MelÉndez v. Autogermana Inc.

• Citation: 622 F.3d 46
• Decision Date: 12 October 2010
• Docket Number: No. 09-1804.,09-1804.
• Parties: Robert MELÉNDEZ, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. AUTOGERMANA, INC., Defendant, Appellee.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)

622 F.3d 46

Robert MELÉNDEZ, Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.AUTOGERMANA, INC., Defendant, Appellee.

No. 09-1804.

United States Court of Appeals,First Circuit.

Heard June 7, 2010.

Decided Oct. 12, 2010.

Peter John Porrata, with whom Law Offices of Peter John Porrata, was on brief for appellant.

Eduardo M. Veray-López, with whom Jesús R. Rabell-Méndez, Rabell-Méndez C.S.P., Phillip A. Escoriaza, and Zorrilla & Escoriaza Law Offices, were on brief for appellee.

Before TORRUELLA, LIPEZ, Circuit Judges, and BARBADORO, ^* District Judge.

TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge.

In this age discrimination in employment action, Plaintiff-Appellant, Robert Meléndez (Meléndez), a former BMW car salesman at the Autogermana dealership in Puerto Rico, appeals the district court's dismissal of his claim of discriminatory discharge in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (ADEA). Meléndez also challenges the district court's denial of his motions for reconsideration. In dismissing Meléndez's claim at the summary judgment stage, the district court found that Meléndez successfully established a prima facie case of discrimination, but ultimately concluded that Meléndez failed to show that Autogermana's proffered non-discriminatory reasons for dismissing him were pretexts that masked age discrimination. After careful review of the record, we affirm the district court's dismissal of Meléndez's age discrimination claim and find no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of Meléndez's motions for reconsideration.

I. Facts and Procedural History

Meléndez worked as a BMW car salesman for Defendant, Autogermana, Inc., over the course of approximately 10 years until Autogermana discharged him on July 7, 2006. Meléndez was 50 years of age at the time of his dismissal.

Throughout the course of his employment at Autogermana, Meléndez received several sales performance awards. For example, Meléndez received the Profiles in Achievement Award from BMW of North America in 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005. From 2004 to 2005, however, Meléndez also received several performance memoranda regarding his failure to meet the required sales quotas for particular months. On June 22, 2004, Meléndez received a performance warning which stated that Meléndez had failed to meet the used car sales quota of two vehicles. A second memorandum dated August 10, 2004 informed Meléndez that he had not sold the required thirteen new cars in the month of July 2004, and that he had one of the poorest sales records of the sales department staff. In 2005, Meléndez received performance warnings because he failed to meet the monthly sales quota in the months of March and April.

In March 2006, and prior to dismissing Meléndez, Autogermana adopted and implemented a new monthly sales quota. In a memorandum dated February 25, 2006, Autogermana informed its sales staff that a new monthly sales quota and payment structure would be adopted on March 1, 2006, requiring all salespersons to sell twelve new cars and one used car each month. The memorandum also informed employees that they would be required to sell at least 85% of their new car sales monthly quota, and that those who did not meet this threshold would be “subject to immediate dismissal.” Autogermana was to perform quarterly evaluations beginning on July 7, 2006. ¹

Shortly after the new sales quota was adopted, Autogermana discharged Meléndez. The letter of dismissal stated that after evaluating Meléndez's sales performance in light of the new sales quota, Autogermana had determined that Meléndez had not met the quota and was thus subject to dismissal. The letter also explained that Autogermana had evaluated Meléndez's sales performance during the prior eighteen months. On that same day, Autogermana discharged Carlos Palmero, a fellow salesperson who was approximately 32 years of age. ²

On November 16, 2007, Meléndez filed the present suit in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, claiming that he was terminated because of his age in violation of the ADEA and Puerto Rico Law 100. Autogermana moved for summary judgment. On March 17, 2009, the district court granted summary judgment in Autogermana's favor on the age discrimination claim and dismissed Meléndez's supplemental state law claim under Puerto Rico Law 100, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, §§ 146-51. The district court found that Meléndez had established a prima facie case of discrimination, but ultimately concluded that Meléndez failed to show that Autogermana's proffered non-discriminatory reason for discharging Meléndez was a pretext for age discrimination.

On March 30, 2009, Meléndez filed a motion for reconsideration of the judgment in which he also requested a stay of the judgment pending final resolution of a parallel state case, Meléndez v. Autogermana, Inc., Civil No. KPE 2007-1402(807) (P.R. Ct. of First Instance March 30, 2009), in which Meléndez claimed he was entitled to severance pay under Puerto Rico Law No. 80. ³ On April 4, 2009, Meléndez submitted a second motion for reconsideration in which he explained that the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico's trial court had issued a judgment granting him relief under Puerto Rico Law 80. Arguing that once the state-court judgment became final it would have preclusive effect on the present ADEA litigation, Meléndez requested a stay of the district court proceedings and/or judgment. Meléndez also requested leave to file an English translation of the state-court judgment. The district court denied the two motions for reconsideration on April 23, 2009. Subsequent to the district court's denial of Meléndez's first two motions for reconsideration, he filed a motion for reconsideration of the district court's April 23rd order, and requested leave to file an English translation of the state-court judgment granting him severance pay under Puerto Rico Law 80. The district court denied this third motion. Meléndez subsequently filed this timely appeal, challenging both the dismissal of his ADEA claim and the district court's denial of his motions for reconsideration.

II. Standard of Review

“We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Roman v. Potter, 604 F.3d 34, 38 (1st Cir.2010). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

III. Discussion

A. ADEA claim

The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer to take an adverse employment action against an employee who is forty years of age or older on the basis of his age. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a), 631(a). In an ADEA claim, the employee “shoulder[s] the ultimate ‘burden of proving that his years were the determinative factor in his discharge, that is, that he would not have been fired but for his age.’ ” Torrech-Hernández v. Gen. Elec. Co., 519 F.3d 41, 48 (1st Cir.2008).

Absent direct evidence of discrimination, a plaintiff-employee may avail himself of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to “prove that he would not have been fired but for his age.” Velázquez-Fernández v. NCE Foods, Inc., 476 F.3d 6, 11 (1st Cir.2007) (citation omitted). Under this framework, the plaintiff-employee must show: (1) that he was at least forty years old when he was fired; (2) that his job performance met the employer's legitimate expectations; (3) that he suffered an adverse employment action such as a firing; and (4) that the employer filled the position, thereby showing a continuing need for the services that he had been rendering. ⁴ See Vélez v. Thermo King de P.R., 585 F.3d 441, 447 (1st Cir.2009); Suárez v. Pueblo Int'l Inc., 229 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir.2000). This “prima facie showing is not especially burdensome, and once established, gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that the employer engaged in intentional age-based discrimination.” Woodman v. Haemonetics Corp., 51 F.3d 1087, 1091 (1st Cir.1995) (citations omitted).

Once the plaintiff-employee establishes a prima facie case for discrimination, the burden of production shifts to the defendant-employer to produce sufficient competent evidence to allow a rational fact-finder to conclude that a legitimate non-discriminatory reason existed for the termination. See id.; see also Vélez, 585 F.3d at 448. If the employer articulates such a non-discriminatory reason, the plaintiff-employee must then prove “that the employer's given reason ‘was pretextual’ and that the record evidence would permit a reasonable jury to infer that the real reason was ‘discriminatory animus' based on his age.” Cordero-Soto v. Island Finance, Inc., 418 F.3d 114, 119 (1st Cir.2005).

1. First stage: the prima facie case

The district court concluded that Meléndez successfully mounted a prima facie case of age discrimination. On appeal, the parties agree that Meléndez satisfies the first, third, and fourth prongs of the prima facie case. Meléndez was 50 years old at the time he parted company with his former employer, he was discharged, and Autogermana admitted it had a continuing need for Meléndez's services. ⁵ Autogermana claims, however, that Meléndez has failed to satisfy the second prong of the prima facie case as he was not meeting the company's legitimate expectations at the time of his dismissal. To support this claim, Autogermana points to Meléndez's sub-par sales performance during the eighteen months prior to his dismissal, and to his failure to meet the new sales quota during the April-June 2006 quarter. Autogermana's argument regarding the prima facie case is unavailing.

First, we cannot “consider the employer's alleged nondiscriminatory reason for taking an adverse employment action when analyzing the prima facie case.” Wexler v. White's Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 574 (6th...