Warmington v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Minn.

• Decision Date: 24 May 2021
• Docket Number: No. 20-1907,20-1907
• Citation: 998 F.3d 789
• Parties: Joanna WARMINGTON, Plaintiff - Appellant v. BOARD OF REGENTS OF the UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, Defendant - Appellee
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

998 F.3d 789

Joanna WARMINGTON, Plaintiff - Appellant

v.BOARD OF REGENTS OF the UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, Defendant - Appellee

No. 20-1907

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: February 16, 2021

Filed: May 24, 2021

Christopher David Anderson, Ely, MN, Daniel McGraw, McGraw Law Firm, Lake Elmo, MN, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Carrie Ryan Gallia, Timothy Joseph Pramas, University of Minnesota, Office of the General Counsel, Minneapolis, MN, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before LOKEN, COLLOTON, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

BENTON, Circuit Judge.

Joanna Warmington resigned from the University of Minnesota Duluth under threat of imminent termination. She sued the Board of Regents of the University of Minnesota, asserting the University constructively terminated her and subjected her to a hostile work environment. The district court¹ dismissed her complaint for failing to plausibly plead the essential elements of her claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) . Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.

I.

Joanna Warmington was the head coach of the women's cross-country and track-and-field teams at the University of Minnesota Duluth for nine years. She resigned in 2018, after the University threatened to terminate her following an outside-law-firm's investigation into her alleged misconduct. Student-athletes had reported to the University that, among other things, she made unwanted sexual comments, engaged in unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature, and discussed their weight and diet.

Warmington sued, asserting the University violated her rights under Titles VII and IX and the Equal Pay Act. She claims it constructively terminated her on the basis of her sex, using the misconduct allegations as pretext. She pleads she was generally treated differently than other coaches and athletes, and terminated for behavior that was commonplace. She also claims the University subjected her to a hostile work environment on account of her sex. She pleads that other coaches and staff insulted her and made sexual comments and gestures.

The district court dismissed her complaint. Warmington v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Minnesota , 455 F. Supp. 3d 871 (D. Minn. 2020). The court ruled she did not plausibly plead a claim for sex discrimination, permitting no reasonable inference that the University terminated her because of her sex. The court also ruled she did not plausibly plead a claim for hostile work environment, as the incidents were not severe enough to meet the pleading requirements.² Warmington appeals.

II.

This court reviews de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss. In re Pre-Filled Propane Tank Antitrust Litig. , 860 F.3d 1059, 1063 (8th Cir. 2017) (en banc).

To survive a motion to dismiss, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A claim is facially plausible where the plaintiff "pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. ; Wilson v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs. , 850 F.3d 368, 371 (8th Cir. 2017) (same). This standard "asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Ashcroft , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (the plausibility standard is not akin to a "probability requirement"). The complaint must give the defendant "fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Ring v. First Interstate Mortg., Inc. , 984 F.2d 924, 928 (8th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted).

This court "construe[s] [a] complaint liberally." Cook v. George's, Inc. , 952 F.3d 935, 938 (8th Cir. 2020) (alterations added) (internal quotations omitted). The complaint "should be read as a whole, not parsed piece by piece to determine whether each allegation, in isolation, is plausible." Wilson , 850 F.3d at 371 (citation omitted).

While a plaintiff "need not set forth ‘detailed factual allegations,’ or ‘specific facts’ that describe the evidence to be presented, the complaint must include sufficient factual allegations to provide the grounds on which the claim rests." Gregory v. Dillard's, Inc. , 565 F.3d 464, 473 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc), quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, and Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (per curiam). The court is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Ashcroft , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Legal conclusions "must be supported by factual allegations." Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. A district court, therefore, is "not required to divine the litigant's intent and create claims that are not clearly raised, and it need not conjure up unpled allegations to save a complaint." Gregory , 565 F.3d at 473 (internal quotations omitted). But when there are "well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Ashcroft , 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

At the pleading phase, a plaintiff need not plead facts establishing a prima facie case for their Title VII claim. See Wilson , 850 F.3d at 372 ; Ring , 984 F.2d at 926–27. In Swierkiewicz , the Supreme Court "negated any need to plead a prima facie case in the discrimination context and emphasized that the prima facie model is an evidentiary, not a pleading, standard." Blomker v. Jewell , 831 F.3d 1051, 1056 (8th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted), citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema , 534 U.S. 506, 512, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002). Because the prima facie model is not a pleading standard, "there is no need to set forth a detailed evidentiary proffer in a complaint." Id. (citation omitted). See Ring , 984 F.2d at 926–27.

However, the "elements of the prima facie case are [not] irrelevant to a plausibility determination in a discrimination suit." Blomker , 831 F.3d at 1056 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). The allegations in a complaint must " ‘give plausible support to the reduced prima facie requirements that arise under McDonnell Douglas ,’ which in turn ‘reduces the facts needed to be pleaded under Iqbal .’ " Wilson , 850 F.3d at 372 (first emphasis added), quoting Littlejohn v. City of New York , 795 F.3d 297, 310, 312 (2d Cir. 2015). See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). The elements are "part of the background against which a plausibility determination should be made." Blomker , 831 F.3d at 1056, quoting Rodriguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodriguez , 711 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2013) ("This approach is fully consistent with Swierkiewicz ’s dictates"). The elements of a prima facie case "may be used as a prism to shed light upon the plausibility of the claim." Id. (citation omitted). Through this prism, the complaint "must include sufficient factual allegations to provide the grounds on which the claim rests ." Id. (emphasis in original), quoting Gregory , 565 F.3d at 473.

A.

Warmington argues the district court erred in dismissing her Title VII sex discrimination claim for failing to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.

Warmington alleges the University's stated reason for terminating her was pretext for discrimination, basing her sex discrimination claim on indirect evidence.³ Without direct evidence, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of sex discrimination by showing: (1) she belongs to a protected group; (2) she was qualified for her former job; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the circumstances give rise to an inference of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas , 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817. See also Ring , 984 F.2d at 926. Once a prima facie case is established, the defendant must articulate a "non-discriminatory reason for the allegedly discriminatory action." Tuttle v. Henry J. Kaiser Co. , 921 F.2d 183, 186 (8th Cir. 1990). See McDonnell Douglas , 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817. If the defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff must then show "the articulated reason is mere pretext for a discriminatory motive." Tuttle , 921 F.2d at 186. See generally Blomker , 831 F.3d at 1056 (using the elements of a prima facie case "as a prism to shed light upon the plausibility of the claim").

Warmington plausibly pled that she belongs to a protected group, was qualified for her former job, and suffered an adverse employment action, a termination. See McDonnell Douglas , 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817. She does not, however, plausibly plead that the circumstances of her termination give rise to an inference of discrimination. Her pleading that the University terminated her on the basis of her sex is a legal conclusion. This court is not bound by this conclusion, which is not supported by the factual allegations in her complaint. See Ashcroft , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

Warmington's factual allegations give rise to the inference that she was treated differently than other coaches and athletes. She pled that unlike herself, "other coaches" were not terminated for disciplining athletes and giving them personal advice on their mental health and sexuality. She pled that the University did not restrict "any other coach" from discussing nutrition and body weight with athletes—a third alleged reason for her termination. She pled that while she was terminated for her sexual expression, other coaches and athletes (including other women) were free to practice in running bras or revealing shorts and be sexually expressive. She pled that other coaches and administrators, "mostly male," were not terminated for making sexual or offensive comments. She pled that the male coaches for the men's...