Meranto v. Meranto

• Decision Date: 31 January 1975
• Citation: 323 N.E.2d 723,366 Mass. 720
• Parties: Maria MERANTO v. Samuel R. MERANTO.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 723

323 N.E.2d 723

366 Mass. 720

Maria MERANTO v. Samuel R. MERANTO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Worcester.

Argued Dec. 6, 1974.

Decided Jan. 31, 1975.

Conrad W. Fisher, Worcester, for libellee.

James G. Reardon, Worcester, for libellant.

Before TAURO, C.J., and REARDON, BRAUCHER, KAPLAN and WILKINS, JJ.

BRAUCHER, Justice.

A wife filed a libel for divorce against her husband. After a decree nisi had been entered, it was vacated by consent of both parties and the libel was dismissed without prejudice. Thereafter, on the wife's petition served by publication, the consent decree was revoked and the decree nisi reinstated. The husband has now been found guilty of contempt of the decree nisi and sentenced to jail for six months, 'until he shall purge himself of his said contempt by complying with said decree.' Largely because of the husband's insistence on proceeding without counsel, the contempt proceedings, in the words of the judge, 'were so unusual and so bizarre that I have never quite heard anything like it.' We reverse the contempt decree and remand the case to the Probate Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The original libel for divorce was filed on March 25, 1971. On October 1, 1971, a decree nisi was entered giving the wife custody of the six minor children of the parties, ordering the husband to pay $150 a week for the support of the children, plus medical and dental expenses, and permitting the wife and children to occupy the home place in Grafton and use the furniture and furnishings therein. Rights of visitation were reserved for later determination, and the husband was prohibited from entering the home premises.

About one mouth later, on November 9, 1971, on the petition of both parties, the decree absolute was stayed, the decree nisi vacated, and the libel dismissed without prejudice. After nearly another month, on December 3, 1971, the wife filed an unverified 'petition to vacate stay of decree absolute,' and notice was given by publication. On January 10, 1972, a decree was entered revoking the decree of November 9, 1971, and 'making the decree nisi effective as of this date, together with the provisions of divorce granted on October 1, 1971.'

On August 9, 1972, the wife filed a petition that the husband be cited to appear and show cause why he should not be adjudged in contempt for his failure to obey the decree of October 1, 1971, alleging that the husband had not made payments on time, had 'threatened by telephone calls, refused her to occupy the Grafton Premises,' and was interfering with the children and the wife's personal life. Testimony was taken on March 5, 1973, and a decree was entered the same day that the husband was guilty of contempt and was committed to jail 'for the term of six months--until he shall purge himself of his said contempt by complying with said decree and (paying) the costs of said commitment or until the further order of this Court or until he be otherwise discharged by due course of law, and that a mittimus issue accordingly.' The husband appealed. The testimony is reported, and the judge made a report of material facts.

We summarize the report of material facts. After several continuances and changes of counsel representing the husband, he appeared without an attorney and despite contrary advice insisted on proceeding pro se. Not only did he refuse to allow the wife and children to have the use and occupancy of the home place, but he moved into the premises in violation of the decree of January 10, 1972, intimidated the wife, threatened her, and 'used abusive language and uttered epithets at her.' She finally moved out and he continually refused to allow her to occupy the premises. He also removed the furniture and prevented her from using it. The 'aforesaid decree was never modified by the respondent,' and he 'controls the said premises in his capacity as trustee of Washington Realty Trust.'

While the reported testimony includes testimony supporting the judge's findings, it indicates as well that the husband was not able to present his case in a coherent fashion. Counsel for the wife called the husband as his first witness, and began his examination by reading from the decree of October 1, 1971, stating that he was reading from the decree dated January 10, 1972. The husband tried to say that he had vacated the premises 'at the time that that was drawn up, your Honor, but we went back together . . ..' The judge intervened, 'Just answer his questions.' The husband's testimony thereafter consisted in substantial part of statements by counsel for the wife, punctuated by denials and expressions of confusion and frustration by the husband. When he tried to say that his wife had all the furniture, he was cut off by counsel for the wife: 'Please, sir. There is no other question before you.' The husband's attempt to cross-examine himself began, 'I had kind of prepared what I was going to say.' He was so thoroughly interrupted by counsel for the wife and by the judge that he managed to say nothing of significance until the judge examined him as to the ownership of the home place in Grafton.

The wife's testimony followed, consisting in large part of lengthy...