Memphis St. Ry. Co. v. Byrne

• Decision Date: 28 September 1907
• Parties: MEMPHIS ST. RY. CO. v. BYRNE.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

104 S.W. 460

119 Tenn. 278

MEMPHIS ST. RY. CO. v. BYRNE.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

September 28, 1907

Shields and Neil, JJ., dissenting in part.

Error to Circuit Court, Shelby County, Third Division; A. B Pittmann, Judge.

Action by William G. Byrne against the Memphis Street Railway Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant brings error. On motion to have the case docketed, tried, and determined in the Supreme Court in the first instance. Granted.

J. C Bradford and E. E. Wright, for plaintiff in error.

Bell Terry, Anderson & Bell, for defendant in error.

SHIELDS J.

This is an action brought by William G. Byrne against the Memphis Street Railway Company in the circuit court of Shelby county to recover damages for the alleged wrongful action of the defendant in refusing to transport him upon one of its cars.

The right of the plaintiff to recover depends upon the constitutionality of a statute of Tennessee, which is assailed by the defendant. The case was tried March 30, 1907, and there was a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $50, and the defendant prayed and was granted an appeal in the nature of a writ of error to this court. The case is now before the court upon a motion, joined in by both parties, to have it docketed and here tried and determined.

The question now presented is one of jurisdiction. The trial and judgment in the circuit court were had after chapter 82 of the Acts of 1907, amending chapter 76 of the Acts of 1895, creating the Court of Chancery Appeals, was enacted and approved. By that statute the name of that court was changed to the "Court of Civil Appeals," the number of its judges increased to five, and its jurisdiction extended, among other things, to the review of civil cases tried in the circuit and common-law courts of the state. The parties, however, insist that they have a right to a trial in this court upon direct proceedings in error, without resort primarily to that Court of Civil Appeals. We will proceed to dispose of the grounds upon which this right is asserted.

The first contention is that the act purporting to amend that establishing the Court of Chancery Appeals, now the Court of Civil Appeals, and extending its jurisdiction, is unconstitutional and void, because it violates article 2, § 17, of the Constitution of the state, providing that "no bill shall become a law which embraces more than one subject, that subject to be expressed in the title."

While counsel for plaintiff and defendant agree in this contention, we must of necessity determine it upon its merits, since statutes which are constitutional and valid cannot be disregarded, nor jurisdiction conferred by consent.

The precise objection to the act is that the subject is not expressed in the title. It is twofold, and may be stated as follows:

(1) That the title to the original act (chapter 76 of the Acts of 1895) is restrictive and confines the subject there expressed to the establishment of a court for the review of causes appealed from the chancery courts of the state, and therefore the provisions of the amendatory act, extending the jurisdiction of that court to the review of cases brought from circuit and common-law courts, are not germane, but foreign, to it.

(2) That the subject expressed in the title of chapter 82, Acts 1907, is the amendment of chapter 76 of the Acts of 1895, creating the Court of Chancery Appeals, while the body of it is a new and complete scheme of legislation, establishing a new and distinctly different court, with entirely different jurisdiction and powers; that instead of amending the former act, by implication it repeals it.

If either of these contentions is sound, the act is void, and must be so held. The particular part of the provision of the Constitution here invoked, that no bill shall become a law which embraces more than one subject, that subject to be expressed in the title, is mandatory, and all legislation, to be valid, must comply with it. This was held by this court in the first case in which this provision came before it for construction, and has been adhered to in all subsequent cases. Cannon v. Mathes, 8 Heisk. 519. The object of the provision requiring the subject to be expressed in the title is that members of the General Assembly and the public may have notice of the nature of the proposed legislation and surprise and fraud in the enactment of laws prevented, and that of the further provision, that the bill shall embrace but one subject, to prevent improper and unlawful combinations between the members of the General Assembly, resulting in the passing of statutes which have no natural connection and would in separate bills fail of enactment. It is liberally construed, in order that the General Assembly may not be unnecessarily embarrassed in the exercise of its legislative powers and functions, and whatever is sufficient to effect its object will be held to be a compliance with this mandate of the organic law, and the legislation in this respect valid. Cannon v. Mathes, supra; Morrell v. Fickle, 3 Lea, 81; Truss v. State, 13 Lea, 312; Luehrman v. Taxing District, 2 Lea, 428; Frazier v. Railway Co., 88 Tenn. 158, 12 S.W. 537.

Titles to statutes may be general or restrictive, or, in other words, broad or narrow, since the Legislature in every case has the right to determine for itself how comprehensive shall be the object of a statute, and it also has a wide discretion in the particularity of the title selected to express it, provided that, by a fair construction, such title complies with the constitutional provision in question.

A general title is one which is broad and comprehensive, and covers all legislation germane to the general subject stated. It is not an objection that it covers more than the subject of the body of the act, but it must not cover less. It is not necessary that it index the details of the act, nor give a synopsis of the means by which the object of the statute is to be accomplished. All matters which are germane to the subject may be embraced in one act. The scope of a general title is defined in one case in these words:

"The true rule of construction, as fully established by the authorities, is that any provision of the act directly or indirectly related to the subject expressed in the title and having a natural connection thereto and not foreign thereto, should be held to be embraced in it." Cannon v. Mathes, supra.

And in another it is said: "Where the title of a legislative act expressed a general subject or purpose which is single, all matters which are naturally and reasonably connected with it, and all measures which will or may facilitate the accomplishment of the purpose so stated, are properly included in the act and are germane to its title." State v. Yardley, 95 Tenn. 555, 32 S.W. 481, 34 L. R. A. 656.

A restrictive title is one where a particular part or branch of a subject is carved out and selected as the subject of the legislation. When this is done, notwithstanding a general title could have been adopted, which would have covered the entire subject, and authorized legislation upon the whole of it, the body of the act must be confined to the particular portion of it expressed in the limited title.

The case of Hyman v. State, 87 Tenn. 112, 9 S.W. 372, 1 L. R. A. 497, is the leading case in the state upon this question. There this is quoted with approval from Cooley on Constitutional Limitations:

"The Legislature may make the title of an act as restrictive as they please. It is obvious that they may sometimes so form it as to preclude many matters being included in the act which might with entire propriety have been embraced in one enactment with the matter enacted by the title, but which must now be excluded because the bill has been made unnecessarily restrictive. The courts cannot enlarge the scope of the title. They are vested with no dispensing power. The Constitution has made the title the conclusive index to the legislative intent as to what shall have operation. It is no answer to say that the title might have been more comprehensive, if in fact the Legislature have not seen fit to make it so."

And in State v. Bradt, 103 Tenn. 591, 53 S.W. 944, it is said:

"It is well settled that an act may be limited to a particular part or branch of a general subject by a restrictive title, and that legislation under such a title, to be good, must be confined within the limitations prescribed."

The law in relation to general and restrictive titles is well expressed by Mr. Justice Caldwell in State ex rel. v. Schlitz Brewing Co., 104 Tenn. 718, 59 S.W. 1033, 78 Am. St. Rep. 941. He says:

"The title of a legislative bill may be either narrow and restricted, or broad and general, as the members of the General Assembly may prefer, and, whether it be in the one form or the other in a given instance, all legislation that is germane to the subject expressed in the title is within the title and permissible under it; but, of course, much that might be germane under the latter class of titles could not be so under the former.

If the title adopted be narrow and restricted, carving out for treatment only a part of a general subject, the legislation under it must be confined within the same limits (State v. Bradt, 103 Tenn. 584, 53 S.W. 942; Hyman v. State, 87 Tenn. 109, 113, 9 S.W. 372, 1 L. R. A. 497; Cooley, Const. Lim. [ 5th Ed.] 179); and, if it be broad and general, the legislation under it may have a like scope.

In every instance the enactment must come within the title, but in no case is it required to cover the whole domain within the title. The Constitution forbids that an enactment shall go beyond the limits of its title, but there is no requirement that it shall completely...