Merchants Motor Freight v. State Highway Commission
| Decision Date | 15 June 1948 |
| Docket Number | 47217. |
| Citation | 32 N.W.2d 773,239 Iowa 888 |
| Parties | MERCHANTS MOTOR FREIGHT. Inc. v. STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION et al. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Robert Larson, Atty. Gen., Don Hise, Asst. Atty. Gen, and Hextell & Beving, of Des Moines, for appellants.
Cosson Stevens, Hauge & Cosson, of Des Moines, for appellee.
Plaintiff, a Minnesota Corporation, operates motor trucks, transporting freight, over established routes and between fixed terminals both within and without the state of Iowa. Some of its trucks are Iowa licensed. Some bear Minnesota registrations. Plaintiff alleges that it has complied with Iowa registration statutes, as construed by the Motor Vehicle Department of Iowa. That the defendants, claiming that plaintiff's trucks, which bear the Minnesota registrations, are improperly licensed are charging plaintiff's drivers with violating the motor vehicle statutes and issuing summonses to them on account thereof. It asks that defendants' rights, status and authority relative to the enforcement of the motor vehicle statutes be declared to be limited to size, weight and load and that defendants be enjoined from acting beyond that limitation.
Defendants assert that the plaintiff's trucks are improperly licensed. That they should bear Iowa licenses, and that under the Iowa statutes, the Commission is charged with the duty of enforcing the motor vehicle statutes as to registration as well as to size, weight and load. That plaintiff, being a law violator is not entitled to equitable relief.
The trial Court held the question of whether plaintiff's trucks were properly licensed or not, was immaterial, and limited the hearing to the sole question of authority to enforce the motor Vehicle statutes of this State. It held this authority was limited to size, weight and load and granted an injunction. Defendants appeal.
I. All Iowa rules and regulations governing motor traffic on the state highways are based upon statutes. Both the Iowa State Highway Commission and the Motor Vehicle Department are creatures of statute and but agents of the State in the carrying out of the legislative provisions governing highways and their use. Except as authorized by statute, these agencies are without authority to act, and an analysis of our various statutes is necessary in determining this basic question. State v. F. W Fitch Co., 236 Iowa 208, 17 N.W.2d 380.
Chapters 307 and 313 create the State Highway Commission and designate its duties, generally. In neither chapter is found authority to in any manner supervise or be concerned with traffic on the highways. If such authority exists it must be found in other Chapters of the Code.
Chapter 80 provides for a Department of Public Safety. Section 80.9 states, 'It shall be the duty of the department of public safety to prevent crime, to detect and apprehend criminals and to enforce such other laws as are hereinafter specified. * * *' Section 80.22 provides 'All other departments and bureaus of the state are hereby prohibited from employing special peace officers or conferring upon regular employees any police powers to enforce provisions of the statutes, which are specifically reserved by this act to this department. * * *'
Chapter 321 pertains to motor vehicles, Section 321.2 states: 'The department of public safety, under the commissioner thereof, shall constitute the motor vehicle department for the administration and enforcement of this chapter.' Thus it is clear that the statutory duty to enforce the motor vehicle laws is specifically reserved to the department of public safety, and under Section 80.22, other departments and bureaus of the state are prohibited from enforcing them. This bar applies to the defendant highway commission. This chapter, 321, is all inclusive in so far as motor vehicles are concerned and includes license and registration; weight, size and load of vehicles and the law of the road. Sections 321.17 to 321.56 incl., contain the regulations relative to license, registration and permits for both resident and nonresident owned vehicles. Section 321.56 clearly contemplates reciprocity agreements between Iowa and the various states, although no express legislative authority is found therefor. In view of the provisions of Section 321.2, the duty and responsibility of reciprocity agreements, rests with department of public safety. See State v. Robbins, 235 Iowa 602, 15 N.W.2d 877.
Sections 321.452 to 321.481, incl., pertain to size, weight and load of vehicles using the highways, and here is found an exception to Section 321.2 in that in addition to the authority vested in the motor vehicle department, the legislature has given a concurrent authority to the highway commission in these matters. Section 321.476 states: 'Authority is hereby given to the state highway commission to stop any motor vehicle or trailer on the highways for the purposes of weighing and inspection, to weigh and inspect the same and to enforce the provisions of the motor vehicle laws relating to the size, weight, and load of motor vehicles and trailers.' This Section grants the authority for the highway commission to enforce the provisions of this chapter as to size, weight and load and limits it to those matters. Section 321.477 states 'The state highway commission may designate by resolution certain of its employees upon each of whom there is hereby conferred the authority of a peace officer to control, direct, and weigh traffic on the highways, and to make arrests for violations of the motor vehicle laws relating to the size, weight, and load of motor vehicles.' This section, which must be considered in conjunction with Section 321.476, merely provides the highway commission with the means to enforce and carry out the authority granted in Section 321.476. No additional authority is granted therein.
Appellants contend that by using the word 'control' in section 321.477, the legislature granted to them authority over registration and licenses. However, the word 'control' as here used, applies not to the authority to act, but to enforcement of that authority. Control is defined in Webster's New International Dictionary, Second Edition, as 'To exercise restraining or directing influence over; to dominate; regulate; hence, to hold from action; to curb.' Appellants further contend that under Section 321.492, its employees, designated in Section 321.477, are given specific authority to act in regard to registration and licenses, it being their theory that these employees are peace officers. Section 321.492 does grant to any peace officer the right to inspect registrations, but the fallacy of appellant's position lies in the fact that the employees are not peace officers. Section 321.1(45) defines a peace officer for the purposes of the chapter to mean 'every officer authorized to direct or regulate traffic or to make arrests for violations of traffic regulations in addition to its meaning in section 748.3.' Section 321.1(65) defines Traffic to mean 'pedestrians, ridden or herded animals, vehicles, street cars, and other conveyances either singly or together while using any highway for purposes of travel.' To say that, when the legislature conferred on certain highway commission employees 'the authority of peace...
To continue reading
Request your trial