Mendez v. State, No. 14-04-00024-CR (TX 5/10/2005)
| Decision Date | 10 May 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 14-04-00024-CR,14-04-00024-CR |
| Parties | MICHAEL CHARLES MENDEZ, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
On Appeal from 183rd District Court Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 915,253.
Affirmed.
Panel consists of Justices YATES, EDELMAN, and GUZMAN.
A jury convicted Appellant Michael Charles Mendez of murder and sentenced him to thirty years' confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. On appeal, appellant contends (1) the trial court erred in allowing the State to impeach him with evidence of a prior conviction, and (2) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm.
Appellant attended a party at the home of Candelario Guerrero. While at the party, he began to argue with another of Guerrero's guests, Rubin Zambrano, over their preference of beers. The argument ended with appellant and Zambrano shaking hands, but after appellant left the party some thirty minutes later, he encountered his brother, Christopher Mendez, and a friend, Chris Ginardi, and told them that someone at the party had threatened to kill him and his wife. Appellant asked Christopher and Ginardi to return to the party with him. Christopher decided to arm himself with a shotgun "just in case" Zambrano was also armed. On their way to the party, appellant stopped at his home and retrieved a shotgun and 30-30 rifle.
When they arrived at the party, appellant and Christopher approached Zambrano and pointed their shotguns at him. Guerrero, who had been observing the confrontation from inside the house, came outside and confronted appellant. Guerrero took hold of appellant's shotgun, attempting to wrestle it away from him. The resulting struggle lasted several minutes, with the two ending up on the ground. Christopher fired in the direction of appellant and Guerrero, striking Guerrero in the chest and fatally wounding him.
A jury convicted appellant and Christopher of murder and sentenced appellant to thirty years' confinement. This appeal followed.
In his first issue, appellant contends the trial court erred in allowing the State to cross-examine him with evidence that he was previously convicted of assaulting his wife because the evidence served no purpose other than to inflame the jury. In his two remaining issues, appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, claiming it does not support a finding that he intended to cause Guerrero serious bodily injury. In the alternative, appellant contends there is no evidence he solicited, directed, aided, or attempted to aid Christopher in causing Guerrero's death. We address appellant's sufficiency issues first.
In a legal sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). During our review, we do not reevaluate the weight or credibility of the evidence; our role is to ensure the jury reached its verdict rationally. Johnson v. State, 967 S.W.2d 410, 412 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). We affirm the decision if any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. McDuff v. State, 939 S.W.2d 607, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
When conducting a factual sufficiency review, we view the evidence in a neutral light and set aside the verdict only if (1) the evidence supporting the verdict, if taken alone, is too weak to support a verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; or (2) the contrary evidence is so strong that the State could not have met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 484-85 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). In our evaluation of the evidence, we must be deferential to the jury's findings and avoid substituting our judgment for that of the fact finder. Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). As the trier of fact, the jury alone judges the credibility of the witnesses and the strength of the evidence. Herrero v. State, 124 S.W.3d 827, 832 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
A person commits murder when that person (1) intentionally or knowingly causes an individual's death, or (2) intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 19.02(b) (Vernon 2003). Here, it is undisputed that appellant did not fire the weapon that caused Guerrero's death; he was convicted as a party to the murder. A person may be convicted as a party to a crime if, "acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid [an]other person to commit the offense." Id. § 7.02(a)(2); Ahrens v. State, 43 S.W.3d 630, 633 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. ref'd). When a defendant is present during the commission of an offense and contributes toward its commission by words or agreement, evidence is sufficient to convict under the law of parties. Ransom v. State, 920 S.W.2d 288, 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (op. on reh'g). Guilt under the law of parties may be proved by circumstantial evidence, and we may look at events occurring before, during, and after the commission of the crime, as well as actions by the defendant that demonstrate an understanding or common design to commit the offense. Id. Each fact need not directly and independently point to appellant's guilt, so long as the cumulative effect of the incriminating facts is sufficient to support the conviction. Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
Appellant argues the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction as a party because neither he nor Christopher intentionally caused Guerrero's death, nor intended to cause Guerrero serious injury. Appellant also claims that, assuming Christopher knowingly caused Guerrero's death, there is no evidence appellant solicited, encouraged, directed, aided, or attempted to aid Christopher in committing Guerrero's murder. Because Christopher was convicted of Guerrero's murder1 and appellant was convicted as a party, we address only appellant's second argument. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 7.02(a)(2).
The record establishes that after appellant left the party, he went to his mother's house, where Christopher and Ginardi were "hanging out," and asked Christopher and Ginardi to return with him to the party because Zambrano had threatened to kill him. The three men armed themselves with two shotguns and one rifle before returning to confront Zambrano. Ginardi testified that appellant said he "wanted to go to that party and show [Zambrano] that he did not know who he was messing with." Ginardi also testified he did not hear either appellant or Christopher attempt to dissuade the other from returning to the party.
When they arrived at the party, all three men exited the truck and one of them fired a gunshot into the air. Appellant and Christopher crossed the street, while Ginardi remained by the truck. Zambrano testified that appellant and Christopher pointed their guns at him and as the two approached, appellant yelled at Zambrano to "talk s**t now," or words to that effect. Zambrano then began walking forward, toward Christopher. Zambrano stated that Christopher said nothing as he approached, but appellant twice told Christopher to shoot Zambrano. As Zambrano continued approaching Christopher, Christopher fired his shotgun into the ground.
At this point, Guerrero came outside and began struggling with appellant, trying to wrestle the gun away from him. Zambrano testified that Christopher kept his gun pointed at Zambrano, but when appellant "said something like `shoot [Guerrero]'" to Christopher, Christopher shot in the direction of Guerrero and appellant, striking Guerrero. The three men then fled the scene, and hid in a trailer park.
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude a reasonable juror could convict appellant as a party to Guerrero's murder. Appellant was present at the commission of the murder, he conceived the idea to return to the party armed for a confrontation with Zambrano, encouraged his brother to shoot Guerrero, and then fled the scene along with his brother. See King, 29 S.W.3d at 562; Ahrens, 43 S.W.3d at 633. Accordingly, we overrule appellant's first issue.
Viewing the evidence neutrally, we cannot say the evidence supporting the conviction, taken alone, is too weak to support the verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, nor are we convinced the contrary evidence is so strong that the State is unable to meet its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt appellant was a party to Guerrero's murder. Zuniga, 144 S.W.3d at 484-85. Appellant asserts that the evidence is factually insufficient because it shows that his dispute was with Zambrano, not Guerrero. The State, however, was not required to prove appellant had any animosity toward the victim to obtain a conviction of appellant as a party to the murder. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 7.02(a)(2); see also Guevara, 152 S.W.3d at 49. Moreover, although the evidence reflects that appellant may have returned to the party to confront Zambrano, it also shows that appellant became involved in a physical struggle with Guerrero. Appellant's second issue is overruled.
In his remaining issue appellant claims the trial court erred in permitting the...
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