Mercado-Garcia v. Ponce Federal Bank

• Decision Date: 03 June 1992
• Docket Number: MERCADO-GARCI,No. 91-2296,M,91-2296
• Citation: 979 F.2d 890
• Parties: 60 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 558, 60 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 41,897, 61 USLW 2374, 16 Employee Benefits Cas. 1251 Julio A.aria Del Carmen Avila Mugica, and their Marital Conjugalship, Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. PONCE FEDERAL BANK, et al., Defendants, Appellees. First Circuit. Heard
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 890

979 F.2d 890

60 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 558,

60 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 41,897, 61 USLW 2374,

16 Employee Benefits Cas. 1251

Julio A. MERCADO-GARCIA, Maria Del Carmen Avila Mugica, and their Marital Conjugalship, Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. PONCE FEDERAL BANK, et al., Defendants, Appellees.

No. 91-2296.

United States Court of Appeals,

First Circuit.

Heard June 3, 1992.

Decided Nov. 19, 1992.

Pia Gallegos with whom Harry Anduze Montano was on brief for plaintiffs, appellants.

Gregory T. Usera with whom Goldman Antonetti Ferraiuoli & Axtmayer was on brief for defendants, appellees.

Before BREYER, Chief Judge, O'SCANNLAIN, ^* and CYR, Circuit Judges.

O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge:

In this case involving claims of age and employment discrimination we must resolve several issues of first impression.

I

Julio Mercado-Garcia ("Mercado") was fifty years old and had been in the employ of the Ponce Federal Bank ("the Bank") for eleven years when he was discharged from his position as Vice President for Human Resources in 1988. The final year of his tenure had not apparently been pleasant. Mercado says that his problems began in November 1987 when he refused to accede to his supervisor's request that he falsify certain personnel records. By his refusal to act in a manner he believed to be illegal, Mercado allegedly precipitated a campaign of harassment, intimidation, and discrimination against himself.

Eventually Mercado was asked, and asked again, to submit his resignation. When he refused, the Bank terminated his employment. A letter from the Bank reached Mercado on October 13, 1988, confirming his discharge effective September 30, 1988. He alleges, however, that his ill treatment at the hands of the Bank did not end there, for the Bank, assertedly without cause, promptly cancelled his VISA card and prematurely called a loan he had taken out from the Bank. In addition, says Mercado, the Bank failed to provide him timely notice of his rights to continue under the Bank's health and life insurance policies, thereby causing him to lose coverage.

Mercado filed his complaint in this case in July 1989 alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 ("ADEA"), the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 ("ERISA"), ¹ the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f ("ECOA"), and the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1168, ("COBRA"), as well as a federal breach of contract claim ² and pendent state law causes of action. In the district court, the Bank prevailed on all claims, some by dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and others by grant of summary judgment. 779 F.Supp. 620. Mercado timely appealed.

II

We turn first to Mercado's claim under the ECOA. Section 701 thereof provides as follows:

(a) It shall be unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any applicant, with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction--

(1) on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status, or age (provided the applicant has the capacity to contract)....

15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1). Mercado contends that summary judgment was erroneously entered against him on his claims under this section. Before reaching the merits of this contention, we must first analyze how the commands of the ECOA are to be applied, a matter we consider for the first time.

It is apparent that the plain language of the statute itself does not resolve a number of questions that are fundamental to its enforcement by the courts. In particular, the statute does not reveal what it is an ECOA plaintiff like Mercado must establish in order to make out a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination in a credit decision and to withstand a creditor's motion for summary judgment.

When faced with a matter of statutory construction that is of first impression we have looked for guidance to our construction of other, similar enactments. See De Jesus v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 918 F.2d 232, 234 (1st Cir.1990) (looking to precedent regarding grant of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in interpreting "similar" attorney's fees provisions of Truth in Lending Act). Doing so in this instance, we find in the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 ("EEOA"), an appropriate model, and cases interpreting that statute instructive. The EEOA seeks to prohibit discrimination in the employment arena much as does the ECOA in the realm of credit decisions. Indeed, the two statutes use nearly identical language in seeking to achieve their purposes. We therefore approve the district court's decision to follow the lead of other circuits and analyze the ECOA as we have analyzed the parallel provisions of the EEOA. See Bhandari v. First Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 808 F.2d 1082, 1100-01 (5th Cir.1987) (language of ECOA is "closely related" to that of EEOA and "was intended to be interpreted similarly"); Williams v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 554 F.Supp. 447, 448-49 (N.D.N.Y.1981) ("protections afforded by the ECOA should be applied in the same manner as those created by" the EEOA), aff'd, 697 F.2d 302 (2d Cir.1982).

Applying the settled law regarding discrimination in employment to Mercado's claim of age discrimination in the Bank's credit decisions, it is apparent that Mercado bore the burden of pleading a prima facie case of age discrimination. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093-94, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); Olivera v. Nestle Puerto Rico, Inc., 922 F.2d 43, 46-47 (1st Cir.1990). Assuming arguendo that he succeeded in doing so, the burden then shifted to the Bank "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the actions of which Mercado complains. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. at 1093.

We think the Bank carried this burden. The Bank explained that the cancelled VISA card was a special employee credit card, to which Mercado was no longer entitled after his termination. A new non-employee VISA card was made available to Mercado just two weeks after cancellation of the employee card. Similarly, the called loan had been offered to Mercado on favorable terms, as a special benefit incident to his employment by the Bank. Mercado, the Bank argued, could not reasonably expect to continue to be afforded the preferential treatment reserved for Bank employees once he was one no longer. Furthermore, it appears that Mercado had, upon learning that his discharge was imminent, run up substantial checking account overdrafts and withdrawn large amounts of cash through his employee VISA card, suggesting that he might be a credit risk.

The Bank having come forward with apparently legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, Mercado, in order to defeat the Bank's motion for summary judgment, was required to offer evidence sufficient to demonstrate by a preponderance that these reasons were in reality a pretext for age discrimination. Id.; Olivera, 922 F.2d at 47-48. This he was unable to do. Mercado failed to plead any verifiable facts showing that the Bank's credit decisions were based on his age. While he recited alleged incidents of age discrimination by the Bank against himself and others, he did not present any facts showing such discrimination in the calling of his loan and the temporary invalidation of his VISA card. Conclusory assertions or mere allegations, in lieu of documented facts, cannot withstand a summary judgment motion. Sheinkopf v. Stone, 927 F.2d 1259, 1262 (1st Cir.1991).

Mercado's showing raised no genuine issue as to whether the Bank's articulated reasons for limiting his credit were merely pretextual. The district court therefore correctly granted summary judgment against Mercado on this claim. See Ramos v. Roche Products, Inc., 936 F.2d 43, 47 (1st Cir.) (where there is no direct evidence that unlawful discrimination was a motivating factor in employer's decision, defendant need only articulate a plausible nondiscriminatory reason therefor to meet its burden in showing the absence of discriminatory intent), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 379, 116 L.Ed.2d 330 (1991); Villanueva v. Wellesley College, 930 F.2d 124, 127-28 (1st Cir.) (plaintiff must introduce evidence sufficient to raise a reasonable inference of discriminatory intent to defeat summary judgment), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 181, 116 L.Ed.2d 143 (1991).

III

Mercado next attempts to establish that the Bank breached his loan agreement by calling his loan prematurely. ³ His task is complicated by the fact that there is a written document evidencing the loan agreement--a promissory note signed by Mercado--that provides that the loan is due on demand. In the district court, Mercado sought to introduce parol evidence to show an oral agreement that the loan term was in fact five years. The Bank, perhaps contrary to its interest, responded by presenting extrinsic evidence that the loan was for a one year term.

In any event, we are convinced that the demand note is conclusive of this issue. The extrinsic evidence presented by the parties is of no relevance because Puerto Rico's parol evidence rule, P.R.Laws Ann. tit. 32, App. IV R. 69 (1983), requires us to ignore such evidence "when the agreement ... is clear and unambiguous." Catullo v. Metzner, 834 F.2d 1075, 1079 (1st Cir.1987). Rule 69(B) reads in pertinent part:

When in an oral or written agreement ... all the terms and conditions constituting the true and final intention of the parties have been included, such agreement shall be deemed as complete, and therefore, there can be between the parties ... no evidence extrinsic to the contents of the same, except in the following cases:

(1) Where a mistake or imperfection of the agreement is put in issue by the pleadings;

(2) Where the validity of the agreement is the fact in dispute.

This rule does not exclude other evidence of the circumstances...