Mell v. Minn. State Agric. Soc'y

Decision Date30 August 2021
Docket NumberFile No. 21-cv-1040 (ECT/KMM)
Citation557 F.Supp.3d 902
Parties Josianne MELL, Plaintiff, v. The MINNESOTA STATE AGRICULTURAL SOCIETY d/b/a Minnesota State Fair, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

Amy E. Boyle and Ross D. Stadheim, Halunen Law, Minneapolis, MN, for Plaintiff Josianne Mell.

Bryan J. Morben and Erin M. Edgerton Hall, Fredrikson & Byron, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for Defendant Minnesota State Agricultural Society.

OPINION AND ORDER

Eric C. Tostrud, United States District Court Judge

After she had been working at The Minnesota State Agricultural Society—which does business as the Minnesota State Fair ("the Fair")—for more than 30 years, Josianne Mell was diagnosed with cancer

. Mell underwent surgery at the recommendation of her doctor and took nearly six months off work to recover. When she returned to work without restrictions in June 2020, the Fair demoted her and eventually terminated her. Mell claims that these actions violated several federal and state statutes. The Fair has moved to dismiss Mell's complaint in its entirety.

The Fair's motion will be granted in part and denied in part. Mell has plausibly alleged that the Fair violated the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") when it refused to restore her to her prior position upon her return from medical leave, and the complaint does not establish the Fair's asserted defenses. Mell's FMLA entitlement claim may therefore proceed. Mell has not plausibly alleged that the Fair discriminated against her for taking FMLA leave, that it took adverse employment actions against her because of her disability, that it failed to reasonably accommodate her disability, or that it retaliated against her for engaging in statutorily protected activity. Her remaining claims will therefore be dismissed without prejudice.

I1

Mell has worked for the Fair in several different roles since 1983, taking on a full-time schedule in 2002. Compl. ¶ 8 [ECF No. 1]. During the time period relevant to this case, she was a finance supervisor in the Fair's Administration Department. Id. She received "positive annual performance reviews" and had no documented instances of discipline. Id. ¶ 9.

In late December 2019, Mell was diagnosed with cancer

. Id. ¶ 11. She scheduled a surgical procedure for January 14, 2020, and her doctor told her she would need to take "at least eight weeks off from work for chemotherapy and related recovery." Id. On December 30, she submitted a leave request to her supervisor at the Fair, Patrick Schoen. Id. ¶¶ 10, 12; Edman Decl., Ex. A at 2 [ECF No. 18-1].2 Schoen retroactively approved the leave request on January 21, after Mell had her surgery. Compl. ¶ 12; Edman Decl., Ex. A at 10. As of that initial approval, Mell was to return to work on March 10. Compl. ¶ 12; Edman Decl., Ex. A at 10.

Mell went through with the January 14 surgery and soon discovered "that she needed more time off to recover." Compl. ¶ 13. She requested a four-week extension of her leave, and the Fair approved that request on March 18. Id. ¶ 14. The approval letter informed her that she would "exhaust all 12 weeks of [her] leave entitlement under the Family and Medical Leave Act on April 8, 2020." Edman Decl., Ex. B at 19.

This is when miscommunications between Mell and the Fair seem to have begun. At first, a fitness-for-duty certification from Mell's physician indicated that Mell would not be able to return to work until June 22, 2020. Edman Decl., Ex. C; see Compl. ¶ 16. In early April, Mell told another Fair supervisor, Debbie Edman, that her physician had released her to work without restrictions on April 13, 2020. Compl. ¶ 15; see Edman Decl., Ex. D. Edman said that she was "surprised" by this and "needed to speak with legal counsel." Compl. ¶ 15.

Shortly after this conversation, Edman and Schoen called Mell to ask why the doctor had changed her return-to-work date. Id. ¶ 16. When Mell replied that she "did not want to lose her job and health insurance," Schoen told her to change her return date back to June 22 "because of the COVID-19 pandemic." Id. Mell did so, requesting additional leave through that date. Id. ¶ 17; see Edman Decl., Ex. E. The Fair approved her request effective April 29. Compl. ¶ 17.3

On June 19, Mell submitted an updated fitness-for-duty certification confirming that her doctor had released her to work without restrictions starting June 22. Compl. ¶ 19; see Edman Decl., Ex. F. According to the job description attached to this certification (which was meant to be used as a reference when determining Mell's work restrictions), Fair employees were expected to take on additional duties due to the "cancellation of the 2020 fair." Edman Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. F at 35. These included "[p]hysical activity such as[ ] maintenance, care and upkeep of plants, flowers, [and] garden areas"; working in an environment with "hazardous substances" and "heat/cold"; and "heavy lifting (up to 50 pounds)." Id. , Ex. F at 35.

Mell attempted to return to her desk job on June 23, 2020. Compl. ¶ 20. In a meeting that day, Schoen and Edman informed her that, going forward, she would be "assigned ‘special projects’ [as] a Floating Laborer," and Schoen would assume "most of her job duties." Id. The Fair soon cut her hours to part time, forcing her to pay for a portion of her health insurance. Id. ¶ 21. Over the next few months, Mell performed primarily manual labor, often in the Fair's greenhouse, where temperatures exceeded ninety degrees and sometimes caused her to vomit from the heat. Id. ¶ 22.

Finally, on October 6, Schoen and Edman told Mell that she would be terminated, with her last day scheduled for October 30. Id. ¶ 23. The Fair offered her a separation agreement which would have required her, among other things, to waive a number of legal claims in exchange for a severance payment. Edman Decl., Ex. G. Mell did not sign the agreement. Compl. ¶ 23.

Mell filed this lawsuit on April 23, 2021, about six months after her termination. ECF No. 1. She asserts the following claims: (1) disability discrimination under the Minnesota Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), Minn. Stat. § 363A.08, subd. 2 ; (2) failure to provide a reasonable accommodation for a disability under the MHRA, Minn. Stat. § 363A.08, subd. 6 ; (3) reprisal under the MHRA, Minn. Stat. § 363A.15 ; (4) interference with her right to be restored to her prior position under the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. § 2615 ; and (5) discrimination under the FMLA. Compl. ¶¶ 24–52. For relief, she seeks a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, back pay, front pay, compensatory damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs. Compl. at 11. The Fair moved to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. ECF No. 12.

II

In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept as true all of the factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Gorog , 760 F.3d at 792. Although the factual allegations need not be detailed, they must be sufficient to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level ...." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (citation omitted). The complaint must "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

At the pleading stage, a plaintiff raising a discrimination or retaliation claim "need not plead facts establishing a prima facie case[.]" Warmington v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Minn. , 998 F.3d 789, 796 (8th Cir. 2021) ; see also Hager v. Ark. Dep't of Health , 735 F.3d 1009, 1016 (8th Cir. 2013). "However, the ‘elements of the prima facie case are [not] irrelevant to a plausibility determination in a discrimination suit.’ " Warmington , 998 F.3d at 796 (quoting Blomker v. Jewell , 831 F.3d 1051, 1056 (8th Cir. 2016) ). Rather, the allegations in the complaint must " ‘give plausible support to the reduced prima facie requirements that arise under McDonnell Douglas ,’ which in turn ‘reduces the facts needed to be pleaded under Iqbal .’ " Wilson v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs. , 850 F.3d 368, 372 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Littlejohn v. City of New York , 795 F.3d 297, 310, 316 (2d Cir. 2015) ). In other words, the elements of the prima facie case are "part of the background against which a plausibility determination should be made." Blomker , 831 F.3d at 1056 (citation omitted).

III

Start with Mell's FMLA claims. "The FMLA entitles eligible employees to twelve weeks of unpaid leave during a twelve-month period for serious medical conditions, and makes it unlawful for employers to interfere with, restrain, or deny employees exercising or attempting to exercise their rights to FMLA leave." Evans v. Coop. Response Ctr., Inc. , 996 F.3d 539, 548 (8th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). Specifically, § 2615(a) of the statute, which provides the basis for Mell's claims, reads:

(a) Interference with rights
(1) Exercise of rights
It shall be unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under this subchapter.
(2) Discrimination
It shall be unlawful for any employer to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any individual for opposing any practice made unlawful by this subchapter.

29 U.S.C. § 2615(a).

Our Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals "has recognized three types of claims arising under these two subsections. The first type, arising under § 2615(a)(1), occurs where an employer refuses to authorize leave under the FMLA or takes other action to avoid responsibilities under the Act." Pulczinski v. Trinity Structural Towers,...

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