Moreno–pÉrez v. Toledo–dÁvila

Citation764 F.Supp.2d 351
Decision Date04 March 2011
Docket NumberCivil 07–1863(JA).
PartiesRobert MORENO–PÉREZ, Plaintiffv.Pedro TOLEDO–DÁVILA, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Javier A. Morales–Ramos, Javier A. Morales–Ramos Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.Christian E. Pagan–Cordoliani, Maria Judith Surillo, Puerto Rico Department of Justice, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
JUSTO ARENAS, United States Chief Magistrate Judge.

This matter is before me on the defendants' motion for summary judgment, filed on December 21, 2010. (Docket No. 147.) The plaintiff filed his motion in opposition to the defendants' motion for summary judgment on December 30, 2010. (Docket No. 152.) For the reasons stated below, the defendants' motion is GRANTED as to Pedro Toledo–Dávila, Diana Marrero–Trinidad, Carmen Bruno–Pabón and José Rivera–Alicea, and DENIED as to defendants Luis R. Márquez–Martínez and Edric Medina–Laureano.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Robert Moreno–Pérez filed the current action on September 18, 2007. (Docket No. 1.) He amended his complaint on January 16, 2008. (Docket No. 3.) The defendants, Pedro Toledo–Dávila, Diana Marrero–Trinidad, Luis R. Márquez–Martínez, Carmen Bruno–Pabón and José Rivera Alicea filed a motion to dismiss on July 31, 2008. (Docket No. 24.) The initial motion was denied on August 4, 2008. (Docket No. 25.) The court gave the plaintiff leave to re-file a second amended complaint, which he did on August 12, 2008. (Docket No. 26.) The defendants filed their second pre-answer motion to dismiss on October 27, 2008. (Docket No. 30.) The court denied this motion and ordered the defendants to file their answer to the plaintiff's amended complaint. (Docket No. 31.) They did so on November 12, 2008. (Docket No. 32.)

The case was referred to me on November 13, 2008 for the initial scheduling conference, which was held on January 7, 2009. (Docket Nos. 33 & 37.) The plaintiff requested leave to amend his complaint a third time, on August 11, 2009. (Docket No. 43.) I granted this motion on September 4, 2009. (Docket No. 45.) The plaintiff filed his third amended complaint on September 11, 2009. (Docket No. 46.) The defendants submitted their amended answers to the respective complaints on January 19, 2010 and March 15, 2010. (Docket Nos. 69 & 86.)

The defendants, Pedro Toledo–Dávila, Diana Marrero–Trinidad, Carmen Bruno–Pabón, Luis R. Márquez–Martínez and José Rivera–Alicea, filed their third motion to dismiss on January 15, 2010. (Docket No. 60.) This motion was denied the same day. (Docket No. 61.) However the court, sua sponte, dismissed Diego Santos–Pabón, Edric Medina–Laureano, FNU Morales and Jane Doe “given [the] lack of service of process, as well as the fact that since 12/16/09 the case was set for trial and pretrial and no prior request to extend time for service was filed.” (Docket No. 62.) The plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of this decision on January 20, 2010. (Docket No. 77.) The defendants filed their motion in opposition on February 5, 2010. (Docket No. 81.) The case was referred to me for all further proceedings on January 19, 2010. (Docket No. 73.) I granted the plaintiff's motion on March 11, 2010, vacating the court's previous dismissal of defendants Medina and Santos. Moreno–Pérez v. Toledo–Dávila, 266 F.R.D. 46 (D.P.R.2010).

The defendants filed their first motion for summary judgment on October 4, 2010. (Docket No. 116.) In response, the plaintiff filed a Rule 56(f) motion, requesting additional discovery before submitting his motion in opposition. The plaintiff alleged that he was [unable] to adduce facts essential to file [his] opposition” because of various third parties' failure to comply with “duly served subpoenas.” (Docket No. 120, at 1.) The plaintiff requested that I compel production of these documents. (Docket No. 120, at 6–7.) The defendants filed their opposition to plaintiff's Rule 56(f) motion on October 21, 2010, claiming that plaintiff was not entitled to the contested documents “after three years of litigation[.] (Docket No. 128, at 4.) I ordered an in camera inspection of the contested documents on November 24, 2010, with the scheduled inspection occurring on December 7, 2010. (Docket No. 137.) I made my ruling on these contested documents on December 7, 2010, restricting the discovery to some of the administrative material. (Docket No. 143.)

Defendants Toledo, Marrero, Márquez, Bruno, Rivera and Medina filed the present motion on December 21, 2010. (Docket No. 147.) The defendants also filed a motion to withdraw the previously filed motion for summary judgment, dated October 4, 2010. (Docket No. 151.) The plaintiff filed his response in opposition on December 30, 2010. (Docket No. 152.)

The plaintiff names the following parties as defendants: Diego Santos–Pabón, Edric Medina–Laureano, John and Jane Does C–Z, Pedro Toledo, Luis R. Márquez–Martínez, Sergeant FNU Morales, Diana Marrero, Carmen Bruno, José Rivera–Alicea, and Insurance Companies A–Z. (Docket No. 46, at 1.) As is relevant in this motion, Pedro Toledo–Dávila (Toledo) is the Superintendent of the Puerto Rico Police Department. Luis R. Márquez–Martínez (“Márquez”) is the captain-in-charge of the relevant precinct in this case. Diana Marrero–Trinidad (“Marrero”), Carmen Bruno–Pabón (“Bruno”), and José Rivera–Alicea (“Rivera” and collectively “Investigatory Officers”) are considered “investigatory officers” by the plaintiff. Finally, Edric Medina–Laureano (“Medina”) is the police officer whom the plaintiff alleges was involved in his assault.

The plaintiff seeks damages under several theories of liability. First, he seeks to enforce his federal rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff claims violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the statute. (Docket No. 46, at 21–22, ¶¶ 88–93.) He also brings a claim of supervisory liability against Toledo and Márquez. (Docket No. 46, at 26–27, ¶¶ 114–18.) Finally, the plaintiff brings a claim for “failure to intervene” against “Jane Does C–Z.” (Docket No. 46, at 22–23, ¶¶ 94–97.)

The plaintiff also brings claims under Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5141. Under that statute, he alleges assault and battery against Santos and Medina. (Docket No. 46, at 25, ¶ 108.) Additionally, he brings a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Finally, the plaintiff presents a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, alleging conspiracy to interfere with his civil rights. (Docket No. 46, at 25, ¶ 105.) In their answer to the third amended complaint, defendants deny all ten counts. (Docket No. 69, at 8–13, ¶¶ 88–125 (dated January 19, 2010); Docket No. 86, at 8–12, ¶¶ 88–125 (dated March 25, 2010).)

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following is the plaintiff's account of the events that bore this lawsuit. During the midnight hours of February 3, 2007, the plaintiff found himself in need of police assistance. (Docket No. 46, at 14, ¶ 36.) The plaintiff waived down the first police car that came into view. (Docket No. 46, at 14, ¶ 37.) Three officers, allegedly identified as Santos, Medina and Jane Doe C, emerged and, instead of coming to his assistance, “brutally assaulted and battered [ ] him. (Docket No. 46, at 14, ¶¶ 38–39.) While this occurred [s]everal other [p]olice cars ... arrived and stood by as the assault on Mr. Moreno [took] place.” (Docket No. 46, at 15, ¶ 47.) After the assault, the police “did not take him to a hospital.” (Docket No. 46, at 16, ¶ 50.)

The following day, the plaintiff admitted himself to a hospital, where he was found to have incurred, among other things, elevated glucose levels, “multiple blunt trauma[,] “uncontrolled diabetes mellitus[,] and “abrasions in various parts of his body[.] (Docket No. 46, at 16, ¶¶ 52–54.) The plaintiff's pain continued, and he eventually “sought re-evaluation of his condition[,] which discovered “the presence of rib fractures.” (Docket No. 46, at 16, ¶¶ 59–60.)

The plaintiff alleges that he has suffered, and continues to suffer, “emotional distress as a result of the assault, consisting, among others, of insomnia, recurrent thoughts of aggression, and profound anxiety.” (Docket No. 46, at 16, ¶ 62.) He also suffers, and continues to suffer, from physical maladies “in and about his body and extremities, had broken bones, suffered pain therefrom ... suffered physical handicaps ... these injuries being either permanent or continuing in nature....” (Docket No. 46, at 17, ¶ 64.) The plaintiff has also sought psychiatric treatment. (Docket No. 46, at 17, ¶ 63.)

The plaintiff has since “given information to the Police of Puerto Rico regarding th[e] incident....” (Docket No. 46, at 18, ¶ 69.) At the Precinct, Morales allegedly “refused to take the report or incident” and sent the plaintiff to another Precinct. (Docket No. 46, at 18, ¶ 71.) After “several” more such instances, “Marrero, Bruno [and] Rivera ... were allowed to interrogate [the plaintiff] and were also allowed to take photographs of the physical injuries....” (Docket No. 46, at 18, ¶¶ 72–73.) The plaintiff “fear[ed] for his safety” in this environment, and has since “request[ed] that any further involvement of his [case] be conducted outside of any police-controlled environments.” (Docket No. 46, at 18–19, ¶ 74.) The police subsequently dropped the investigation, citing the plaintiff's “lack of cooperation.” (Docket No. 46, at 20, ¶ 82.)

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Meléndez v. Autogermana, Inc., 622 F.3d 46, 49 (1st Cir.2010). The intention of summary judgment is to “pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.”...

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  • Boyle v. Barnstable Police Dep't
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
    • September 22, 2011
    ...or agreement are insufficient to survive motion to dismiss without additional factual support); see, e.g., Moreno–Perez v. Toledo–Davila, 764 F.Supp.2d 351, 358 (D.P.R.2011) (allowing summary judgment on section 1985(3) claim because “ ‘failure to allege a conspiracy’ with sufficient partic......
  • Boyle v. Barnstable Police Dep't
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
    • September 22, 2011
    ...agreement are insufficient to survive motion to dismiss without additional factual support); see, e.g., Moreno-Perez v. Toledo-Davila, 764 F.Supp.2d 351, 358 (D.P.R. 2011) (allowing summary judgment on section 1985(3) claim because "'failure to allege a conspiracy' with sufficient particula......
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    • October 3, 2011
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    ...or to exercise official responsibilities and effectively abuses the position given to him by the state." Moreno-Perez v. Toledo-Davila, 764 F.Supp.2d 351, 354 (D.P.R. 2011) (citing Martinez v. Colon, 54 F.3d 980, 986 (1st Cir. 1995)). Determining whether or not a police officer was acting u......

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