Mendez v. Superior Court
| Decision Date | 07 March 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. B145701.,B145701. |
| Citation | 87 Cal.App.4th 791,104 Cal.Rptr.2d 839 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Carlos Francisco MENDEZ, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent; The People, Real Party in Interest. |
Michael P. Judge, Public Defender, Kelly G. Emling, Head Deputy Public Defender, Marie C. Girolamo and John Hamilton Scott, Deputy Public Defenders, for Petitioner.
Steve Cooley, District Attorney, George M. Palmer, Head Deputy District Attorney, Brentford J. Ferreira and Shirley S.N. Sun, Deputy District Attorneys, for Real Party in Interest.
No appearance for Respondent.
Coram nobis will not issue to correct a judgment based upon perjured testimony unless the prosecuting authorities or the court knew or had reason to know about the perjury at the time it occurred. The question before us is this: Should we ignore that rule simply because this case is tangentially related to the Rampart scandal? Our answer is "no."
In April 1992, Carlos Francisco Mendez was convicted of a drug offense and placed on probation. In September 1992, he was convicted of another drug offense and once again placed on probation. On May 13, 1993, he was arrested by Los Angeles Police Department Officer David Mack. At Mendez's preliminary hearing, Officer Mack testified that when he saw Mendez on the street on May 13, he recognized him because, the day before, he had purchased $20 worth of rock cocaine from him (but had not arrested him then because he ran off). Mendez was held to answer and an information was filed charging him with one count of selling cocaine base.
At Mendez's arraignment in June, the trial court (Hon. J. Stephen Czuleger) said it was "a good case for a disposition" since Mendez was already on probation in two cases, suggested the new case was "worth four years in state prison," and noted that the prosecutor had nevertheless offered three years. The trial court said it was "a very, very reasonable offer under the circumstances and [was] in fact the lowest possible term" that Mendez could serve. When the court asked whether Mendez would like "to take advantage of that," Mendez said, When defense counsel confirmed that her client did not want to accept the offer, the court asked, "Do you understand it may not be available to you in the future and that you are on probation and I am going to run your probation violation hearings first and that on one probation you can get four years and on the other one you can get three years, and I can run them consecutive to each other, and that's aside from the new case that you have?" Mendez responded: "But how are they going to violate my probation if I didn't do anything?"
The court said,
Mendez was arraigned, a hearing on the probation violation was set for July 9, and trial was set for August 2. On July 9, defense counsel reminded the court (Judge Czuleger) about the three-year offer, then explained that Mendez's father had called and persuaded Mendez to accept the offer. The court responded: "My recollection is he not only did not want it, but he had quite a bad attitude about not wanting it." Defense counsel disagreed:
The court asked Mendez: Mendez said, "No. I was confused." The court said, "Sir, you weren't confused, you had a bad attitude." But the court then added: "If the defendant wants to plead right now I will give him the three years, if not we will go forward with the hearing immediately." Mendez was advised of his rights, which he waived. When asked if anyone had threatened him in any way, he said "no." When asked, "Are you doing this freely and voluntarily because you are in fact guilty," he said "yes," then pled guilty to the new count and admitted the probation violations. Mendez was sentenced to state prison for a term of three years.
In 1999, in federal court, Officer Mack was convicted of a bank robbery charge and sentenced to prison for a term of 14 years, three months. According to Mendez, Officer Mack had also "attempted to contract for a murder, consorted with narcotics dealers, and asserted that he `renounced' his career as a police officer and that he was a member of the Bloods street gang." In February 2000, in response to claims of corruption in the Rampart Division of the Los Angeles Police Department, the Los Angeles County Public Defender formed a Public Integrity Assurance Task Force to identify cases in which police misconduct might have resulted in a miscarriage of justice so that relief could be sought for those who had been victimized by police malfeasance.
In August 2000, Mendez filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus (presumably as the result of the Task Force's investigation). The petition alleged that he was innocent and that he had been unlawfully arrested by Officer Mack, and claimed that "[r]elief should be granted [because his] arrest and conviction [were] based solely on the credibility of ... Officer Mack." In an accompanying declaration signed in El Salvador, Mendez said he had "pled guilty even though [he] was not guilty because of what the judge told [him] would happen on [his] probation cases." The petition was summarily denied without prejudice (Hon. Larry Paul Fidler) on the ground that Mendez was not in actual or constructive custody.
In September, Mendez filed a "motion to vacate judgment or for other appropriate equitable relief in which he simply incorporated his habeas petition, noted that it had been denied without prejudice, and asked the court to vacate the judgment against him. The People construed Mendez's motion as a petition for a writ of coram nobis and, so construed, moved to dismiss it on the grounds (1) that Mendez "had to have been fully aware that there existed false evidence as presented in the police reports and the preliminary hearing and cannot claim this information is newly discovered"; (2) that the petition was "time barred because [Mendez] was not diligent in presenting his claims"; (3) that "coram nobis will not vacate a judgment when the conviction was obtained by the use of false testimony"; and (4) that Mendez had "not alleged with particularity facts that entitle him to relief."
The trial court (Judge Fidler) denied Mendez's motion. Mendez then filed a petition for a writ of mandate in which he asked us to compel the trial court to afford him a hearing and, upon a sufficient showing, to grant whatever equitable relief is appropriate under the circumstances. We issued an order to show cause.
Since Mendez is not in prison or on probation or parole or otherwise in constructive custody, the remedy of habeas corpus is not available to him—and it is immaterial that lingering noncustodial collateral consequences are still attached to his conviction. (Pen.Code, § 1473, subd. (a); In re Wessley W. (1981) 125 Cal. App.3d 240, 246-247, 181 Cal.Rptr. 401; Maleng v. Cook (1989) 490 U.S. 488, 490-492, 109 S.Ct. 1923, 104 L.Ed.2d 540; In re Azurin, 87 Cal.App.4th 20, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 284 (2001).) Mendez does not seriously contend otherwise.
The trial court construed Mendez's motion to vacate as a petition for a writ of error coram nobis and, so construed, denied it. Mendez contends this must be wrong. He says there must be some remedy available to him. On the showing he has made, there isn't.
In People v. Perez (1908) 9 Cal.App. 265, 98 P. 870, the defendant pled guilty to robbery and was sentenced to state prison. About a year later he filed a petition for a writ of coram nobis, alleging that his guilty plea was entered under duress—while incarcerated and awaiting his preliminary hearing, the sheriff had told him that he was in immediate danger of mob violence, and the only way to escape was to plead guilty, in which event he would be immediately moved from the local jail to the state prison. The People presented evidence to the contrary and the trial court denied the petition. The Court of Appeal said a guilty plea obtained by duress is void and cannot be the basis for a valid judgment, but affirmed in this case because the trial court was justified in believing, on the evidence before it, that the defendant's plea was entirely voluntary. (Id. at pp. 266-267, 98 P. 870; see also Alexander v. State (1912) 20 Wyo. 241 .)
In People v. Mooney (1918) 178 Cal. 525, 174 P. 325, the defendant was convicted of murder based on the testimony of eyewitnesses. His motion for a new trial was denied and the judgment was affirmed on appeal. Later, he filed a petition for a writ of coram nobis in which he presented new evidence (previously unknown to him or his lawyers) to show the eyewitness's testimony was false. If true, the new testimony would have impeached the witness's credibility. The petition was denied. The truth or falsity of...
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