Meinhardt v. White

• Decision Date: 30 July 1937
• Docket Number: No. 34655.,34655.
• Citation: 107 S.W.2d 1061
• Parties: J.P. MEINHARDT v. N.R. WHITE, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

107 S.W.2d 1061

J.P. MEINHARDT v. N.R. WHITE, Appellant.

No. 34655.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

Division One, July 30, 1937.

Appeal from Madison Circuit Court. — Hon. Taylor Smith, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Edgar & Banta for appellant.

(1) In a suit to ascertain and determine title, where there is nothing in the pleadings giving the proceedings an equitable character, the rules applicable to ordinary actions at law govern. Secs. 1520, 1521, R.S. 1929; Ebbs v. Neff, 30 S.W. (2d) 616, 325 Mo. 1182; Sorrell v. Bradshaw, 222 S.W. 1024; Tracy v. Coppage, 213 S.W. 38; Lead Co. v. Maynard, 223 S.W. 600, 283 Mo. 646; Jacobs v. Waldron, 298 S.W. 773, 317 Mo. 1133; Stewart v. Stewart, 262 S.W. 1016; Russ v. Hope, 178 S.W. 447, 265 Mo. 638; Crawford v. Amusement Syndicate Co., 37 S.W. (2d) 581; Welch v. Veasley, 227 S.W. 58, 286 Mo. 93; Busby v. Self, 223 S.W. 729, 284 Mo. 206; Peterson v. Larson, 285 Mo. 119; Stewart v. Omaha Loan & Trust Co., 222 S.W. 808, 283 Mo. 364; Wolfersberger v. Hoppenjon, 68 S.W. (2d) 818. (2) The pleadings raised no equitable issue and therefore defendant's Declarations 1, 2, 3 and 5 should have been given and followed. (3) By defendant's Declaration 4 the court properly held that if the description of the property contained in the deed is such that the identity of the property can be established, or if the description furnishes the means of identification, then the deed is good between the parties thereto and the legal title vests in the grantee. The description in the deed offered in evidence met this test and the judgment should have been for the defendant. 18 C.J., pp. 180-182; Carter v. Holman, 60 Mo. 498; Adkins v. Moran, 67 Mo. 100; Cornwell v. Thurston, 59 Mo. 156.

C.P. Damron for respondent.

(1) The description in appellant's deed to the land sought to be conveyed being vague and uncertain, and yet furnishing some descriptive matter, which by aid of parol evidence might enable the land to be identified, made such parol evidence admissible. 18 C.J., sec. 248, p. 280, sec. 491, p. 412, sec. 522, p. 431; Hubbard v. Whitebread, 221 Mo. 683; Schrieber v. Osten, 50 Mo. 516. (2) Latent ambiguity may always be explained by extrinsic evidence. 22 C.J., sec. 1593, p. 1192; Hardy v. Matthews, 38 Mo. 122. (3) As where the description in a deed may apply to one or more tracts of land, or in some respects applies to one tract, and in other respects applies to another tract, parol evidence is admissible to identify the tract conveyed. Hardy v. Matthews, 38 Mo. 122; Lauderdale v. Kane, 130 Mo. App. 236; Goff v. Roberts, 72 Mo. 570; 22 C.J., sec. 1570, pp. 1173-1175, sec. 1595, p. 1194. (4) Conversations of parties at time of and just previous to execution of contract between them may be admissible for purpose of aiding in the construction of the contract. 22 C.J., sec. 1573, p. 1180; Sharp v. Sturgeon, 66 Mo. App. 197; Morey v. Feltz, 173 S.W. 85; Vance v. Humphreys, 241 S.W. 94; McPike v. Allman, 53 Mo. 551; Evans v. Green, 21 Mo. 170; 13 Cyc. 607. (5) And such conversations and conduct are admissible to show intentions of the parties in suit to quiet title such as the present action. Hunt v. Hunt, 270 S.W. 365. (6) In the construction of writings containing descriptions of property, words of particular specifications prevail over more general language. Rosenberger v. Wabash Ry. Co., 96 Mo. App. 507; Pecare v. Chouteau, 13 Mo. 377. (7) The descriptive matter in appellant's deed, viz.: "just south of Cedar Creek" does not necessarily mean or imply contiguity. Buchanan v. Banks, 45 Mo. 349. (8) Appellant's Declarations 1, 2, 3 and 5, being contrary to the law of the case, as shown by previous authorities herein were properly refused.

FERGUSON, C.

This is an action, under Section 1520, Revised Statutes 1929, to try title. Plaintiff's petition alleges that he is "the fee-simple owner" of a triangular parcel of land, therein specifically described by courses, metes and bounds, and situate in Washington County; that "defendant claims to have a title, estate or interest in said real estate" which "is adverse and prejudicial to plaintiff;" and prays the court to ascertain and determine, and "by its judgment define and decree" the title and interest "of plaintiff and defendant, respectively, in said real estate." Defendant's answer admits that "he claims title to the land" described in the petition and avers that he is the owner thereof in fee simple, and "that plaintiff has no right, title or interest in said land or any part thereof." Plaintiff's reply was a denial of the averments of the answer. The case was filed in the Circuit Court of Washington County, but went on change of venue to the Circuit Court of Madison County where, a jury being waived, the cause was tried and submitted to the court. The court found the issues for the plaintiff and by its judgment and decree declared plaintiff to be "the owner of and vested with fee simple title to" the real estate described in the petition and that "defendant has no right, title, ... or estate" therein. Defendant has appealed from the judgment.

Defendant White resided in Iron County. He owned a tract of land in Washington County bounded on the west by a public road known as the Caledonia Road. Cedar Creek runs in a general easterly direction. From the crossing of Cedar Creek, the Caledonia Road, as it formed the boundary of White's land, ran southwest, thence south for a short distance, curved to the east and then toward the southwest. Missouri State Highway 21 was constructed and the Caledonia Road abandoned as a public road. The State highway (hereafter referred to merely as the highway) along and near White's land ran straight north and south. Following the highway, from south to north, it intersects and crosses the Caledonia Road (which we will refer to as the road) at or near the southwest corner of White's land, continues straight north for 813 feet and again intersects the road, from that point what had been the road was covered by the highway for a distance of 224 feet, then the course of the road emerges from the highway and runs northeast to its former crossing of Cedar Creek, from which point we commenced, supra, tracing the general southerly meanderings of the road as forming the western boundary of the White land. The highway continues, from the point where the course of the road emerges and runs to the northeast, straight north across Cedar Creek. Thus two small, separate parcels of land were left between the highway and the road, the boundary of White's land; one, referred to by the parties in their testimony as a "strip of land," between the highway on the west and the curve of the road from the point where the highway intersects the road at or near the southwest corner of White's land and the point 813 feet north where the highway again intersects the road. This strip of land continued about one and one-half acres and there was a building on it. Referring to our former statement, supra, it will be seen that from this last-mentioned point the highway covers the road and would form the west boundary of the White land for a distance of 224 feet to the point where, as above stated, the road emerges from the highway and runs northeast to its former Cedar Creek crossing (presumably the northwest corner of the White land), thereby forming the other parcel of land between White's land and the highway, a triangular parcel of land, bounded by the highway, the road, and Cedar Creek, and containing between "½ and ¾ of an acre." There was no building on this parcel of land. This triangular shaped parcel of land is the land described in the petition by courses and distances and title to which is in controversy in this case.

Plaintiff, Meinhardt, "moved to Missouri from Mississippi" in February, 1928. Some few months prior thereto, the date is not stated, Meinhardt had purchased the tract of land west of and adjoining the White land. The description in the deed to Meinhardt fixed the abandoned Caledonia Road as the east boundary of the land conveyed to him. Thus, and it is not disputed, the Caledonia Road was the boundary between the Meinhardt and White land. The highway had been completed at that time and it is admitted that, by the deed to him, Meinhardt became the owner of, and acquired title to, the two intervening parcels of land between the road and the highway, that is, both the triangular parcel of land and the strip of land, above described, between White's land and the highway.

[1] As first stated this is an action by Meinhardt against White to quiet title to the triangular parcel of land and it is admitted that Meinhardt has title to, and is the owner of, this parcel unless it is the land described in and conveyed by a quitclaim deed from Meinhardt and wife to White on March 19, 1928. The consideration for the deed is stated therein, and admitted, to have been $35. The deed conveys, "the following described Lots, Tracts, or Parcels of land, lying, being and situate in the County of Washington and State of Missouri, to-wit: A strip of land lying East of State Highway No. 21 and just South of Cedar Creek and bound on the East by the old roadbed. This is all the land now owned by the grantors East of the Highway and contains one acre, more or less. Grantors reserve the right to remove building from land."

It will be noted that while the description does not specify the section, township or range it does describe with apparent certainty a "strip of land," upon which a building was, at the time, located, situate in Washington County, and described by reference to Cedar Creek, State Highway No. 21 and the "old roadbed." Where it is apparent upon its face that the description contained in the deed is impossible and that such a tract of land could not exist or that it is so contradictory, inconsistent, or uncertain that the location and identity of the land is impossible of determination a patent ambiguity exists and extrinsic or parol...