Melton v. State, SC04-1689.

• Decision Date: 30 November 2006
• Docket Number: No. SC04-1689.,No. SC05-1423.,SC04-1689.,SC05-1423.
• Citation: 949 So.2d 994
• Parties: Antonio MELTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. Antonio Lebaron Melton, Petitioner, v. James R. McDonough, etc., Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

949 So.2d 994

Antonio MELTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Antonio Lebaron Melton, Petitioner, v. James R. McDonough, etc., Respondent.

No. SC04-1689.

No. SC05-1423.

Supreme Court of Florida.

November 30, 2006.

Rehearing Denied February 15, 2007.

D. Todd Doss, Lake City, FL, for Appellant/Petitioner.

Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Charmaine M. Millsaps, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, for Appellee/Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

Melton appeals an order of the circuit court denying his motion to vacate his sentence of death filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 and petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed below, we affirm the circuit court's order denying postconviction relief and we deny Melton's habeas petition.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The facts of this crime are set forth in our opinion from Melton's direct appeal:

Melton was convicted of fatally shooting George Carter during a robbery of Carter's pawn shop in Pensacola. Jurors found Melton guilty of first-degree felony murder and armed robbery. They recommended death for the murder conviction by an eight-to-four vote. The trial judge followed the jury's recommendation and sentenced Melton to death. We affirm the convictions and sentences.

The record shows that Melton and a friend, Bendleon Lewis, entered Carter's pawn shop, planning to rob it. Melton and Lewis each testified that the other planned the robbery.

Lewis was granted use immunity to testify for the State. He testified that once in the pawn shop, he feigned an interest in pawning a necklace. While Carter weighed the necklace, Lewis testified that he grabbed Carter's arm and Melton pulled a gun he was carrying in his pants. Melton held the gun on Carter while Lewis gathered jewelry and guns from the shop. As Lewis tried to unlock a door so he and Melton could flee, he heard a gunshot.

Melton testified that while Lewis talked to Carter about jewelry, he put on surgical gloves and reached to pick up a ring. He testified that Carter saw him try to pick up the ring and reached for a gun he was carrying. Lewis grabbed Carter's hands, while Melton pulled his own pistol and took Carter's gun. Melton said while he held his gun on Carter, Carter rushed at him, then fell and hit his head. Melton testified that he told Carter to remain still, but Carter pushed up from the floor and grabbed for the hand with the gun. As the two struggled over the gun, the weapon discharged and hit Carter in the head. Police arrested Melton and Lewis as they were leaving the shop.

Although there was conflicting testimony about who planned the robbery and whether there was a struggle before Carter was shot, the evidence is clear that Melton held a .38-caliber gun on Carter and fired the fatal shot.

In sentencing Melton to death, the trial judge found two aggravating factors: (1) Melton was previously convicted of a violent felony (first-degree murder and robbery) and (2) Melton committed the homicide for financial gain. The trial judge found two nonstatutory mitigating factors, but assigned them little weight: (1) Melton exhibited good conduct while awaiting trial and (2) Melton had a difficult family background. The judge also sentenced Melton to life imprisonment for the robbery conviction.

Melton v. State, 638 So.2d 927, 928-29 (Fla.1994). This Court affirmed Melton's conviction and death sentence, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari review. Melton v. Florida, 513 U.S. 971, 115 S.Ct. 441, 130 L.Ed.2d 352 (1994).

In a separate case, Melton was also convicted of the armed robbery and first-degree felony murder of Ricky Saylor, a taxicab driver, and was sentenced to life imprisonment on each offense with the sentences to run consecutively. On direct appeal, the First District affirmed both convictions and sentences. See Melton v. State, 611 So.2d 116 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). This Court declined to exercise jurisdiction and denied Melton's petition for review. See Melton v. State, 624 So.2d 267 (Fla. 1993). These convictions served as the basis for the trial court's finding of the prior violent felony aggravator in this case.

Melton filed postconviction motions in both this case and the Saylor case. Melton filed his original 3.850 motion in the instant case in January of 1996, and filed an amended motion in July of 2001. A Huff¹ preliminary hearing was held in October of 2001; Melton then filed a second amended 3.850 motion two days before the evidentiary hearing was scheduled. The evidentiary hearing addressed issues concerning both the Carter/"pawn shop" murder and Melton's postconviction claims filed regarding the Saylor/"taxi cab" murder. The circuit court issued its order denying relief on all claims in both the Carter and Saylor cases on March 23, 2004. The First District subsequently affirmed the circuit court's order in the Saylor case. Melton v. State, 909 So.2d 865 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).

POSTCONVICTION CLAIMS

Melton argues on appeal that the lower court erred in denying postconviction relief regarding: (1) his claim that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel during both the guilt phase and penalty phase of his trial; (2) his claim that the State withheld material and exculpatory evidence and presented misleading evidence; (3) his newly discovered evidence claim; (4) his claim that the prosecutor's misconduct during the course of his case rendered Melton's conviction and sentence fundamentally unfair and unreliable; and (5) his claim that there was unconstitutional systematic exclusion of a significant portion of the nonwhite population from the jury pool. Melton also raises a claim that the lower court improperly considered Melton's "lack of remorse" in its order denying relief.²

I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Melton asserts that the trial court erred in rejecting his claim that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel during both the guilt and penalty phases of his trial. Melton claims that at the guilt phase of his trial, counsel could have obtained information that could have been used to impeach witness Bendleon Lewis's testimony and, furthermore, counsel was deficient for failing to adequately investigate the true nature and extent of Lewis's negotiations with the State. Melton also alleges that trial counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase of his trial because his attorney failed to present evidence of compelling and substantial mitigating circumstances and, furthermore, counsel failed to provide Melton with a competent psychiatric evaluation. Melton further argues that trial counsel failed to sufficiently challenge the weight of his prior violent felony conviction in front of the jury, which was particularly prejudicial because there were only two aggravating circumstances presented at trial.

Following the United States Supreme Court's decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), this Court has held that for ineffective assistance of counsel claims to be successful, two requirements must be satisfied:

First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably competent performance under prevailing professional standards. Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined.

Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So.2d 927, 932 (Fla.1986) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Downs v. State, 453 So.2d 1102 (Fla.1984)). Because both prongs of the Strickland test present mixed questions of law and fact, this Court employs a mixed standard of review, deferring to the circuit court's factual findings that are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but reviewing the circuit court's legal conclusions de novo. See Sochor v. State, 883 So.2d 766, 771-72 (Fla. 2004).

There is a strong presumption that trial counsel's performance was not ineffective. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052. "A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time." Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The defendant carries the burden to "overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action `might be considered sound trial strategy.'" Id. (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101, 76 S.Ct. 158, 100 L.Ed. 83 (1955)). "Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential." Id. In Occhicone v. State, 768 So.2d 1037 (Fla.2000), this Court held that "strategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been considered and rejected and counsel's decision was reasonable under the norms of professional conduct." Id. at 1048 (citing Rutherford v. State, 727 So.2d 216, 223 (Fla.1998); State v. Bolender, 503 So.2d 1247, 1250 (Fla.1987)). We have also held that where this Court previously has rejected a substantive claim on the merits, "[c]ounsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to make [a] meritless argument." Melendez v. State, 612 So.2d 1366, 1369 (Fla.1992).

Attorney Terry Terrell represented Melton during trial in both the instant case and in the Saylor/"taxi cab" case. Melton's concerns about counsel's performance during the guilt phase of his trial focus on the testimony of two witnesses presented at the evidentiary hearing below, both of whom testified that Ben Lewis told them versions of the Carter murder that differed from Lewis's testimony at trial.

Paul Sinkfield, an inmate at the Wakulla Correctional Institution,...