Mercer v. Borden
Decision Date | 24 July 1998 |
Docket Number | No. SA CV 98-266-GLT [AM].,SA CV 98-266-GLT [AM]. |
Citation | 11 F.Supp.2d 1190 |
Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
Parties | Michael Anthony MERCER, Plaintiff. v. Candace BORDEN, et. al., Defendants. |
Gloria Dredd Haney, Law Offices of Gloria Dredd Haney, Anaheim Hills, CA, for Plaintiff.
David M. Lester, Michael R. Goldstein, Musick, Peeler & Garrett, LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendants.
On first Ninth Circuit impression, the Court holds the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 and following, extends potential liability to individuals.
Plaintiff alleges various wrongful employment practices against his employer and several manager-level individuals, including refusal to allow Plaintiff to take leave to care for his wife during a dangerous pregnancy. Among other claims, Plaintiff asserts a violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 and following.
The individual manager-level defendants move to dismiss the FMLA claim, contending individual defendants cannot be liable under that statute.
Whether potential liability under the FMLA extends to individuals is an issue of first impression in the Ninth Circuit. Additionally, no other Circuit Court has yet decided this issue, and the few district courts that have addressed it reached different conclusions. However, there is a clear weight of authority.
Most of the district courts that have considered the question have concluded potential liability under the FMLA extends to individuals. The definition of "employer" in the FMLA is identical to the definition of "employer" in the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). Both FMLA and FLSA extend employer status to "any person who acts, directly or indirectly, in the interest of an employer to any of the employees of such employer." 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(ii)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). Therefore, these courts have adopted an expansive interpretation of "employer," and have applied case law regarding individual liability under the FLSA. Since individuals can be liable under the FLSA,1 the courts conclude individuals can also be liable under the FMLA. See Stubl v. T.A. Systems, Inc. 984 F.Supp. 1075, 1084 (E.D.Mich.1997); Waters v. Baldwin County 936 F.Supp. 860, 863 (S.D.Ala.1996); Johnson v. A.P. Products, Ltd., 934 F.Supp. 625, 628 (S.D.N.Y.1996)(citing Falk v. Brennan, 414 U.S. 190, 94 S.Ct. 427, 38 L.Ed.2d 406 (1973)); Freemon v. Foley 911 F.Supp. 326, 330 (N.D.Ill.1995).
In contrast, the Eastern District of Tennessee has concluded liability under the FMLA does not extend to individuals. Frizzell v. Southwest Motor Freight, Inc. 906 F.Supp. 441 (E.D.Tenn.1995). Frizzell held the term "employer" as used in the FMLA should be construed the same as the term "employer" is construed under Title VII, which does allow liability for individuals who are not otherwise employers. Frizzell omits to mention, however, that the "employer" definition in the FMLA is different from the definition in Title VII ( ), but is the same as the definition in the Fair Labor Standards Act ( ).
The Ninth Circuit has recognized that, in determining whether liability extends to managing individuals in wrongful employment practice cases, comparative "employer" definitions in the respective statutes are significant. Miller v. Maxwell's International, Inc., 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir.1993) ( ).
Since the definition of "employer" in the FMLA is identical to the definition of "employer" in the FLSA, the Court holds individuals are...
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...that the FMLA extends individual liability to those who control a plaintiff's ability to take a leave of absence"); Mercer v. Borden, 11 F.Supp.2d 1190, 1190 (C.D.Cal.1998) ("Since the definition of `employer' in the FMLA is identical to the definition of `employer' in the [Fair Labor Stand......
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...that FMLA extends individual liability to those who control a plaintiff's ability to take a leave of absence); Mercer v. Borden, 11 F.Supp.2d 1190 (C.D.Cal. 1998) ("Since the definition of `employer' in the FMLA is identical to the definition of `employer' in the FLSA, the Court holds that ......
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Bonzani v. Shinseki, 2:11–cv–0007–EFB.
...Ninth Circuit, there is district court authority that public employees can be individually liable under the FMLA. See Mercer v. Borden, 11 F.Supp.2d 1190 (C.D.Cal.1998) (finding that liability extends to managing individuals under the FMLA consistent with precedent under the FLSA); Morrow v......
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...allows suit against public agency employers such as the Postal Service, as well as supervisory personnel, see, e.g., Mercer v. Borden, 11 F.Supp.2d 1190, 1191 (C.D.Cal.1998). Defendants nonetheless argue that the FMLA's definition of employer provides an implicit exemption from individual l......
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Family and Medical Leave Act
...F. Supp.2d 288, 291 (D. Mass. 1998); Bryant v. Delbar Products, Inc. , 18 F. Supp. 2d 799, 807-09 (M.D. Tenn. 1998); Mercer v. Borden , 11 F. Supp.2d 1190, 1191 (C.D. Cal. 1998); Rupnow v. TRC, Inc. , 999 F. Supp. 1047, 1048 (N.D. Ohio 1998); Stubl v. T.A. Sys., Inc. , 984 F. Supp. 1075, 10......
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Table of cases
...March 24, 2003, no pet.), §24:6.N.6 Mennor v. Fort Hood Nat’l Bank , 829 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1987), §18:4.B.2.c Mercer v. Borden , 11 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (C.D. Cal. 1998), §25:8.B.1, App. 25-2 Mercer v. Ross , 701 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. 1986), §9:5.C.2.e Merchant v. State , 379 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. Civ. ......
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Family and Medical Leave Act
...F. Supp.2d 288, 291 (D. Mass. 1998); Bryant v. Delbar Products, Inc. , 18 F. Supp. 2d 799, 807-09 (M.D. Tenn. 1998); Mercer v. Borden , 11 F. Supp.2d 1190, 1191 (C.D. Cal. 1998); Rupnow v. TRC, Inc. , 999 F. Supp. 1047, 1048 (N.D. Ohio 1998); Stubl v. T.A. Sys., Inc. , 984 F. Supp. 1075, 10......
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Table of cases
...March 24, 2003, no pet.), §24:6.N.6 Mennor v. Fort Hood Nat’l Bank , 829 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1987), §18:4.B.2.c Mercer v. Borden , 11 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (C.D. Cal. 1998), §25:8.B.1, App. 25-2 Mercer v. Ross , 701 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. 1986), §9:5.C.2.e Merchant v. State , 379 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. Civ. ......