Melendez v. Johns
Decision Date | 07 March 1938 |
Docket Number | Civil 3919 |
Citation | 76 P.2d 1163,51 Ariz. 331 |
Parties | ANTONIO MELENDEZ, Petitioner, v. GARWOOD JOHNS and WAYNE BRAND, Defendant Employers, and THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ARIZONA, Respondents |
Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
APPEAL by Certiorari from an award of The Industrial Commission of Arizona. Proceeding dismissed.
Miss S V. Ross, for Petitioner.
Mr Herman Lewkowitz and Mr. Raymond R. Wein, for Respondents Garwood Johns and Wayne Brand.
This proceeding is one under the Workmen's Compensation Law. Rev. Code 1928, sec. 1391 et seq., as amended. The Industrial Commission denied Melendez compensation and dismissed his application therefor on the ground that the work he was doing when injured was not covered by the Compensation Law. The employers were Garwood Johns and Wayne Brand, according to the commission's findings. The commission is made a party as the representative of the State Compensation Fund.
On or about May 1, 1936, and after the spring lettuce season in the Salt River Valley was practically over, the employers, Johns and Brand, agreed to and did buy a lettuce field located a short distance south of Glendale for the purpose of harvesting and shipping it to the markets. This was the only transaction of the kind in which Johns and Brand had ever engaged together. Johns' business, according to his testimony, was the buying, shipping, and growing of lettuce. Brand's business was the buying in the field, harvesting and shipping of produce, including lettuce. Whether he was a grower does not appear.
Johns and Brand employed L. F. McKillip to harvest this field of lettuce for the stipulated price of 16 cents a packed out crate at the packing sheds. McKillip employed Melendez to assist in harvesting, and said he was to do anything he told him to do. There was considerable discussion at the hearing as to just what his duties were, and it was stipulated by counsel that his job was "picking lettuce." It was the duty of the pickers to follow the cutters and pick up from the ground the lettuce and put it into field crates. The work of the cutter was to cut the lettuce with a lettuce knife, and then there were the packers who packed the lettuce into the crates at the shed. While riding on a truck on the 2d of May from the field to Phoenix, Melendez suffered an injury to his hand in a collision with another automobile. At the time he was on his way to the packing shed to be paid for his day's work. The truck in which he was riding was under the control of McKillip.
There were about twenty cutters, pickers, and packers engaged in harvesting this field of lettuce.
The Industrial Commission under these facts found that Melendez was an agricultural worker not employed in the use of machinery, and denied his application for compensation, the employers not having elected to bring agricultural workers not engaged in the use of machinery under the Workmen's Compensation Law, and "ordered that said proceedings be dismissed by reason of lack of jurisdiction." A motion for a rehearing was made in due course and denied, and we are asked to review the proceeding.
The petitioner's claims, we think, may be stated to be (1) that Melendez and his coworkers were not agricultural workers. His counsel in her brief says:
"Certainly no one after reading all the evidence in this case could question that Johns and Brand had in service three or more workmen or operatives regularly employed in the same business, except agricultural workers."
(2) That the Workmen's Compensation Law as revised in the Code of 1928, sections 1418 and 1419, makes employers of agricultural workers subject to the Compensation Law, even though "not employed in the use of machinery." We will consider these points in the reverse order.
The Workmen's Compensation Law was passed in 1925, chapter 83. The relevant portions of the sections involved, and as originally passed, read as follows:
These two sections of the act of 1925 in the 1928 revision were changed to read as follows:
It will be readily conceded that the correct interpretation of the original section 44 excludes from the act employers of agricultural workers not using machinery and domestic servants, unless such employers elect to come under the law. It is equally certain that the same meaning is carried forward in the revision of that section as found in section 1418, supra. A comparison of the two sections shows some verbal changes were made, but no change in meaning. In the revision, employers of agricultural workers as designated and domestic servants are not subject to the act. Whatever may be said of changes in other sections, section 44, as revised, excludes from the act employees not working with machinery.
The next section (45) of the original act is complementary to section 44. The two sections fit into each other. The first names the employers subject to the act and the other the employees. The first excludes employers of agricultural workers not using machinery and domestic servants, and the latter likewise excludes them from the benefits of the act. The revision of section 45 into section 1419, although changing the verbiage, does not change the meaning, but in the respects now questioned takes particular pains to preserve the meaning of section 45 as originally passed. It is true, in naming who is an "employee," "workman," or "operative," the revision substitutes forthe phrase, "Every person, except agricultural laborers as designated and domestic servants in the service of any employer, as defined in subdivision 2 of Section 44," the phrase, "every person in the service of any employer subject to this article as defined in the preceding section." Sec. 1419.
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