In re Inspection of Titan Tire

• Decision Date: 19 December 2001
• Docket Number: No. 99-0555.,99-0555.
• Citation: 637 N.W.2d 115
• Parties: In the Matter of the INSPECTION OF TITAN TIRE. Titan Tire Corporation, Appellant, v. Labor Commissioner of the State of Iowa, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

637 N.W.2d 115

In the Matter of the INSPECTION OF TITAN TIRE.

Titan Tire Corporation, Appellant, v. Labor Commissioner of the State of Iowa, Appellee.

No. 99-0555.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

December 19, 2001.

Gene R. La Suer and Becky S. Knutson of Davis, Brown, Koehn, Shors & Roberts, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Shauna Russell Shields, Assistant Attorney General, Gail Sheridan-Lucht, Iowa Workforce Development, Division of Labor Services, for appellee.

LAVORATO, Chief Justice.

Titan Tire Corporation (Titan) appeals from a district court order denying its motion to quash an administrative inspection warrant for Iowa Occupational Safety and Health Administration (IOSHA) inspectors to conduct a safety inspection at its plant, and allowing striking union representatives to accompany the inspectors during the inspection. In a certiorari action, Titan challenges a district court finding that it was in contempt for violating the order allowing the inspection and permitting the striking union representatives to accompany the IOSHA inspectors during the inspection. We affirm on the appeal and annul the writ in the certiorari proceeding.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

On March 19, 1999, IOSHA received a complaint from John A. Peno, president of United Steelworkers of America Local 164 (Union). The complaint listed nineteen alleged violations of the Iowa Occupational Safety and Health Act (IOSH Act) at the Titan plant in Des Moines. IOSHA is a bureau of the division of labor services of the department of workforce development, which enforces the federal occupational safety and health regulations. See Iowa Admin. Code r. 875—1.3.

In his letter accompanying the complaint, Peno explained that (1) the Union had been in an unfair labor practice strike since May 1, 1998, against Titan; (2) he had not been inside the Titan plant since the strike began; and (3) a non-striking Titan employee and a Titan supervisor, who did not wish to be identified, reported the alleged violations to him. At all times material to this case, the Union had not been decertified and was still the exclusive authorized representative of Titan workers.

Mary Bryant, IOSHA administrator, reviewed the complaint. Bryant then called Peno to clarify some of the information in it. Following that conversation, Bryant determined there were reasonable grounds to believe a violation or violations of the safety and health standards existed at Titan that threatened physical harm to employees. She instructed IOSHA inspectors Joe Sawyer and Deborah Babb to conduct a safety inspection at the Titan plant.

On March 29, 1999, Titan denied IOSHA inspectors entry to conduct an inspection without a warrant. The inspection team then sought an inspection warrant from the district court based on the application of the deputy labor commissioner. The application was supported by affidavits from Bryant and Sawyer. District Judge Paul R. Huscher granted the inspection warrant, authorizing representatives of the labor commissioner to enter Titan's premises and conduct a safety inspection of all areas of the workplace.

On the same day, the IOSHA inspectors returned to Titan to serve the warrant and inspect the plant. The inspectors told Titan that they wanted to inspect the plant, accompanied by striking Union representatives. Titan told the inspectors that they could inspect the plant, but it would not permit Union representatives to participate in the inspection. Titan cited the on-going strike and acts of violence and disruption that had accompanied the strike as its reasons for refusing entry of Union representatives. The inspectors refused to inspect the plant without Union representatives present.

The following day, Titan filed a motion to quash the inspection warrant. On April 5, IOSHA resisted the motion and filed a petition asking the district court to hold Titan in contempt for refusing to allow the inspection to proceed pursuant to the warrant.

On April 12, the IOSHA inspectors returned to Titan with the March 29 inspection warrant. Titan again refused entry based on its lawyer's statement that neither IOSHA nor Union representatives would be allowed to inspect until after the court hearing.

On April 14, Titan filed a supplement to its motion to quash, alleging that the inspection warrant lacked probable cause because it was based on stale information and hearsay. Following a hearing on April 15, District Judge Jerrold W. Jordan orally denied the motion to quash and denied IOSHA's petition for contempt. Judge Jordan authorized IOSHA to execute the inspection warrant pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 88, which meant striking Union representatives could be present during the inspection. Judge Jordan also denied Titan's oral request for a stay. The following day, the judge filed a written order incorporating his oral ruling.

On April 16, Titan appealed and requested a stay of the inspection until we could decide the merits of the appeal. Titan did not file a supersedeas bond. On the same day, IOSHA inspectors returned to the Titan plant to inspect it. Titan again refused to permit the inspection if Union representatives were allowed to participate. Titan informed the inspectors that it had appealed Judge Jordan's order and had requested a stay from our court. A Titan representative read a statement allegedly from its lawyer which indicated that Titan believed a ten-day automatic stay applied to Judge Jordan's order.

On April 19, Titan filed an "amended supplement to appeal: request for stay and emergency hearing." In its amended request, Titan agreed to permit IOSHA inspectors to conduct an inspection, but without striking Union representatives. We denied the request for a stay on April 21.

Meanwhile, on April 19, IOSHA filed a second contempt petition in the district court. The petition asked the district court to find Titan in contempt for failing to comply with Judge Jordan's April 16 order.

On April 22, Titan permitted IOSHA to inspect its plant with the participation of Union representatives. IOSHA completed the inspection without incident.

On April 28, Judge Jordan found Titan in contempt for failing to comply with his April 15 (oral) and 16 (written) order and assessed it a $500 fine. Titan filed a petition for writ of certiorari challenging Judge Jordan's contempt ruling. We granted the writ and, upon Titan's motion, consolidated Titan's appeal from the ruling on its motion to quash and its certiorari challenge to the contempt ruling.

We set out additional facts where relevant to the issues discussed.

II. Issues.

Titan challenges the district court's denial of its motion to quash on two grounds. First, Titan contends probable cause for the issuance of the inspection warrant was lacking. Second, even if there was probable cause for the warrant, the district court should not have allowed striking Union representatives to participate in the inspection.

As for the district court's contempt finding, Titan contends its actions were not willful and therefore did not rise to the level of contempt. In the alternative, Titan contends it purged itself of any contempt.

III. Inspection Warrant — Finding of Probable Cause.

A. Background.

Under section 8 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. § 657, the secretary of labor is authorized to conduct health and safety inspections of workplaces within the Act's jurisdiction. Section 8(a) gives the secretary the general power to enter and inspect workplaces to carry out the purposes of the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 657(a). Section 8(f)(1) specifically requires the secretary to conduct a "special inspection" as soon as practicable whenever the secretary receives a written employee complaint that leads the secretary reasonably to believe that a violation exists at the workplace. 29 U.S.C. § 657(f)(1). Neither provision expressly states that the secretary must secure a warrant before conducting a search.

In Camara v. Municipal Court, the Supreme Court held that an administrative search by municipal health and safety inspectors without a search warrant lacked "the traditional safeguards which the Fourth Amendment guarantees to the individual." 387 U.S. 523, 534, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1733, 18 L.Ed.2d 930, 938 (1967). To determine the existence of probable cause to issue an inspection warrant, "the need for the inspection must be weighed in terms of [the] reasonable goals of code enforcement." Id. at 535, 87 S.Ct. at 1734, 18 L.Ed.2d at 939. Probable cause "must exist if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular building." Id. at 538, 87 S.Ct. at 1736, 18 L.Ed.2d at 941.

In addressing the propriety of warrantless nonconsensual inspections under section 8(a) of OSHA, the Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment requires an administrative search warrant be obtained prior to such inspections. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311, 98 S.Ct. 1816, 1819, 56 L.Ed.2d 305, 310 (1978). Similarly, the Court indicated that the Constitution requires the secretary to obtain such a warrant for a section 8(f) inspection. Id. at 320 n. 16, 98 S.Ct. at 1824 n. 16, 56 L.Ed.2d at 316 n. 16. The Court held that OSHA was unconstitutional insofar as it purported to authorize inspections without a warrant or its equivalent. Id. at 325, 98 S.Ct. at 1827, 56 L.Ed.2d at 319.

In a footnote, the Barlow's opinion stated that "a regulation expressly providing that the Secretary could proceed ex parte to seek a warrant or its equivalent would appear to be ... within the Secretary's power...." Id. at 320 n. 15, 98 S.Ct. at 1824 n. 15, 56 L.Ed.2d at 316 n. 15. The Court's approval of such procedures meant that they passed the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Rockford Drop Forge Co. v. Donovan, 672 F.2d 626, 630 (7th Cir.1982). Shortly after Barlow's was decided, the...