Melton v. Ind. Athletic Trainers Bd.

• Decision Date: 14 September 2020
• Docket Number: Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-CT-1972
• Citation: 156 N.E.3d 633
• Parties: Molly Ann MELTON, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. INDIANA ATHLETIC TRAINERS BOARD, et al., Appellee-Defendants
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

156 N.E.3d 633

Molly Ann MELTON, Appellant-Plaintiff,

v.INDIANA ATHLETIC TRAINERS BOARD, et al., Appellee-Defendants,

Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-CT-1972

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

FILED September 14, 2020

Rehearing Denied November 6, 2020

Attorneys for Appellant: Kevin W. Betz, Sandra L. Blevins, Courtney E. Endwright, Betz + Blevins, Indianapolis, Indiana

Attorneys for Appellee: Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, Frances Barrow, Benjamin M.L. Jones, Deputy Attorneys General, Indianapolis, Indiana

Robb, Judge.

Case Summary and Issues

[1] After Molly Melton's athletic trainer's license was suspended by the Indiana Athletic Trainers Certification Board (the "Board") for conduct that violated the standards of professional practice, she filed a complaint seeking judicial review of the Board's sanction decision and asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (" Section 1983") for alleged violations of her constitutional rights in the disciplinary process. Her complaint named the Board, the Indiana Professional Licensing Agency ("IPLA"), and the five members of the Board at the time of the disciplinary decision in their official and individual capacities ("Members," and collectively with the Board and IPLA, the "Defendants"). The trial court heard the judicial review petition first and, finding that Melton had been prejudiced by the agency action, reversed the Board's sanctions order. The Defendants then filed a motion for summary judgment asserting immunity defenses to the Section 1983 claims which the trial court granted. Melton appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment on her Section 1983 claims; the Board cross appeals the trial court's grant of relief on the petition for judicial review. Concluding the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the Defendants but erred in granting relief on Melton's petition for judicial review, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

Facts and Procedural History

I. Background and Prior Proceedings

[2] The Board regulates the practice of athletic trainers within Indiana and is responsible for establishing standards for the practice of athletic training. Ind. Code § 25-5.1-2-6(2)(C). The Board consists of five members appointed by the governor. Ind. Code § 25-5.1-2-2(a). Among other things, the Board has been given the power to conduct hearings, keep records of proceedings, and do all things necessary to properly administer and enforce the law involving licenses for athletic trainers. Ind. Code § 25-5.1-2-6(5). Upon finding an athletic trainer has violated a standard of professional practice, Ind. Code § 25-1-9-4, the Board has authority to impose a range of disciplinary sanctions, including suspension of a practitioner's license, Ind. Code § 25-1-9-9(a).

[3] Melton was a licensed athletic trainer in the State of Indiana from September 20, 2011 until her license expired on December 31, 2012.¹ In August 2012, Melton was hired as an athletic trainer by IU Health Paoli Hospital's Rehab and Sports Medicine Department ("IU Health"). As part of her duties with IU Health, she worked at Paoli Jr. & Sr. High School (the "School"). In November/December of 2012, Melton, then twenty-three years old, began a sexual relationship with an eighteen-year-old male athlete ("C.J.")² at the School whom she had been treating for a knee injury

. After approximately three weeks, C.J.'s parents discovered the relationship and filed a complaint with the School. Melton initially denied anything inappropriate occurred other than text message exchanges initiated by C.J. that were "words of friendship" and specifically denied there was any physical contact "at all." Appellant's Corrected Appendix ("App."), Volume 3 at 45. Sometime in December 2012, Melton's employment with IU Health was terminated. Melton did not renew her license when it expired at the end of 2012, which would have required only the payment of a renewal fee. Ind. Code § 25-5.1-3-4(b). Her license became invalid on December 31, 2012 by operation of statute and without any action by the Board. Ind. Code § 25-5.1-3-4(c).

[4] On May 10, 2013, the State of Indiana filed an administrative complaint with the Board alleging that Melton had a sexual relationship with an athlete whom she was treating, violating Indiana Code sections 25-1-9-4(a)(5) (for engaging "in a course of lewd or immoral conduct in connection with delivery of services to the public") and 25-1-9-4(a)(11) (for engaging "in sexual contact with an athlete in her care"). App., Vol. 2 at 211. A Board hearing was first held in September 2013, but Melton did not personally appear. Instead, her counsel appeared on her behalf to admit to the factual basis and argue the sanction. The Board deemed this insufficient and issued a notice of proposed default, which Melton opposed. In January 2014, the Board voted unanimously to find Melton in default, and on February 3, issued an order suspending Melton's license for at least seven years.

[5] Melton filed a complaint in the trial court alleging that the Board, IPLA, and six members of the Board who were involved in the proceedings³ violated her federal constitutional rights by holding her in default and arguing that she was therefore entitled to damages under Section 1983.⁴ The trial court granted the Board's motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed Melton's Section 1983 complaint. The Court of Appeals held that the Board's decision to find Melton in default was in error because it "deprived Melton of her opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner[.]" Melton I , 53 N.E.3d at 1220 (quotation omitted). We therefore reversed the trial court's order dismissing Melton's complaint and remanded with instructions for the Board to vacate its February 3, 2014 order and hold a hearing on the administrative complaint against her that comports with due process. Id. The court offered no opinion on the Board's order on its merits but confined its decision to the conduct of the hearing.

[6] Following the Court of Appeals' decision, the Board changed the status of Melton's license from "suspended" (due to Board action) to "expired." See Transcript of the Evidence, Volume II at 16. This returned the status of Melton's license to the status it had been in before administrative proceedings were initiated.⁵

II. Current Proceedings

[7] On February 8, 2017, pursuant to the remand instructions, the Board held an administrative hearing at which Melton appeared in person and by counsel. Melton admitted to the relationship with C.J. and to violating the professional standards of athletic training. Melton said she took responsibility for what occurred but characterized it as "consensual," "embarrassing," a mistake that "ruined everything that I worked for," and explained it happened because she was "lonely" and "naïve." App., Vol. 5 at 65-67. She felt the suspension she had already served was "three years of living in fear of applying for other licenses" that had "impacted [her] greatly" and was "more than enough." Id. at 65, 68.

[8] The State offered C.J.'s testimony about the relationship and its effects on him, including that he became estranged from his parents; suffered from stress and anxiety; and had problems at school, academically, athletically, and personally. The State also admitted documents about Melton's performance as an athletic trainer at New Palestine High School during the 2011-12 school year, just prior to being hired by IU Health and assigned to work at the School. The documents included a written reprimand for violating school policy by transporting students in her personal vehicle and a document listing twenty-one instances of unprofessional behavior, including "[e]xtreme texting" with a student after midnight and "[f]lirtatiousness with wrestlers and baseball players." App., Vol. 3 at 130.⁶ Both documents about Melton's performance at New Palestine had been shared with Melton during her employment at New Palestine, which ended when she was asked to resign. Melton objected to these documents as irrelevant, improper character evidence, and hearsay. See App., Vol. 5 at 21, 23. The State defended admission of the documents as relevant to Melton's state of mind because they showed "she was aware boundary issues existed." Id. at 21. The Board allowed the documents to be admitted.

[9] Melton offered the affidavits of two psychologists, one of whom opined that Melton would not pose an unreasonable risk of harm to patients and recommended reinstatement of her license, see App., Vol. 3 at 79, and the other of whom had "no basis to disagree" with those recommendations after "extensive interview, evaluation, and testing" of Melton, id. at 108. Melton also provided the Board with a document described as "research about the relevant sanctions from the [ ] Board as well as relevant other sanctions by other boards in the state of Indiana, as well as the Indiana Supreme Court." App., Vol. 5 at 88. The State provided the Board, with no objection from Melton, "some teacher cases" regarding sanctions imposed by the Indiana Department of Education for teacher misconduct. Id. at 89.

[10] On March 27, 2017, the Board again found that Melton's conduct violated Indiana Code subsections 25-1-9-4(a)(5) and (11). Concluding, inter alia , that C.J., his family, and the School suffered "significant harm" from Melton's actions, App., Vol. 2 at 123, that Melton "did not acknowledge the potential for pain and suffering by [C.J. who was] in the inferior position" but simply considered the relationship "a mistake," id. at 124-25, and that Melton having sex with C.J. was "more than a mistake" because it was "repeated over and over again," id. at 124, the Board placed Melton on indefinite suspension for at least three years from the date of the order. With respect to the sanction, the Board distinguished the previous Board decisions Melton had offered as precedent and instead relied on its own comparisons with Indiana...