Mercer v. State
| Decision Date | 27 January 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. SD 30397.,SD 30397. |
| Citation | 330 S.W.3d 843 |
| Parties | Richard S. MERCER, Movant–Appellant,v.STATE of Missouri, Respondent–Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Craig A. Johnston, Columbia, MO, for Appellant.Chris Koster, Attorney General, and Karen L. Kramer, Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, MO, for Respondent.GARY W. LYNCH, Judge.
Richard S. Mercer (“Movant”) appeals the denial of his Rule 29.15 1 motion for post-conviction relief, which sought to vacate his convictions for second-degree statutory rape and incest. Movant contends that the motion court clearly erred in finding that trial counsel was not ineffective for objecting to testimony the State attempted to elicit from an investigating detective on the issue of findings contained in a report of a sexual abuse forensic examination of the victim. Finding no such error, we affirm the motion court's judgment denying Movant's motion.
Movant was charged as a prior and persistent offender with the class C felony of statutory rape in the second degree, in violation of section 566.034, RSMo 2000, and the class D felony of incest, in violation of section 568.020, RSMo Cum.Supp.2006.
At Movant's criminal jury trial, the State called Detective Paul Satterfield who testified on direct examination that he made arrangements for a third party to perform a sexual assault forensic examination (“SAFE”) of the victim, who is Movant's daughter. Detective Satterfield had received and reviewed the report of the findings following the examination. At trial, he identified State's Exhibit 5 as being the SAFE report in question. The State then moved to admit Exhibit 5, to which Movant's trial counsel, Donna Holden, objected on the basis of hearsay, in that the detective testifying was not qualified to authenticate the report. That objection was sustained. The State continued its direct examination of Detective Satterfield, inquiring, “with regard to the SAFE exam, were there any physical findings?” Trial counsel again objected. Her objection was sustained, and the detective did not answer the State's question.
Movant was found guilty on both counts. The trial court sentenced Movant as a persistent offender to 15 years' imprisonment on the charge of second-degree statutory rape and 7 years' imprisonment on the incest charge. The sentences were ordered to run consecutively. Movant timely appealed his convictions and sentences to this Court, which affirmed the same in a written order. See Rule 84.16(b).
Movant timely filed a pro se motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 29.15. Post-conviction counsel was appointed and filed an amended motion that alleged, in part, that trial counsel was ineffective for objecting to the inquiry posed by the State to Detective Satterfield regarding whether any physical findings were identified in the SAFE report.2 Movant contended that “[r]easonably competent counsel would not have objected to this particular question but rather would have welcomed the question and the expected answer which would have been that there were no physical findings revealed by the SAFE exam.” Further, had trial counsel allowed the witness to answer, Movant claimed, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of Movant's case would have been different.
Following an evidentiary hearing the motion court found, in relevant part, that trial counsel's objection to the State's question was reasonable trial strategy, that Movant failed to carry the burden of proving his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence, and that there was “no reasonable probability that had counsel allowed this evidence to be introduced, the outcome of the case would have been different.” Movant appeals.
Our review on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is limited to a determination of whether the motion court's findings and conclusions are clearly erroneous. Rule 29.15(k). The motion court's findings and conclusions are deemed to be clearly erroneous only when, following review of the entire record, we are left with a definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made. Storey v. State, 175 S.W.3d 116, 125 (Mo. banc 2005). The motion court's findings are presumptively valid, and we defer to the motion court's determination on matters of witness credibility. Morgan v. State, 319 S.W.3d 514, 517 (Mo.App.2010).
Movant alleges in his sole point on appeal that the motion court clearly erred in denying post-conviction relief, in that trial counsel was ineffective for objecting to the question posed to Detective Satterfield by the State. Movant alleges that the detective's “answer would have been that there were no physical findings revealed by the SAFE exam.” He argues that trial counsel's objection to the State's question was essentially a failure to present evidence, “since her objection kept out evidence supporting [Movant's] defense.” 3
To prevail on a claim that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, a movant must prove that counsel failed to exercise the customary skill and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances and that such failure prejudiced the movant. Maclin v. State, 184 S.W.3d 103, 107 (Mo.App.2006). A movant must establish both prongs to obtain relief, and this Court may end its inquiry upon a finding that one or the other has not been established. Id.
“To satisfy the first prong, [M]ovant must overcome the presumption that any challenged action was sound trial strategy and that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of professional judgment.” Helmig v. State, 42 S.W.3d 658, 667 (Mo.App.2001). To prove the second prong—counsel's failure to render adequate assistance resulted in prejudice to Movant—Movant must demonstrate that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different. Maclin, 184 S.W.3d at 107. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient...
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Mercer v. State
...of law. See State v. Mercer , SD29114 (May 4, 2009). Mercer sought post-conviction relief, which was denied. Mercer v. State , 330 S.W.3d 843 (Mo. App. S.D. 2011).On October 8, 2013, Mercer filed a pro se motion for post-conviction DNA testing pursuant to section 547.035. On October 21, 201......
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Mercer v. State
...opinion, State v. Mercer , SD29114 (per curiam ); (2) an unsuccessful appeal of the denial of his Rule 29.15 motion, Mercer v. State , 330 S.W.3d 843 (Mo. App. S.D. 2011) ; and (3) an appeal from the denial of a previous § 547.035 motion in which this Court dismissed his appeal due to the l......