Mendez v. State

Decision Date03 January 1979
Docket NumberNo. 3,No. 55819,55819,3
Citation575 S.W.2d 36
CourtTexas Court of Criminal Appeals
PartiesGuadalupe MENDEZ, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee

Will Gray, Houston, court appointed on appeal only, for appellant.

Carol S. Vance, Dist. Atty., James C. Brough and Ned B. Morris, Asst. Dist. Attys., Houston, for the State.

Before DOUGLAS, TOM G. DAVIS and VOLLERS, JJ.

OPINION

DOUGLAS, Judge.

Guadalupe Mendez was indicted for murder. The court directed a verdict of acquittal on the murder charge and the jury found him guilty of the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter. Punishment was assessed by the court at five years.

Mendez appeals contending essentially that the law of parties does not apply to the offense of involuntary manslaughter. In this respect he challenges both the charge and the sufficiency of the evidence.

The conviction arises out of a senseless and tragic series of events which occurred in suburban Houston on July 30, 1974. Mendez, William Robinson and Alfred Fuschak were drinking beer when Robinson suggested they shoot Ray Richmond because he had dated Robinson's girl friend. Appellant got a shotgun, the other two got rifles. They drove to Richmond's parents' house where Richmond lived. Richmond was not home at the time. They shot up a car outside the Richmond house and fired at least eight shots at the house. The trio then drove to the house of Tommy DeArman, an acquaintance who was "tight" about lending his car, and shot up his car. As they left DeArman's house, Robinson shot his rifle randomly at several houses. One of these shots hit Rafael Martinez as he slept in bed next to his wife. Martinez was able to ask his wife to call an ambulance and managed to get to the dining room before he slumped against the wall and died. When the police arrived, they found Martinez and observed a trail of blood from his bed to the dining room.

Appellant's confession was introduced. He and Fuschak testified that they tried to talk Robinson out of the shooting spree and that appellant did not shoot at the houses. According to their testimony, they continued in the shooting spree after trying to get Robinson to stop.

Appellant contends that he could not, as a matter of law, be responsible for the actions of Robinson. He relies on the reasoning of Gonzales v. State, 532 S.W.2d 343 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). Gonzales held that our law did not provide for the offense of attempted involuntary manslaughter. The rationale of Gonzales was that attempt required a specific intent to commit a crime while involuntary manslaughter by definition, differs from other types of murders in its lack of specific intent. Thus, attempted involuntary manslaughter was a contradiction of terms.

Appellant argues from Gonzales that there can be no accomplice to an involuntary manslaughter. He contends that since the principal who commits an involuntary manslaughter does not act with a specific intent he cannot be assisted by another.

In other jurisdictions which have considered this precise question, there is a clear trend to hold the law of parties applicable to involuntary manslaughter. In Wade v. State, 174 Tenn. 248, 124 S.W.2d 710 (1939), the court had to decide if an individual could aid and abet in an involuntary manslaughter case. The court concluded:

"Involuntary manslaughter necessarily negatives, of course, any intent on the part of the accused to kill another, but does not negative an intent to do the unlawful act, or the act not strictly unlawful in itself, but done in an unlawful manner and without due caution. Hence, one may be an aider and abettor in involuntary manslaughter because of a common purpose to participate in the unlawful act the natural and probable result of which was to kill another."

Similarly, in Black v. State, 103 Ohio St. 434, 133 N.E. 795 (1921), the court dealt with a situation where several police officers were engaged in target practice in a saloon, an act which was prohibited by statute. An innocent passerby was killed by one of the shots. The Black court sustained an involuntary manslaughter conviction and concluded:

"(I)n such a...

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17 cases
  • State v. Bridges
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division
    • 28. Februar 1992
    ...actor unintentionally kills the victim; then the defendant is liable for manslaughter as an aider and participant."); State v. Mendez, 575 S.W.2d 36, 38 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) ("[i]t is entirely possible to intentionally solicit or assist an individual in committing a reckless act"). Although ......
  • Olson v. State
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • 16. Mai 2019
    ...liability for crimes involving unintended injury or death. See Ex parte Simmons , 649 So.2d 1282 (Ala. 1994) ; Mendez v. State , 575 S.W.2d 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) ; People v. Novy , 232 Ill.App.3d 631, 173 Ill.Dec. 565, 597 N.E.2d 273 (1992) ; People v. Cole , 253 Ill.App.3d 603, 192 Ill......
  • Gaona v. State, 13-86-221-CR
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 4. Juni 1987
    ...was aware of the risk created by his conduct. See generally Yates v. State, 624 S.W.2d 816 (Tex.App.1981); see also Mendez v. State, 575 S.W.2d 36 (Tex.Crim.App.1979); cf. Keith v. State, 692 S.W.2d 921 (Tex.App.1985). Point of error eight is At the charge conference in the guilt/innocence ......
  • Nava v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 15. Oktober 2012
    ...prior decision applying § 7.02(a)(2) to manslaughter may suggest a more expansive reading of the statute [referring to Mendez v. State, 575 S.W.2d 36 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) ], but it remains to be seen whether the reading would be expansive enough to infer an “intent to promote or assist” for ......
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