Memphis Housing Authority v. Newton
| Decision Date | 18 April 1972 |
| Citation | 484 S.W.2d 896 |
| Parties | MEMPHIS HOUSING AUTHORITY, Appellant, v. Lucille Burke NEWTON, Appellee. |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
Melvin Fleischer, and Bernie Mullikin, Jr., Memphis, for appellant; Cochran, Carey, Fleischer & Mullikin, Memphis, of counsel.
Lucius E. Burch, Jr., and Joel H. Porter, Memphis, for appellee; Burch, Porter & Johnson, Memphis, of counsel.
The Memphis Housing Authority condemned the defendant's property as a part of the Beale Street Urban Renewal Project in Memphis, Tennessee. Two appraisers for the owner valued the property at $256,600.00 and $250,000.00; the condemner's appraisers valued the property at $115,000.00 and $100,000.00. The jury verdict was for $235,000.00.
On appeal the condemner insists the Trial Court erred in permitting evidence of three prior sales because those sales reflected enhanced values brought about by the Urban Renewal Project; the Court erred in rejecting one prior sale offered by the condemner; and the Court erred in the admission of certain evidence concerning amounts expended by a lessee on the subject property.
The three prior sales of other property admitted in evidence by the Trial Judge, and complained of by the condemner are: (1) The Y.M.C.A. property sale; (2) The B & G Investment property sale; and (3) The Vergos property sale. Each of these properties is located within the bounds of the urban renewal project but is not to be taken as a part of the project.
The urban renewal project for which the owner's property was taken was approved by the Memphis Housing Authority and the City of Memphis in August, 1968. The B & G Investment property sale was on February 17, 1966, about two and one-half years prior to the approval of the urban renewal project. The Vergos property sale was on June 30, 1966, over two years prior to the approval of the urban renewal project.
As a general rule, proof of sales of similar property made at about the same time of the taking is admissible on the issue of the value of the property taken. Union Railway Co. v. Hunton (1905) 114 Tenn. 609, 88 S.W. 182. No general rule can be laid down as to the degree of similarity and nearness in respect of time and distance which must exist in order to render the prior sale comparable and thus admissible; these are matters which rest largely within the discretion of the trial judge. Lewisburg & N.R. Co. v. Hinds (1915) 134 Tenn. 293, 183 S.W. 985; Memphis Housing Authority v. Ryan (1964) 54 Tenn.App. 557, 393 S.W.2d 3. Sales affected and influenced by the public project pursuant to which the property to be valued is taken are inadmissible to prove the value of the property taken. State Department of Highways v. Jennings (1968) 58 Tenn.App. 594, 435 S.W.2d 481.
Under the record there is no evidence from which it could be inferred that the urban renewal project enhanced or diminished the value of the B & G Investment property or of the Vergos property so as to affect those sales. Any enhancement in value of these two properties, sold over two years prior to the approval of the urban renewal project, would, under the record of this lawsuit, be based on mere surmise and speculation. We hold the prior sales of the B & G Investment property and of the Vergos property were admissible on the issue of the value of the property being taken.
The Y.M.C.A. sale was on March 31, 1970, well after the approval of the urban renewal project, and after some work had begun toward the completion of the project. It is possible the Y.M.C.A. property was enhanced or depreciated in value because of the project, or it could have retained its prior value. The condemner offered no proof that the Y.M.C.A. property was enhanced in value because of the project. The condemner on appeal insists that the very object of an urban renewal project is to take a deteriorated non-productive area and to cause it to be rehabilitated and redeveloped to make it a productive area; it is argued that the end result in urban renewal activities is to have an area which is Per se more valuable than as it existed prior to the establishment of the project. In short, the condemner requests the Court to take judicial knowledge that the Y.M.C.A. property was enhanced in value because of the urban renewal project. We cannot so rule.
We note in the case of State Department of Highways v. Jennings, supra, the witness who offered to testify about the prior sale stated that the...
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Water Authority of Dickson County v. Hooper, No. M2009-01548-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. App. 4/28/2010), M2009-01548-COA-R3-CV.
...1987 WL 18968, at *2 (citing Union Railway Co. v. Hunton, 114 Tenn. 609, 624-25, 88 S.W. 182, 186 (1905)); Memphis Hous. Auth. v. Newton, 484 S.W.2d 896, 897 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972); see United States v. An Easement and Right of Way over a Tract of Land in Madison County, Tenn., 405 F.2d at 3......
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