Mengelkoch v. Industrial Welfare Commission

• Decision Date: 10 May 1968
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 66-1618-S.
• Citation: 284 F. Supp. 950
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California
• Parties: Velma L. MENGELKOCH, Mary Fazzio, and Dea C. Kaskela, as citizens of the United States and of the State of California on their own behalf and on behalf of all other citizens of the State of California similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. INDUSTRIAL WELFARE COMMISSION, and North American Aviation, Inc., a corporation, Defendants.

284 F. Supp. 950

Velma L. MENGELKOCH, Mary Fazzio, and Dea C. Kaskela, as citizens of the United States and of the State of California on their own behalf and on behalf of all other citizens of the State of California similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. INDUSTRIAL WELFARE COMMISSION, and North American Aviation, Inc., a corporation, Defendants.

Civ. No. 66-1618-S.

United States District Court C. D. California.

May 10, 1968.

Phill Silver, Hollywood, Cal., and Philip Poppler, Long Beach, Cal., subsequently, Evelyn E. Whitlow, Los Angeles, was substituted as counsel for plaintiff Velma L. Mengelkoch.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., B. Franklin Walker, Jr. and William L. Zessar, Deputy Attys. Gen., for defendants Industrial Welfare Commission and Division of Industrial Welfare.

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Los Angeles, for defendant North American Aviation, Inc.

Before JERTBERG, Circuit Judge, and STEPHENS and GRAY, District Judges.

OPINION AND ORDER ON MOTION TO DISSOLVE THREE-JUDGE COURT

STEPHENS, District Judge.

This is an action brought for declaratory and other appropriate relief pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Plaintiffs, three female employees of defendant North American Aviation, Inc., are suing to have Section 1350 of the California Labor Code (a maximum hours for women law), declared unconstitutional as violating the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, or invalid as conflicting with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7. Plaintiffs, suing in their own behalf and purportedly in behalf of all similarly situated women in the State of California, seek to enjoin defendants California Industrial Welfare Commission and the California Division of Industrial Welfare from enforcing § 1350, C.L.C. and to enjoin defendant North American from further violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.

Plaintiffs requested that a three-judge court be convened to hear and determine the case pursuant to Title 28 U. S.C. § 2281 and § 2284. A three-judge court was appointed and convened. Defendants Division of Industrial Welfare and the Industrial Welfare Commission filed a motion to dismiss.¹ Defendants' motion seeks three separate kinds of relief: (1) to dissolve the three-judge court; (2) to dismiss the complaint as against them on the ground that, as state agencies, they are immune from suit; and (3) to dismiss the action on the ground that the court, in the exercise of its discretion, should abstain from adjudicating the merits of this case.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES.

The ultimate merits of plaintiffs' claims are not now before the court. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to briefly mention the substance of the laws in issue. Section 1350 of the California Labor Code prohibits the working of females in certain employments for more than eight hours a day or forty-eight hours a week. Since the institution of this action, this section was amended to provide an exception to its terms pursuant to section numbered 1350.5 which was added in 1967. Where applicable this new section authorizes the employment of women up to ten hours per day and provides for overtime pay. In 1967 a new section numbered 1357 was added.

There are two distinct issues, one relating to the Equal Protection Clause and the other to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Issue No. 1

Section 1350 is said to violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. In general, the Equal Protection Clause prohibits unreasonable classifications in state laws, including classifications based upon sex. The question is one of the reasonableness of the classification made in the state regulatory statute.

Issue No. 2

Section 1350 is said to be in conflict with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution dictates that a state statute which conflicts with a valid federal statute cannot stand. The federal statute, Title VII, prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment based upon, inter alia, that employee's sex. It also prohibits an employer from limiting, segregating or classifying his employees in any way which would deprive them of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect their status as employees because of their sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). There is no "savings clause" for state protective laws for women in Title VII. However, Title VII does provide that an employer does not have to comply with a state statute requiring him to do acts which Title VII makes unlawful.

Plaintiffs claim that a state law which forbids an employer from allowing women to work overtime at premium pay compels discrimination with respect to compensation and privileges of employment by reason of their sex. The question is whether the state law conflicts or is inconsistent with the federal law. If it does, the federal law prevails.²

PROPRIETY OF A THREE-JUDGE COURT.

Section 2281 provides for a three-judge court where an injunction is sought restraining the enforcement of a state statute upon the ground that it is unconstitutional. Section 2281 provides:

"An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation or execution of any State statute by restraining the action of any officer of such State in the enforcement or execution of such statute or any order made by an administrative board or commission acting under State statutes, shall not be granted by any district court or judge thereof upon the ground of unconstitutionality of such statute unless the application therefor is heard and determined by a district court of three judges under section 2284 of this title." (Italics supplied.)

A. Substantial Constitutional Issue

It has been consistently held that a substantial constitutional question must be raised in order to invoke a three-judge court. California Water Service Co. v. City of Redding, 304 U.S. 252, 58 S.Ct. 865, 82 L.Ed. 1323 (1938). Lack of substantiality of the constitutional issue may exist because prior Supreme Court decisions make clear that it is without merit. California Water Service Co. v. City of Redding, supra; German v. South Carolina State Ports Authority, 295 F.2d 491 (4th Cir., 1961); People of State of Ill. ex rel. Sankstone v. Jarecki, 116 F.Supp. 422 (D.C.Ill., 1953); appeal dismissed 346 U.S. 861, 74 S.Ct. 107, 98 L.Ed. 373; Bradley v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, 130 F.Supp. 303 (D.C.N.Y., 1955); Blass v. Weigel, 85 F.Supp. 775 (D.C.N.J.,1949). The insubstantiality is especially apparent when previous decisions of the Supreme Court have specifically upheld the state statute in question against attack on constitutional grounds. German v. South Carolina State Ports Authority, supra.

The first issue raised by plaintiffs is that Section 1350 is unconstitutional as a denial of "equal protection of the laws." (See, Complaint ¶ XXIV) The constitutionality of Section 1350³ was challenged in Matter of Application of Miller, 162 Cal. 687, 124 P. 427 (1912) and Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373, 35 S.Ct. 342, 59 L.Ed. 628 (1915) as a deprivation of liberty to contract and a denial of equal protection. The Supreme Court held that the California statute was constitutional. The statute was found to be a reasonable regulation by the state to safeguard the public health. In so holding, the court regarded its prior decisions upholding other state maximum hours for women laws as decisive.

In Miller, the court quoted at length from the landmark case, Muller v. State of Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 28 S.Ct. 324, 52 L.Ed. 551 (1908), the first Supreme Court case to uphold the constitutionality of a state maximum hours law. Cf. Lochner v. State of New York, 198 U.S. 45, 25 S.Ct. 539, 49 L.Ed. 937 (1905). In Muller, the validity of an Oregon law limiting the hours of labor of females was attacked on constitutional grounds. The constitutionality of the statute was sustained.

The decision was based upon considerations relating to woman's physical structure, her maternal functions, and the vital importance of her protection in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race. "She is properly placed in a class by herself," the court stated (28 S.Ct. at 326-327), "and legislation designed for her protection may be sustained, even when like legislation is not necessary for men, and could not be sustained. * * * Even though all restrictions on political, personal, and contractual rights were taken away, and she stood, so far as statutes are concerned, upon an absolutely equal plane with him man, it would still be true that she is so constituted that she will rest upon and look to him for protection; that her physical structure and a proper discharge of her maternal functions — having in view not merely her own health, but the well-being of the race — justify legislation to protect her from the greed as well as the passion of man. The limitations which this statute places upon her contractual powers, upon her right to agree with her employer as to the time she shall labor, are not imposed solely for her benefit, but also largely for the benefit of all. Many words cannot make this plainer. The two sexes differ in structure of body, in the functions to be performed by each, in the amount of physical strength, in the capacity for long-continued labor, particularly when done standing, the influence of vigorous health upon the future well-being of the race, the self-reliance which enables one to assert full rights, and in the capacity to maintain the struggle for subsistence. This difference justifies a difference in legislation * * *."

Suffice it to say that the Supreme Court has passed upon and rejected the contention that state maximum hours for women laws violate the Equal Protection Clause. The restriction on working hours which such statutes impose on women, as a special class, has been held to be a...