Mellor v. Cook

Decision Date22 June 1979
Docket NumberNo. 15639,15639
Citation597 P.2d 882
PartiesPatricia MELLOR, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Mark COOK, Bryant Madsen and Kenneth Strate, Defendants and Appellants.
CourtUtah Supreme Court

Howard, Lewis & Petersen, Robert C. Fillerup, Provo, for defendants and appellants.

Nielsen, Henriod, Gottfredson & Peck, Arthur H. Nielsen, Earl J. Peck, Thomas R. Blonquist, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent.

CROCKETT, Chief Justice:

The defendants appeal from a finding that they were in contempt of court and an order imposing a fine of $200 on each, and also ordering them collectively to pay plaintiff's attorney $1,000 for his services in this proceeding. The alleged contempt was for meeting as the board of trustees of the North Sanpete County School District in violation of an order signed by a district judge that they should not do so.

The parties do not dispute as to the facts. On the 22nd day of September 1977, the plaintiff sought the aid of the district court to prevent the defendants from holding a meeting as the board of trustees in which meeting the removal of Royal N. Allred as Superintendent of Schools was to be considered. Because Hon. Don V. Tibbs the Judge of the Sixth Judicial District, was holding court in another county, request was made of the court administrator's office, who directed plaintiff to Hon. Judge David Dee of the Third District in Salt Lake City.

Upon plaintiff's ex parte application, that afternoon about 2:30 Judge Dee signed the restraining order. Thereafter at about 5:00 p. m. the complaint in the proceeding was filed in the office of the clerk of Sanpete County. About one hour later, and after the defendants had arrived to hold their meeting, they were served with the order. Shortly thereafter, their attorney Thomas R. Blonquist arrived and advised them that in his opinion the restraining order was invalid because it had not been issued pursuant to proper proceedings; and that they could go ahead with their board meeting, which advice they followed.

Consequent to the foregoing, a hearing was held before Hon. Don V. Tibbs and it was upon the basis of facts delineated above that the defendants and Mr. Blonquist were found in contempt and the penalty of which defendants complain was imposed.

The statute from which any authority for the order under attack herein must be found is Sec. 78-3-14, U.C.A.1953:

Ex parte applications from another district. A judge of the district court may, in his own district, hear any ex parte application, and make any order concerning the same, in any action or proceeding pending or about to be commenced in another judicial district, in the following cases:

(1) Upon the written request of the judge of the district in which the action or proceeding is at the time pending or is about to be commenced.

(2) When it shall be made To appear by affidavit to the satisfaction of such judge That the judge of the district court in which the action or proceeding is at the time pending or is about to be commenced Is absent from his district, or is incapacitated, or is disqualified to act therein; such Application shall be made only to the judge of the adjoining district. (Emphasis added.)

There are some basic principles which apply to a charge of contempt for disobedience of an order of court committed outside of the court's presence. 1 Inasmuch as contempt of court is punishable by sanctions which are usually regarded as criminal in nature, it is sometimes referred to as quasi-criminal. In any event, due to its serious nature, the provisions of the law relating to contempt should be carefully adhered to; and it must appear clearly that the party knew the duty imposed upon him by the court order, and that he wilfully and knowingly failed and refused to comply. 2 The foregoing is stated in awareness that there is another side of this proposition: that there should be no cavalier attitude in disregarding an order of court which is fair on its face; and that one who wilfully and knowingly presumes to do so may act at his peril.

We revert to the facts here in the light of the observations just made and consider the critical questions: was there in fact any lawful restraining order; and did the defendants' conduct constitute contempt of court. We are not here concerned with what the result may have been as to the individual defendants relying on the advice of their attorney if he had been mistaken. But under the circumstances recited herein, we are unable to see any justification for a finding that the individual defendants manifested any attitude of knowing and willful disobedience of the court order.

The conduct of attorney Blonquist presents a somewhat more serious question. Nevertheless, in accordance with the cautionary rules hereinabove recited, he is entitled to such consideration as the law affords. It is fundamental that disobedience of an...

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9 cases
  • Utah Telecomm. Open Infrastructure Agency v. Hogan
    • United States
    • Utah Court of Appeals
    • 10 Enero 2013
    ...fees are authorized as a contempt sanction when not awarded as compensation for an actual loss or injury to a party. See Mellor v. Cook, 597 P.2d 882, 884 (Utah 1979) (“[W]e are aware of no provision authorizing an additional penalty of attorney's fees.” (interpreting Utah Code Ann. § 78–32......
  • In re Inspection of Titan Tire
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • 19 Diciembre 2001
    ...the advice of counsel. As a matter of law, Titan could not have contemptuously violated the court order in this case. See Mellor v. Cook, 597 P.2d 882, 884 (Utah 1979) (no willful disobedience to support contempt by school board for holding a meeting in violation of a court order where the ......
  • Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan
    • United States
    • Utah Court of Appeals
    • 1 Abril 1994
    ...the order constitutes contempt of court." Utah Farm Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Labrum, 762 P.2d 1070, 1074 (Utah 1988) (citing Mellor v. Cook, 597 P.2d 882, 884 (Utah 1979)). Legality of Injunction Callahan argues that the preliminary injunction issued after the trial court's oral ruling in the ......
  • Jensen v. Brown
    • United States
    • Utah Supreme Court
    • 7 Diciembre 1981
    ...who was acting under a two-year-old general emergency authorization rather than a specific assignment for this case. See Mellor v. Cook, Utah, 597 P.2d 882 (1979). We find no merit in this contention. Even if the circuit judge was unauthorized, so that the temporary restraining order signed......
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