Mercantile Trust Co. v. Schramm
| Decision Date | 21 December 1916 |
| Docket Number | No. 19628.,19628. |
| Citation | 269 Mo. 489,190 S.W. 886 |
| Parties | MERCANTILE TRUST CO. v. SCHRAMM, City Assessor, et al. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Judson, Green & Henry, of St. Louis, for petitioner. Chas. H. Daues and T. P. Young, both of St. Louis, for respondents.
Respondents are members of the St. Louis Board of Equalization, and as such have the same general power of reviewing local assessments in the city of St. Louis as has county boards of equalization in their respective counties.
It appears from the record that the assessor of the city of St. Louis, as required by section 11357, submitted to the state board of equalization an abstract of the taxable property in the city of St. Louis and its valuation, including, among other things, "corporate company's bank stock," at a total valuation of that class of property in the city of St. Louis of $65,738,690. The state board, having received such abstracts and reports, proceeded to equalize the assessments of banks throughout the state, and fixed such valuation at 50 per cent. of the aggregate returned by the various assessors, including that of the city of St. Louis. This assessment was certified by the state auditor to the city assessor of St. Louis and the assessor of the counties, being dated April 1, 1916, and shows that the aggregate valuation of the stock in banks in the city of St. Louis was placed at $32,688,450, or 50 per cent. of the aggregate returned by the city assessor. This was the uniform per cent. of the returned aggregates made by the various assessors of the state. Thereafter respondents, as members of the city board of equalization, placed the aggregate assessment against such banks at $46,017,083, which was exactly 70 per cent. of the original valuation certified to the state board by the city assessor, or 20 per cent. more than the valuation fixed by the state board.
Several cases involving the question here presented are pending, but by stipulation they are submitted on one record, all involving the same question. There is no dispute as to the controlling facts.
Our law provides a complete plan and scheme for the assessment and collection of taxes, an adequate means by which the burden primarily borne by the state and its subdivisions is transferred to the citizen. The prime and dominant idea of the scheme is furnished by the Constitution, and is that all property of the same class and value shall bear the same burden. While it is a matter of common experience that absolute equality in the imposition of taxes is not attainable, we nevertheless find an aim and intention on the part of our lawmakers to approximate to the idea of absolute equality as closely as the nature of the subject and the necessities of practical administration will permit. It is the uniformity of burden that the principle of uniformity in taxation is intended to accomplish, and whatever tends to foil this incurs the law's wrath. Discrimination, by whatever means induced, whether by different rates on the same values or the same rates on different values, seems within the inhibition. The state being subdivided, practical administration and the necessities of the case require that different rates be charged in different subdivisions in order to meet different local needs and conditions, and constitutional and statutory provisions for such different local rates are made. The principle of uniformity, however, requires that all property of the same class within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax be taxed at the same rate. A state tax must be apportioned uniformly throughout the state; a county tax throughout the county; and a municipal tax throughout the municipality. While provisions are made for different rates in different subdivisions and for local purposes no provisions are to be found anywhere which authorize different standards or bases of valuation. It is evidently intended that the difference in the various local conditions shall be cared for by a difference in the rate and not otherwise.
The law clearly and expressly requires that for the purpose of valuation all property in the state, regardless of where situate, shall be dealt with in the same manner. For this purpose of valuation, the law decrees uniformity and one standard throughout the state, and this without any regard whatever to local needs or differences in local conditions, for it ordains that all property, wherever situate, shall be assessed at its true value. In order to effectuate this command a state board of equalization has been provided, and its arm of authority extended to all parts of the state. It is a creature of the Constitution (Const. art. 10, § 18), and by that instrument enjoined to adjust and equalize the value of property among the several counties of the state, and perform such other duties as may be prescribed by law. The law has prescribed, among other things, that this board shall equalize the valuation of each class of property among the respective counties in the following manner:
It is these provisions, in the light of those in pari materia, that we are called upon to construe. It is not questioned that, under the provisions of this section not quoted, the state board of equalization can equalize according to classes as it did in the instant matter. This power was expressly confirmed by the amendment of 1899 (Laws 1899, p. 323), prior to which time its power was limited to equalizing among the different counties and not between classes. State ex rel. v. Vaile, 122 Mo. 33, 26 S. W. 672. Respondents concede that under this section the state board has the exclusive power to determine the minimum taxable value,...
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...may not change the aggregate figure, some saying that it may not increase or decrease it. Plaintiff thus cites: Mercantile Trust Company v. Schramm, 269 Mo. 489, 190 S.W. 886; Columbia Terminals Co. v. Koeln, 319 Mo. 445, 3 S.W.2d 1021; State ex rel. Thompson v. Dirckx, 321 Mo. 345, 11 S.W.......
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