Meka Const. Co. v. Village Mall of Port Orange, Ltd.
| Decision Date | 02 May 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 84-771,84-771 |
| Citation | 469 So.2d 838,10 Fla. L. Weekly 1081 |
| Parties | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 1081 MEKA CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, etc., Appellant, v. VILLAGE MALL OF PORT ORANGE, LTD., etc., Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Michael B. Jones of Stanley, Harmening, Lovett & Livingston, Orlando, for appellant.
Emery H. Rosenbluth, Jr., of Subin, Shams, Rosenbluth & Moran, P.A., Orlando, for appellee.
This is an appeal from a non-final order of the Volusia County Circuit Court which grants appellee's motion to transfer venue to the circuit court in Orange County. 1 Appellant submits that the lower court erred in transferring venue of this action to foreclose a mechanic's lien to a county other than that where the property subject to the lien is located. We affirm.
According to the allegations of the complaint, appellee engaged appellant as general contractor to provide labor, material and equipment for the construction of a shopping mall on appellee's property in Volusia County. The contract between the parties is attached to the complaint. Article 7.5 of the agreement provides for venue of any litigation between the parties, arising from or pertaining to their contract, in the Orange County Circuit Court:
Any legal proceedings of any nature brought by any part [sic] to this contract against the other party in enforcing any obligation under this contract, arising out of any matter pertaining to this contract, the work to be performed hereunder, shall be submitted to trial without jury before the circuit court of the Ninth Judicial Circuit, in and for Orange County, Florida; or if the circuit court does not have jurisdiction, then before the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida (Orlando Division).
On September 16, 1983, appellant General Contractor recorded its claim of lien in Official Records Book 2518, Page 1167, Public Records of Volusia County, Florida. Sixteen months later appellant filed the instant action for foreclosure of the lien, alleging that it has complied with all terms of the parties' contract but that there remains unpaid and owing from appellee the sum of $598,375.50. According to the complaint, $299,620 of this amount constitutes the balance due appellant for work not provided for in the contract but which the parties orally agreed appellant would perform. Appellant seeks judgment against appellee in the amount of $598,375.50 plus interest, costs and attorney fees, with a provision for forced sale of appellee's property in the event of default in payment of the judgment.
Appellee filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for improper venue and an alternative motion to transfer venue. Both motions are based on Article 7.5, quoted above, of the parties' contract. The Circuit Court for Volusia County granted appellee's motion to transfer venue to the Circuit Court for Orange County, thereby rendering moot appellee's motion to dismiss.
We affirm the order transferring venue notwithstanding that this is an action to foreclose a mechanic's lien, and therefore may affect an interest in land. Appellant's reliance on the local action rule is anachronistic. According to Trawick's Florida Practice and Procedure, § 5-5 at 49, "[a]t common law all actions were local because juries were originally witnesses and not triers of fact." It follows that when
... the jury ceased to be composed of witnesses, the reason for the local action rule ceased. Neither an in rem nor a quasi in rem action requires application of the local action rule. If the court has jurisdiction, it can determine the controversy, regardless of venue ...
Id. See also 77 Am.Jur.2d, Venue, § 2 (1975). Since the reason underlying the distinction between local and transitory actions is no longer viable, this court will not disregard an express contractual provision in favor of an outdated rule. The fact that this equitable action will not be tried to a jury reenforces our conclusion that the local action rule does not require a different result. Clearly, both the Volusia County Circuit Court and the Orange County Circuit Court have subject matter jurisdiction (i.e., the authority and power to resolve the parties' dispute) over the instant case. Art. V, § 5(b), Fla. Const.; § 26.012, Fla.Stat. (1983). A court's subject matter jurisdiction is not inhibited because of its particular venue. See Ringling Bros. Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. State, 295 So.2d 314 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974).
In Tietig v. Riccio, 451 So.2d 1016 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), the...
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Publix Super Markets, Inc. v. Cheesbro Roofing, Inc.
...only refused to retreat from or abolish this rule of law, it has most recently reaffirmed it. 7 In Meka Construction Corp. v. Village Mall of Port Orange, Ltd., 469 So.2d 838 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. denied, 480 So.2d 1295 (Fla.1985), this court held that a contractor's action to foreclose a me......
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Mechanics Laundry & Supply, Inc. v. Wilder Oil Co., Inc., 49A05-9110-CV-320
...parties who have contracted to litigate future contractual disputes in specific state counties: Meka Construction Corp. v. Village Mall of Port Orange, Ltd. (1985), Fla.App., 469 So.2d 838; Fine v. Carney Bank (1987), Fla.App., 508 So.2d 558; and Montana Wholesale Accounts Service v. Pening......
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Haws & Garrett General Contractors, Inc. of Fort Worth v. Panhandle Custom Decorators & Supply, Inc., BL-285
...where the property is located. Tietig v. Riccio, 451 So.2d 1016 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). But see Meka Construction Corporation v. Village Mall of Port Orange, Ltd., 469 So.2d 838 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985) (parties' choice of venue approved, notwithstanding suit was one to foreclose a mechanic's lien, ......
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Meka Const. Corp. v. Village Mall of Port Orange, Ltd.
...Meka Construction Corporation v. Village Mall of Port Orange Ltd. NO. 67,266 Supreme Court of Florida. DEC 11, 1985 Appeal From: 5th DCA 469 So.2d 838 Pet. for rev. ...