Menefee v. State
| Decision Date | 01 July 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. PD-1530-08.,PD-1530-08. |
| Citation | 287 S.W.3d 9 |
| Parties | Robert Lee MENEFEE, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas. |
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
James W. Huggler, Tyler, for Appellant.
Michael J. West, Asst. Criminal District Atty., Tyler, for State.
The appellant pled guilty in an open plea proceeding to the offense of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver in an amount greater than one, but less than four grams, a second-degree felony.1 He also pled true to an allegation that the offense occurred within a thousand feet of an institution of higher learning as well as to an allegation that he had been previously convicted of another felony offense for possession of a controlled substance, thus subjecting him to punishment as an enhanced first-degree felon.2 The trial court assessed his punishment at confinement in the penitentiary for a period of fifty-six years.
On appeal, the appellant contended that the evidence was insufficient to support his guilty plea, in contravention of Article 1.15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.3 In an unpublished opinion, the Tyler Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that, notwithstanding a defect in the written stipulation of evidence that the appellant entered in support of the plea, his sworn responses during the plea colloquy provided sufficient support for his guilty plea in satisfaction of the statute.4 One justice dissented, believing that the appellant's sworn response constituted only an entry of the guilty plea itself and could not be taken to constitute evidence in support of the plea.5 We granted the appellant's petition for discretionary review to examine the court of appeals's holding.6 We now reverse that holding and remand the cause to the court of appeals for consideration of extant, unresolved issues in the appeal.
The indictment alleged, inter alia, that the appellant "did then and there possess with intent to deliver, a controlled substance, namely, cocaine, in an amount of one (1) gram or more but less than four (4) grams, including any adulterants or dilutants[.]" The written stipulation of evidence in support of the appellant's open guilty plea, however, acknowledged as "true and correct" that the appellant "did then and there with intent to deliver, a controlled substance, namely, cocaine, in an amount of one (1) gram or more but less than four (4) grams, including adulerants and dilutants[.]" It is undisputed that the written stipulation thus failed to include the element of possession with intent to deliver the requisite amount of cocaine. For this reason, the court of appeals proceeded to inquire, consistent with Dinnery v. State,7 whether the record might otherwise contain evidence sufficient to sustain the appellant's guilty plea.
The court of appeals found independent support for the appellant's guilty plea in the following sworn colloquy between the trial court and the appellant occurring during the guilty plea proceeding:
From this point, the trial court turned to inquire into the appellant's plea to the enhancement provisions in the indictment.
The court of appeals held that the above colloquy sufficed to make up for the deficiency of the written stipulation. It reasoned that "[b]ecause [the appellant] pleaded guilty `[a]s to that charge in the indictment'—possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver—he supplied the element of possession, which was included in the indictment but omitted from his stipulation of evidence."9 For support of this proposition, the court of appeals relied principally upon this Court's opinion in Cooper v. State.10 Justice Hoyle disagreed with the majority, observing that "the fact that the trial court specifically referenced the `charge in the indictment' before [the appellant] pleaded guilty is not evidence supporting the conviction."11 We granted the appellant's petition for discretionary review to determine which view better accords with our case law construing Article 1.15.12
The United States Constitution does not require that the State present evidence in support of a guilty plea in Texas courts.13 Article 1.15 constitutes "an additional procedural safeguard required by the State of Texas but not by federal constitutional law."14 No trial court is authorized to render a conviction in a felony case, consistent with Article 1.15, based upon a plea of guilty "without sufficient evidence to support the same."15 Evidence offered in support of a guilty plea may take many forms. The statute expressly provides that the defendant may consent to the proffer of evidence in testimonial or documentary form, or to an oral or written stipulation of what the evidence against him would be, without necessarily admitting to its veracity or accuracy; and such a proffer or stipulation of evidence will suffice to support the guilty plea so long as it embraces every constituent element of the charged offense.16 Alternatively, our case law has recognized that the defendant may enter a sworn written statement, or may testify under oath in open court, specifically admitting his culpability or at least acknowledging generally that the allegations against him are in fact true and correct; and again, so long as such a judicial confession covers all of the elements of the charged offense, it will suffice to support the guilty plea.17 However, a stipulation of evidence or judicial confession that fails to establish every element of the offense charged will not authorize the trial court to convict.18 A conviction rendered without sufficient evidence to support a guilty plea constitutes trial error.19
A deficiency of one form of proof— say, a defective written stipulation of evidence (as we have in this case) or written judicial confession—may be compensated for by other competent evidence in the record.20 In the instant case, the court of appeals held that the defective written stipulation was saved by the sworn colloquy between the trial court and the appellant in which the appellant acknowledged that he was pleading guilty to the offense as alleged in the indictment, including the element of possession that was missing from the stipulation. The question presented in this case is whether a sworn acknowledgment that one is opting to plead "guilty" to the charged offense (without expressly admitting that the charges are "true and correct") is tantamount to a judicial confession, sufficient to satisfy Article 1.15. We hold that it is not.
Article 1.15 requires substantiation of a guilty plea. By its plain terms it requires evidence in addition to, and independent of, the plea itself to establish the defendant's guilt.21 In their comprehensive treatise on Texas criminal practice and procedure, Professors Dix and Dawson have observed that, when it comes to examining the record of a guilty plea proceeding for evidence sufficient to support the plea,
[t]here is sometimes difficulty determining whether a statement made by the defendant is part of the plea entry process or is independent of it. Clearly, the uttering of the words "guilty" or "no contest" in response to the question, "How do you wish to plead?" is not substantiation, but the plea itself. Some additional statement must be found to support a claim of substantiation by oral judicial confession.22
If they are right, then the court of appeals plainly erred in this case. When the appellant answered the trial court's question, "As to that charge in the indictment as we've just covered, how do you plead guilty or not guilty?" by responding, "Guilty, Your Honor[,]" he was merely entering his plea, not confessing to the truth and correctness of the indictment or otherwise providing substance to the plea. It should make no difference that the appellant entered his plea while under oath. Otherwise, any plea proceeding will serve to satisfy Article 1.15 so long as the defendant is sworn in before he enters his plea of guilty or nolo contendere, and he will be "convicted on what is essentially no more than his plea—the very vice the statute was designed to combat!"23
Unfortunately, Professors Dix and Dawson cite no cases for their assertion that the plea itself cannot provide substantiation. Perhaps the reason for this omission is that our case law is impossibly ambiguous on the subject. We turn to an examination of the relevant case law.
In Drain v. State,24 an oral stipulation was dictated into the record in support of the guilty plea. At that time, Article 1.15 did not authorize convictions based upon oral stipulations,25 so the Court proceeded to examine the balance of the record, including Drain's sworn testimony at the plea hearing, for any other evidence sufficient to support the plea. We found the following colloquy between Drain and his own attorney:
Q Your name is Dyon Weslie Drain?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you heard me make several waivers for you, and did I have the right to make those waivers for you?
A Yes, sir.
Q And...
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