Mello v. K-Mart Corp.
Decision Date | 18 March 1985 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 83-3434-C. |
Citation | 604 F. Supp. 769 |
Parties | David MELLO and Phyllis Mello, Plaintiffs, v. K-MART CORPORATION, Shinn Fu of America, Inc.: and Shinn Fu Auto Supply Co., Ltd., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Roger E. Hughes, Jr., Latti Associates, Boston, Mass., for plaintiffs.
James P. Whitters, III, Esq. Gaston Snow & Ely Bartlett, Boston, Mass., for Shinn Fu of America, Inc., and Shinn Fu Auto Supply Co. & K-Mart.
This is a diversity action brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 by David and Phyllis Mello, residents of Massachusetts, against K-Mart Corporation ("K-Mart"), Shinn Fu Auto Supply Co., Ltd. ("Shinn Fu Auto"), and Shinn Fu of America, Inc. ("Shinn Fu America"). All three defendant corporations are organized under the laws of states other than Massachusetts and have their principal places of business in cities outside of Massachusetts.
Plaintiff David Mello alleges that he sustained severe injuries as a result of using a six ton hydraulic jack designed, manufactured, and marketed by defendants. Plaintiff's wife, Phyllis Mello, claims that her husband's injuries caused her to suffer loss of consortium. According to the complaint, David Mello was hurt on or about November 7, 1982, while plaintiffs were vacationing in Tennessee. At the time of the accident, Mello was using a hydraulic jack to repair an automobile. He had purchased this jack the previous day at a K-Mart store in Goodlettsville, Tennessee.
The case comes before the Court on three motions filed by the respective defendants. Shinn Fu Auto seeks to have the case against it dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2);1 Shinn Fu of America moves for summary judgment; and K-Mart requests partial summary judgment.
In a diversity action, the jurisdiction of this Court over a foreign corporate defendant is determined by the provisions of the Massachusetts long-arm statute, M.G.L. c. 223A, § 3. E.g., Pulson v. American Rolling Mill Co., 170 F.2d 193, 194 (1st Cir.1948); Marketing & Distribution Resources, Inc. v. Paccar, Inc., 460 F.Supp. 990, 991 (D.Mass.1978). Although the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has construed the state long-arm statute as "an assertion of jurisdiction over the person to the limits allowed by the Constitution of the United States," "Automatic" Sprinkler Corp. of America v. Seneca Foods Corp., 361 Mass. 441, 443, 280 N.E.2d 423 (1972), the court has nevertheless cautioned that "G.L. c. 223A, § 3 asserts jurisdiction over the person to the constitutional limit only when some basis for jurisdiction enumerated in the statute has been established." Good Hope Industries, Inc. v. Ryder Scott Co., 378 Mass. 1, 6, 389 N.E.2d 76 (1979). This Court must therefore engage in a two step analysis: "(1) is the assertion of jurisdiction authorized by statute, and (2) if authorized, is the exercise of jurisdiction under State law consistent with basic due process requirements mandated by the United States Constitution?" Id. at 5-6, 389 N.E.2d 76.
Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving that this Court's exercise of jurisdiction over Shinn Fu Auto is permissible under both Massachusetts law and the federal Constitution, Droukas v. Divers Training Academy, Inc., 375 Mass. 149, 151, 376 N.E.2d 548 (1978); Walsh v. National Seating Co., 411 F.Supp. 564, 568 (D.Mass. 1976). Accordingly, plaintiffs argue that § 3(d) of the long-arm statute provides the requisite state authorization. § 3(d) declares:
M.G.L. c. 223A, § 3(d).
Plaintiffs maintain that they have suffered tortious injury in Massachusetts because David Mello has incurred medical expenses and endured pain and suffering in the state, and Phyllis Mello has experienced loss of consortium in the Commonwealth.
These contentions are meritless on the jurisdictional problem. David Mello purchased the hydraulic jack in Tennessee, and he was injured in Tennessee. The fact that he returned to Massachusetts for treatment and recovery cannot alter where the injury occurred. Judge Tauro's insightful analysis in Walsh v. National Seating Co., Inc., 411 F.Supp. 564 (D.Mass.1976) addresses this very issue. Walsh, a resident of Massachusetts, was injured by a defective bus seat while he was operating a motor coach in Maine. He and his wife brought suit in Massachusetts against the seat's manufacturer, an out-of-state corporation. Explaining why § 3(d) of the long-arm statute did not authorize the court to exercise jurisdiction over the corporate defendant, Judge Tauro stated:
Plaintiff asks too much from the phrase "tortious injury." While it is undoubtedly true that plaintiff and his wife suffered in Massachusetts this does not mean they were injured here. They suffered here as a result of an injury that occurred in Maine. To accept plaintiff's theory would mean that parties could choose their court by choosing their hospital or place of recuperation.
Because the Mellos, like the Walshes, have experienced no tortious injury in Massachusetts, I rule that § 3(d) of the state long-arm statute provides no basis for this Court's exercise of jurisdiction over Shinn Fu Auto.
Apparently anticipating the Court's ruling with respect to the applicability of § 3(d), plaintiffs proffer an alternative jurisdictional theory. They assert that "when the non-resident defendant has numerous contacts with the forum such that the demands of due process are satisfied, it is not necessary that the cause of action arise from or be connected with the defendants' contacts with the forum." Plaintiffs' assertion is directly contradicted by the wording of the Massachusetts long-arm statute. The statute specifies that a court may exercise jurisdiction over a foreign corporation only if the cause of action arises from some action or event which took place within the state. As noted above, no aspect of the incident on which plaintiffs base their claims transpired in Massachusetts.
Because there is no provision of the long-arm statute on which to predicate jurisdiction, the Court need not reach the question of whether plaintiffs' assertion is constitutionally sound. Singer v. Piaggio & C., 420 F.2d 679, 681 (1st Cir.1969).2 I therefore rule that Shinn Fu Auto's motion to dismiss should be granted.
Shinn Fu America bases its motion for summary judgment on an affidavit by Peter Chi, Secretary of the Board of Shinn Fu America. Mr. Chi declares that "prior to November 7, 1982, Shinn Fu of America, Inc. made no sales of any products, including hydraulic jacks, to K-Mart." This affidavit, the corporation asserts, proves that Shinn Fu America had no connection to the jack in question, and that the company is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
To rebut Mr. Chi's statements, plaintiffs produce a copy of a letter printed on Shinn Fu America letterhead. The letter, dated November 8, 1982, summarizes the results of a business meeting apparently attended by personnel of both Shinn Fu America and K-Mart. It states in pertinent part:
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