Meniz v. Quissett Mill

• Citation: 104 N.E. 286,216 Mass. 552
• Parties: MENIZ v. QUISSETT MILL.
• Decision Date: 25 February 1914
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

216 Mass. 552

104 N.E. 286

MENIZ

v.QUISSETT MILL.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Bristol.

Feb. 25, 1914.

On Report from Superior Court, Bristol County; Lloyd E. White, Judge.

Action by Joseph Meniz against the Quissett Mill. On report. Judgment for plaintiff.

Jennings & Brayton, of Fall River, for plaintiff.

David F. Slade and Richard K. Hawes, both of Fall River, for defendant.

RUGG, C. J.

[1][2] The only question raised in this case is the sufficiency of the notice, the giving of which was a condition precedent to the maintenance of the plaintiff's action. Within the statutory time a communication from a duly authorized attorney in fact of the plaintiff was sent to the defendant, as follows:

‘Bliss & Walsh.

‘Law Offices, 19 College Street.

‘Telephone. Providence, R. I., June 28, 1911.

‘Quissett Mills, New Bedford, Mass.-Gentlemen: Joseph Menise has retained us in the matter of his case against your company for injuries sustained through the negligent starting of an engine while said Menise was engaged in cleaning the flywheel and was in a position within said wheel doing said work on the twelfth day of June in your mill in the city of New Bedford.

‘We should be glad to take this matter up with you at your earliest convenience.

‘Very truly yours,

‘E. Raymond Walsh.’

This communication was addressed to the defendant. It sets out with precision the time and place of the accident, and with reasonable sufficiency of detail its cause. Beauregard v. Webb Granite & Construction Co., 160 Mass. 201, 35 N. E. 555. At least in this respect it is sufficient to warrant a finding of good faith and that the defendant was not misled. Young v. Douglas, 157 Mass. 383, 32 N. E. 354. It is not signed by the plaintiff. But the requirement of St. 1909, c. 514, § 132, is that it shall be ‘signed by the person injured or by a person in his behalf.’ It sufficiently appears on the face of the communication that this notice was given by the attorney of the plaintiff in behalf of the plaintiff. It is not disputed that at this time the person signing the notice was the attorney in fact of the plaintiff for this purpose. It is not necessary that the notice should state expressly that it is signed in behalf of the plaintiff if such an intent can be reasonably inferred from its words. The relation of the parties may be taken into account in determining this question. In respect to its signature this communication was sufficient. Taylor v. Woburn, 130 Mass. 494;Dolan v. Alley, 153 Mass. 380, 26 N. E. 989;Carberry v. Sharon, 166 Mass. 32, 43 N. E. 912;Higgins v. North Andover, 168 Mass. 251, 47 N. E. 85;Greenstein v. Chick, 187 Mass. 157, 72 N. E. 955. The facts plainly distinguish the case at bar from Lukkonen v. Fore River Ship Building Co., 197 Mass. 586, 84 N. E. 299.

The communication is couched in the form of a letter rather than a notice. It frequently has been held that notices required by statutes of this sort are not to be construed with technical strictness. They are sufficient if enough appears from their terms to show that they are intended for the purpose of fixing a right of action and as the basis of a claim in behalf of the person injured. Lyman v. Hampshire, 138 Mass. 74, 77;Driscoll v. Fall River, 163 Mass. 105, 39 N. E. 1003;Carroll v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R., 182 Mass. 237, 241, 65 N. E. 69. But a written communication must go to this extent in order to be a compliance with the statutory requirement for a notice. It must show, when fairly construed, that it is intended as the foundation of that kind of a right of action to which a notice is a condition precedent. There is a great field of actions for personal injury for the maintenance of which no notice in writing is prerequisite. It is only in the restricted instances arising under the Employers' Liability Act (Rev. Laws 1902, c. 106, § 71 et seq.), narrow in operation since the enactment of the Workman's...