Memorial Hosp. of Galveston County v. Gillis
| Decision Date | 18 November 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. C-6709,C-6709 |
| Citation | 741 S.W.2d 364 |
| Parties | MEMORIAL HOSPITAL OF GALVESTON COUNTY, et al, Petitioners, v. Zelma Lee GILLIS, Respondent. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Scott Lyford, Co. Atty., Galveston, for petitioners.
Scott A. Sanes, Hardy, Milutin, Johns & Sherrod, Houston, for respondent.
Forty days after the trial court had dismissed her worker's compensation suit for want of prosecution, Zelma Lee Gillis filed an unverified motion to reinstate. Gillis' motion stated the nature of her action, explained the cause for the delay in prosecution, and claimed that her suit had merit. Following a hearing on her motion, the trial court reinstated her action. The record does not reflect what transpired at that hearing, and the order reinstating the cause does not recite the trial court's findings or the grounds for reinstatement. The action later went to trial, where Gillis had judgment on a jury verdict awarding some $52,000 for her injuries. The court of appeals affirmed. 731 S.W.2d 692. On September 16, 1987, we refused Memorial Hospital's application for writ of error, finding no reversible error. The court grants Memorial Hospital's motion for rehearing, and without hearing oral argument reverses the judgment of the court of appeals and vacates the judgment of the trial court. The opinion of the court of appeals conflicts with TEX.R.CIV.P. 306(a).
The procedure for obtaining relief from a dismissal for want of prosecution is set forth in TEX.R.CIV.P. 165a. In pertinent part, Rule 165a states:
[a] motion to reinstate shall set forth the grounds therefor and be verified by the movant or his attorney. It shall be filed with the clerk within 30 days after the order of dismissal is signed or within the period provided by Rule 306a.
It is undisputed that Gillis' motion was not filed within thirty days of the signing of the order dismissing her action. The question is whether it was filed within the time period provided by TEX.R.CIV.P. 306a. Rule 306a provides that a party who did not have notice or knowledge of a judgment or order may be afforded thirty days from the date he acquired such notice or knowledge in order to invoke the trial court's plenary jurisdiction, provided that he can:
... prove in the trial court, on sworn motion and notice, the date on which the party or his attorney first either received a notice of the judgment or acquired actual knowledge of the signing and that this date was more than twenty days after the judgment was signed.
TEX.R.CIV.P. 306a(5). Compliance with the time periods prescribed by these rules is a jurisdictional prerequisite. Unless a party establishes in the manner prescribed by the rule that he had no notice or knowledge of the judgment, the general rule prevails: a trial court's power to reinstate...
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