Meier, and refused to pay to plaintiff. Plaintiff is the widow of Thomas Meier. By order of the probate court, all the property of her husband had been turned over to her; and the other heirs of Thomas Meier had assigned to her all interest in the leasehold.

On the trial, defendant was allowed to introduce evidence tending to show, that Thomas Meier, the lessor of defendant, was a mere tenant at will of his brother, Adolphus Meier, who let him have possession of the place. Adolphus Meier bought the farm in 1857; and had ever since owned it and paid taxes and improvements on it. Thomas Meier was allowed by his brother Adolphus to occupy the place as a means of support; and Adolphus did not know, till after his death, that Thomas had given a lease of it.

It is contended by appellant, that Adolphus Meier was not a competent witness to prove the understanding between himself and his brother Thomas, under which Thomas was in possession of the premises; and, also, that the defence set up was incompentent, because it was a denial by by the tenant of his landlord's title. These two questions are the only questions that arise upon the record.

1. If a tenant at will lease the land in his possession, the lease will be good between himself and his lessee, so long as he is suffered to enjoy the premises. Holbrook v. Young, 108 Mass. 85; 1 Washb. on Real Prop. 582. But the original landlord may enter upon the demisee of the tenant at will as a disseisor; and such demisee is entitled to no notice, and, as to the original landlord, is a mere tenant at sufferance. Reckhow v. Shank, 43 N. Y. 448. The rule is well settled that a tenant, after having accepted possession from his landlord, is not allowed to dispute his landlord's title. But this doctrine has its limits. A lessee may plead that though the lessor had an interest in the premises at the time of making his lease, his interest terminated before the alleged cause of action rose. Palmer v. Bowker, 106 Mass. 317. He may show, for instance, that the lessor was only seised in right of his wife, for her life, and that she died before the covenant was broken; or, that the lessor being executor durante minori ætate, the infant has since become of age. Lamson v. Clarkson, 113 Mass. 348; Andrews v. Pearce, 4 B. & P. 158. No proof of title is required in an action for the rent by the landlord, because, if the tenant has once recognized the title of plaintiff, and treated him as his landlord, he is precluded from showing that the plaintiff had not title at the time the lease was granted. But this the defendant in the present case did not attempt to do. He admits that his landlord had some interest; but he offered to show what was the quantity and duration of that interest, and that it expired before the rent accrued which the representative of the landlord seeks to recover in this action. This, we think, he had a right to do. Upon the termination of the landlord's estate, the tenant became a tenant at sufferance, and no longer liable for rent under his lease. Lamson v. Clarkson, supra; 14 Allen, 134; 1 Washb. on Real Prop. 582.

2. As to the...