Mendieta v. Municipal Court

Decision Date18 August 1980
Citation168 Cal.Rptr. 1,109 Cal.App.3d 290
PartiesMike MENDIETA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MUNICIPAL COURT, etc., County of San Diego, North County Judicial District, Defendant and Respondent. Civ. 22082.
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Thomas F. Gorman, Escondido, for plaintiff and appellant.

Edwin L. Miller, Jr., Dist. Atty., and Peter C. Lehman and George J. DuBorg, Deputy Dist. Attys., for defendant and respondent.

THE COURT. *

Mike Mendieta pleaded guilty in the Municipal Court to disturbing of the peace and petty theft (Pen.Code, §§ 415, 484, 488). After sentence he moved to set aside his plea on the ground his attorney had advised him no jail time would be imposed, but the court granted probation conditioned on 90 days in the county jail. After denial of his motion to set aside the plea, defendant pursued two remedies: he appealed to the appellate department of the superior court, which affirmed his conviction without opinion; and he also unsuccessfully sought a writ of mandate in the superior court to compel the municipal court to vacate the plea. Mendieta now seeks to appeal both the order of the municipal court denying his motion to vacate the plea and also the superior court judgment denying a writ of mandate. Only the latter is appealable to this court and the purported appeal from the municipal court order should be dismissed.

As a preliminary matter, we note Mendieta has availed himself of the so-called procedural "loophole" described in Gilbert v. Municipal Court, 73 Cal.App.3d 723, 140 Cal.Rptr. 897, and Burrus v. Municipal Court, 36 Cal.App.3d 233, 111 Cal.Rptr. 539, where a judgment of the municipal court, not normally appealable to the court of appeal, is converted into an original judgment of the superior court, which is appealable here, by the simple expedient of applying in superior court for a writ of mandate directed against the municipal court and then appealing to this court, the superior court judgment denying the writ. Such a procedure circumvents the established channels of judicial review which preclude review of municipal court judgments as of right in the court of appeal, and is highly disfavored, so that sanctions may be imposed for unwarranted use of the procedure. (See Burrus v. Municipal Court, supra, 36 Cal.App.3d 233, 239, 111 Cal.Rptr. 539.) The procedure is particularly objectionable when, as here, it results in the defendant having two identical appellate reviews of the same issue. The denial of the motion to set aside the plea is reviewable on appeal from the judgment of conviction (People v. Ribero, 4 Cal.3d 55, 62-63, 92 Cal.Rptr. 692, 480 P.2d 308), and was here so reviewed, and was also considered in the parallel writ proceeding. The availability of an adequate appellate remedy is normally a bar to prerogative writ relief, and where that remedy is not only available but also used, we think any further writ review should be limited to the question whether the municipal court judgment was voidable or void.

Here the alleged reasons for withdrawal of the plea were defendant's attorney examined a computer printout of defendant's past record which contained the entry "No" on an earlier robbery conviction. Although the attorney admitted to knowing Mendieta had done time on the robbery charge in the CRC facility, the attorney said he believed the time was served on a civil commitment. Based on his belief there was no actual criminal conviction of robbery, he advised Mendieta there would probably be no jail time imposed if he pleaded guilty in this case. However, at sentencing the probation report showed defendant had in fact been convicted of the robbery. The attorney contends if he had known of the robbery conviction he would not have advised his client to plead guilty nor would he have told his client not to exceed any jail time.

There is no showing defendant was himself unaware of his robbery conviction. Also, the record shows other prior convictions of forgery, auto theft, and possession of dangerous drugs. The drug conviction occurred in June 1978, and the date of d...

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4 cases
  • Andrus v. Municipal Court
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • June 17, 1983
    ...two contemporaneous and inconsistent rulings from higher courts on the same legal point in the same case. (Mendieta v. Municipal Court (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 290, 293, 168 Cal.Rptr. 1.) To deny retroactive application to the amendment of section 904.1 is to subscribe to the notion that the L......
  • Burg v. Municipal Court for Santa Clara Judicial Dist. of Santa Clara County
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • June 22, 1983
    ...the extraordinary importance of the issue presented, we do not fault counsel for using this procedure. (See Mendieta v. Municipal Court (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 290, 168 Cal.Rptr. 1.)4 South Dakota v. Neville, supra, 459 U.S. at p. ----, 103 S.Ct. at p. 920, 74 L.Ed.2d at p. ...
  • People v. Day, No. C060667 (Cal. App. 5/26/2010)
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • May 26, 2010
    ...that the plea was entered as a result of mistake, ignorance, or other factor overreaching his free understanding. (Mendieta v. Municipal Court (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 290, 294.)2 "`"Clear and convincing" evidence means evidence of such convincing force that it demonstrates, in contrast to the......
  • People v. Shavers, A125310 (Cal. App. 2/8/2010)
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • February 8, 2010
    ...he perceives as his attorney's poor tactical assessments or decisions. (McMann v. Richardson (1970) 397 U.S. 759; Mendieta v. Municipal Court (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 290, 294.) Appellant was the first witness at the hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea. Under cross-examination, he expla......

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