Melton v. Amar
| Decision Date | 04 January 1961 |
| Docket Number | No. 8905,8905 |
| Citation | 358 P.2d 855,83 Idaho 99 |
| Parties | Melvin M. MELTON and Lena M. Melton, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Fidele H. AMAR and Barbara Amar, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Sherman F. Furey, Jr., Furey & Furey, Salmon, Davison, Davison & Copple, Boise, for appellants.
Charles Herndon, Salmon, Ralph Breshears, Boise, for respondents.
This is an action for rescission of a land sale contract. Defendants, in their affirmative defense and counterclaim, seek to avoid specific performance by way of reformation, or, in the alternative, a rescission of the contract and return of the consideration paid by them.
Respondents seek to recover possession of real property known as 'Williams Lake Ranch,' which is located in Lemhi County, Idaho, it having been sold under installment contract to the appellants. The Williams Lake Ranch property described in the contract of sale is mountainous in character, and was described by legal subdivisions, with no reference to the number of acres. Located thereon are a ranch house by the Salmon River, cabins and cafe at Williams Lake, and other miscellaneous structures built to accommodate fishermen and other guests.
By the contract of November 12, 1957, respondents agreed to sell to appellants the ranch property and personal property situated upon the ranch for the sum of $100,000. The contract expressly stated that time was of the essence. Appellants paid $29,000 upon the execution of the contract, and thereafter agreed to pay $10,000 on or before December 16 of the years 1958, 1959, 1960, and 1961, and further agreed to assume a mortgage in the sum of $5,913.12. The contractual balance of $25,086.88 plus interest at the rate of six per cent per annum from December 1, 1957, was to be paid in annual installments of $3,500, commencing December 16, 1962, this balance plus interest to be paid on or before December 16, 1966. No interest was to be paid by the appellants under the contract except interest on the sum of $25,086.88.
Respondents brought this action after appellants made payment of $2,926.50 on January 7, 1959, in lieu of the $10,000 payment due December 16, 1958.
Appellants formerly lived in La Puente, California; they learned the ranch was for sale through a friend in Los Angeles. While on vacation in Idaho during July, 1957, they visited respondent Melton, who showed them the property. Appellants made about four trips to the ranch before signing the contract November 12, 1957. Before the contract was entered into, respondent Melton had represented to appellants that the ranch had an acreage of 900 acres. Appellants assert they bought the ranch not only as a 'dude ranch' but also as a cattle ranch; therefore, the total acreage and the acreage of hay land was important to that business.
During the trial, respondent Melton testified that there were 888 acres of deeded land in the ranch. The contract provided that no 'Taylor grazing' or forest area grazing privileges were used in connection with the property. Apellants charge that they had attempted to secure a location of the corners and exterior boundaries of the ranch located through a surveyor, and by artifice the respondents caused the surveyor to abandon the project bofore it was completed. It was proved that the ranch consisted of 799.72 acres of land.
By way of demonstrating that they had not proceeded fraudulently, respondents introduced evidence to show: first, that they had relied upon the statements of others concerning the number of acres in the ranch; second, that they were not aware of appellants' intention to use the ranch for cattle raising; third, that appellants made their own independent investigation of the premises and had the assistance of others to determine the size of the property and hadn't relied upon any representation of respondents.
Appellants also urge that certain of the irrigated lands were smaller in size than had been represented by respondent Melton. Appellants assert that respondent Melton represented that the alfalfa field contained 70 acres, whereas it appears there are about 37 acres. Respondent Melton's answer to this variance was that he was merely relating information that someone else had stated to him. Appellants counter with the showing that this ground had been leased and a settlement made between the tenant and respondent Melton on the basis of 27 acres of tillable land. Respondent Melton seeks to avert the conclusion of misrepresentation by testifying he did not mean there were 70 acres in the one piece of ground, but he meant there were 70 acres in three pieces of irrigable ground. The ground which he was describing consisted of two 6-acre tracts and the 37-acre tract. Further, there was some evidence that appellants had made an independent investigation together with other parties, and that appellants had not relied upon representations made by the respondents.
Appellants testified they were fraudulently induced into purchasing the ranch upon the misrepresentation that respondents had made a gross profit of more than $13,000, and had very little expense except for gas, oil, and tires. The record discloses that from the gross income of $13,812.75 there was a net income after expenses of $4,276.26. Earnings of appellants during their occupancy are as follows: 1958 gross income, $15,331.63, net income $4,084.76; 1959 gross income $22,822.82, net income $7,200.84. Appellants testified that demand had been made upon the Meltons for income tax returns in order to establish the profit and loss operation of the ranch, and they were in one way or another put off by the respondents. On the other hand, the respondents deny that these demands were made, and maintain that no misrepresentation was made in this regard.
For guests to reach Williams Lake from a bridge crossing the river, it was necessary to traverse a portion of a neighbor's property. Representation was made by respondents that they held a lease upon the ground. Appellants assert a wilful, intentional misrepresentation in that respect. However there is evidence showing that appellants were aware that no easement for right-of-way existed over this adjacent property before the contract was entered into, and after the contract was negotiated appellants purchased the property necessary for the roadway.
There is also misrepresentation alleged by appellants on behalf of the respondents of an electric generator. Respondents did represent a four kilowatt generator as a five kilowatt generator. The generator was insufficient in capacity to furnish electricity for all of the electrical requirements on the ranch. Respondent Melton excuses this representation for the reason that he had been advised by an electrician that the generator was of the five kilowatt capacity.
Another misrepresentation alleged by appellants in that merchandise, consisting principally of fishing equipment, was not of the value as stated by respondents. Respondent Melton represented that the fishing equipment had a value of $380, whereas appellants state in their brief that it had a net value of $100.
Substantial improvements have been made upon the property by appellants. Some improvements have become part of the realty, and others are separable. There is ample evidence in the record on behalf of both parties that the property has not decreased in valud since it was acquired by the appellants. There is evidence in the record of annual rental values of the property.
The trial court in its findings of fact found that the appellants had refused to make the payment due December 16, 1958, as required by the contract. The court further found that the respondents had made no false or fraudulent representations with intent to deceive the appellants or which were relied upon by the appellants or which induced appellants to purchase the property. The trial court also found that appellants made their own independent investigation of the property before purchasing it, and that they relied upon this investigation, and that they had their own attorney prepare the contract of sale.
The court also found that appellants had never offered to rescind the contract...
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