Melsha v. Wickes Companies, Inc., s. C5-90-237
| Decision Date | 21 August 1990 |
| Docket Number | Nos. C5-90-237,C4-90-861,s. C5-90-237 |
| Parties | 69 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 45 Mary Jo MELSHA, Respondent, v. WICKES COMPANIES, INC., d/b/a Wickes Furniture, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Minn.Stat. § 363.071, subd. 2 (1986), the damages provision of the Human Rights Act, does not limit compensatory damages to actual damages but rather permits redress for up to three times the actual damages.
2. Minn.Stat. § 363.11 (1986), the preemption provision of the Human Rights Act, precludes recovery for tort claims supported by the same facts as pending human rights claims.
3. Absent clear error, a trial court's findings of fact will be affirmed.
Douglas A. Hedin, Minneapolis, for respondent.
Mary E. Steenson, Charles E. Lundberg, Bassford, Heckt, Lockhart, Truesdell & Briggs, Minneapolis, for appellant.
Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Atty. Gen., Tracey Evette Burton, Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, observer.
Considered and decided by GARDEBRING, P.J., and PARKER and CRIPPEN, JJ.
Respondent, an employee of appellant, was awarded $135,704 in damages resulting from appellant's sexual harassment, retaliation and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Appellant challenges the trial court's doubling of the compensatory damage award, its failure to dismiss the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, and the evidentiary support for several of its findings. We affirm the award and the findings, and reverse the failure to dismiss a claim.
Respondent Mary Jo Melsha worked as a sales consultant for appellant Wickes Furniture from October 1984 until November 1987. She was found to have suffered sexual harassment from 1984 until September 1987; the statute of limitations period, 300 days before the suit here, extended back to July 1987. Rejecting the advisory jury's special verdict finding, the trial court also found that Wickes had retaliated against respondent after she complained to Wickes and after she subsequently contacted the Human Rights Department, and that she had been constructively discharged.
Coinciding with the advisory jury's special verdict, the trial court awarded the state a $10,000 civil penalty and awarded respondent $31,602 in compensatory damages, $50,000 in past emotional distress damages, and $2500 for future medical expenses. The trial court differed from the jury in finding respondent was also entitled to $20,000 in future emotional distress damages, and in choosing to double the compensatory damages.
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in doubling the past actual damage award?
2. Did the trial court err in not dismissing respondent's claim for the negligent infliction of emotional distress?
3. Are the trial court's findings of fact clearly erroneous, i.e. unsupported by the evidence in the record?
1. Appellant disputes the doubling of the past actual damages. Minn.Stat. § 363.071, subd. 2 (1986) permits compensatory damages in an amount up to three times the actual damages sustained * * * [and] damages for mental anguish or suffering and reasonable attorney's fees, in addition to punitive damages in an amount not more than $6,000.
The statute reflects the strong legislative purpose for full and adequate compensation of victims, and the realization that this may exceed the actual damage sustained. It is within the discretion of the trial court to determine whether, in the interests of justice, the actual damages must be multiplied in order for a victim to be fully compensated.
The general purpose of the Minnesota Human Rights Act, § 363.01-.15, is to redress the wrongs suffered by the victims of discrimination. Treble damages are a fixed multiple of the compensatory damages. And, the degree of culpability of the employer need not be considered in awarding treble damages.
The compensatory nature of treble damages under § 363.071 is [clear.] It labels the treble damages as "compensatory damages," and it * * *, section 363.071 also provides for punitive damages in addition to treble damages.
Convent of the Visitation School v. Continental Casualty Co., 707 F.Supp. 412, 416 (D.Minn.1989) (citations omitted). Here the trial court specifically addressed the need for doubling of some damages to give respondent adequate redress. The court observed that respondent suffered a long period of helplessness, along with efforts to cope without giving up her job, due to ongoing incidents of abuse. On its findings of wrongdoing and damage, the trial court did not err in deciding to double actual compensatory damages of $31,602.
Although it was an unnecessary consideration, the trial court's order and memorandum indicate that it did take into account the employer's culpability when it doubled the damages. This court addressed a similar situation in State by Cooper v. Moorhead State University, 455 N.W.2d 79 (Minn.App.1990), where an administrative law judge awarded punitive damages. The trebling of actual damages was based on "the same factors as the law requires with respect to punitive damages." Id. at 84. The award was affirmed:
[E]ven if the administrative law judge improperly used the punitive damage standard for awarding treble compensatory damages, such standard is actually higher than necessary, and was therefore not prejudicial.
Id. Thus, in the earlier view of this court, punitive intent does not invalidate trebling actual damages where additional punitive damages have been awarded. Here no punitive damages were awarded, and actual compensatory damages were doubled. There was no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to double the actual damage determination.
2. Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in not dismissing respondent's claim for the negligent infliction of emotional distress. This did not affect the award, because the trial court declined to duplicate the emotional distress damages assessed under the human rights claim.
Respondent alleged no separate facts to support her claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress. Appellant contends that this claim is therefore barred on legal grounds, because the Minnesota Human Rights Act expressly preempts recovery under an alternate claim which is supported by the same facts. "[A]s to acts declared unfair by sections 363.03 and 363.123, the procedure herein provided shall, while pending, be exclusive." Minn.Stat. § 363.11 (1986). The alleged sexual harassment falls under section 363.03, and these remedial proceedings preclude other tort claims premised on the same facts. As this court has observed before,
[t]he balanced legislative scheme for handling Human Rights Act claims cannot be implemented if aggrieved parties can circumvent...
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