People of State of Illinois v. Jarecki

• Decision Date: 28 September 1953
• Docket Number: No. 53 C 1939.,53 C 1939.
• Citation: 116 F. Supp. 422
• Parties: PEOPLE OF STATE OF ILLINOIS ex rel. SANKSTONE v. JARECKI, County Judge et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

116 F. Supp. 422

PEOPLE OF STATE OF ILLINOIS ex rel. SANKSTONE v. JARECKI, County Judge et al.

No. 53 C 1939.

United States District Court N. D. Illinois, E. D.

September 28, 1953.

George Yellen, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff.

Ben Schwartz, Asst. Atty. Gen., Bernard J. Korzen, John F. Tyrrell and Vincent P. Flood, Asst. State's Attys., Chicago, Ill., for defendants.

CAMPBELL, District Judge.

Plaintiff styles his complaint as one "in the nature of a mandamus proceeding and for equitable relief." The complaint alleges in substance, that the plaintiff is a resident and citizen of the State of Illinois and of the United States, and a duly qualified and registered voter in the County of Cook and State of Illinois; that on August 17, 1953, plaintiff filed certain petitions with the Honorable Richard J. Daley, County Clerk of Cook County, Illinois; that these petitions entered the plaintiff as a new party candidate under the designation of Judicial Non-Partisan Organization, as candidate for Judge of the Superior Court of Cook County, Illinois, for the full six-year term to be voted on at the judicial election to be held in Cook County on November 3, 1953; that these petitions conformed in all respects to the requirements outlined in the Illinois Election Code, Ill.Rev.Stat., Ch. 46, Sec. 10-2; that the nominating petitions were duly accepted and filed with the said Richard J. Daley, together with a certificate of candidacy of plaintiff, accepting the nomination; and that on August 21, 1953, one Leah M. Wiley filed certain objections to the nominating petitions.

The complaint further alleges that the Sheriff of Cook County failed to notify plaintiff of the time and place the electoral board would meet to hear the objections to his petitions, as provided by Illinois statute; that the Chairman of the electoral board failed to notify the members of the board and the plaintiff of the hearing on the petitions and the objections within the time specified by statute; that a hearing was held before the electoral board on August 27, 1953, tions to plaintiff's petitions, but that the hearing was held improperly because of the absence of Richard J. Daley, one of the members of the board; that the hearing was commenced over plaintiff's objection, and then continued for further hearing to August 31, 1953; that at this further hearing, the full electoral board was present; that plaintiff then objected that the hearing was illegally constituted, since Richard J. Daley had not been present at the first hearing, and, in the alternative, since the board did not convene within the time specified by the Illinois Election Code; that the hearing was nevertheless held by the board, and its decision was announced on September 2, 1953.

The decision of the electoral board is attached to and made part of the complaint. The board found that "the Nominating Petition of the plaintiff does not contain a sufficient number of signatures to equal at least five percent (5%) of the total number of persons who voted at the next preceding General Election in Cook County." On the basis of this finding, the board sustained the objections to plaintiff's nominating petitions, and ordered that plaintiff's name should not be printed on the ballot at the judicial election to be held on November 3, 1953.

The complaint also contains several lengthy descriptions of the Illinois Election Code, with particular emphasis upon Section 10-2 of Chapter 46, which prescribes the manner in which new parties may be formed within the State. The complaint alleges that this section of the Code is unconstitutional.

Plaintiff concludes his complaint with a prayer for declaratory and injunctive relief. He asks this court to declare that he has been denied due process of law, in that his constitutional right to become a candidate for judge of the Superior Court of Cook County has been violated; that Section 10-2 of Chapter 46 of the Illinois Statutes is unreasonable, arbitrary and unconstitutional; and that the electoral board acted without due process of law and without jurisdiction. Plaintiff asks that an interlocutory injunction be issued, restraining the enforcement of the decision of the Cook County Electoral Board, and the printing of the ballots for the judicial election of November 3, 1953, and that a three-judge court be convened to pass upon the constitutionality of Section 10-2, Chapter 46 of the Illinois Election Code.

The matter is now before the court on plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order and the convening of a three-judge district court. Section 2281 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S. C.A. § 2281, provides:

"An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation or execution of any State statute by restraining the action of any officer of such State in the enforcement or execution of such statute or of an order made by an administrative board or commission acting under State statutes, shall not be granted by any district court or judge thereof upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute unless the application therefor is heard and determined by a district court of three judges under section 2284 of this title."

This Section was added to the Judicial Code in 1948, and it is substantially similar to former Section 380 of Title 28. This former section has been construed by the Supreme Court on several occasions, and the Court has repeatedly held that Congress did not intend to prescribe the convening of a three-judge court whenever a complainant attacked the validity of a state statute. In short, an application for a three-judge court must be accompanied by a complaint which alleges a substantial federal question.

In Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co. v. Oklahoma Packing Co., 1934, 292 U.S. 386, 54 S.Ct. 732, 734, 78 L.Ed. 1318, the Court stated:

"The three-judge procedure is an extraordinary one, imposing a heavy burden on federal courts, with attendant expense and delay. That procedure, designed for a specific class of cases, sharply defined, should not be lightly extended. * * * The limitations of the statute would be defeated were it enough to keep three judges assembled that a plaintiff could resort to a mere form of words in his complaint alleging that the suit is one to restrain action of state officers, with no support whatever in fact or law."

Again, in California Water Service Co. v. City of Redding, 1938, 304 U.S. 252, 58 S.Ct. 865, 866, 82 L.Ed. 1323, the Court made clear that it is "the duty of a district judge, to whom an application for an injunction restraining...