Meredeth v. Owen

Decision Date31 December 1856
PartiesWASHINGTON MEREDETH v. JOSHUA OWEN et al.
CourtTennessee Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

FROM OVERTON.

This bill was filed in the chancery court at Livingston, for the purposes stated in the opinion. At the March term, 1856, Chancellor Van Dyke gave a decree for the complainant. The defendants appealed.

Swope and W. F. Cooper, for complainant; S. Turney and Jones, for the defendants.

Caruthers, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

The question raised in this case is upon the construction of a deed of gift, made by John Beaty to his daughter Polly Owen, wife of Joshua Owen, of a negro girl, Celia, in 1846. It is in these words:

“Know all men by these presents that I, John Beaty, Sr., for and in consideration of the love and affection I have for my daughter, Polly Owen, wife of Joshua Owen, do give a certain negro girl slave, Celia, nine years of age, to be the right and property of said Polly during her life; and for the love and affection I have for her, I give to her the aforesaid girl Celia, to her and her heirs, to have and to hold said negro girl free from the lawful claims of all and every person whomsoever. Given under my hand and seal this 9th January, 1846.

John his X mark Beaty. [Seal.]

Test: Elias Bowden.

Sampson Solomon.”

This was duly proved and registered the same year, and the slave held under it by the husband and wife.

In September, 1850, the complainant obtained a decree in the chancery court at Livingston, against the defendant Owen and others, for about $550, and an execution issued for the same, which was returned “no property found.” The sheriff refused to levy upon this girl, because of the disputed title, and this bill was filed to remove the cloud and subject the slave to the payment of the judgment.

On the 22d of October, 1850, after the said decree of Meredith was obtained, John Beaty executed another deed of gift, conveying the slave explicitly to the said Polly and her children, by name, for their separate use. This can, of course, have no effect upon the case, but it must turn upon the proper construction of the deed of 1846. Yet it may operate as an obstacle in executing the decree, and should be removed.

The form of the first deed is very peculiar, and was evidently drawn by an unskillful hand. We have to take such papers as we find them, and give them the best interpretation we can, under the guides furnished by precedents and the rules of law. He first gives her the slave “for her life,” and in the next lines and same sentence, in fee “to her and her heirs.” What estate does she take--for life or absolutely? There has been no little difficulty in the cases in settling the rights of parties claiming under formal deeds where the estate given in the premises is different from that described in what is called the habendum. Its office, where the deed is formal, is properly to determine what estate or interest is granted by the deed. But this may be, and often is, performed in the premises. This embraces all the parts of a deed which precede the habendum, and comprehends the names of the parties, the consideration, and the certainty of the thing granted. But it would be good if the grantee were first named in the habendum, provided there were no other grantee named in the premises (Co. Lit. 26, b. note); or if there were, provided the estate given in the habendum to the new grantee was not immediate, but by way of remainder. The habendum part of a deed was originally, and is yet where strict form is observed, used to determine the interest granted, or to enlarge, explain, or qualify the premises. But it can not divest an estate already vested in the premises, for it is void if repugnant to the estate before granted. 2 Bla. Com. 298; 4 Kent, 468. Chancellor Kent observes that in modern conveyancing the habendum clause in deeds has degenerated into a mere useless form, for the deed is good without it under the usual specifications in the premises. If this deed can be regarded as containing the formal parts referred to, the first clause, conveying a life interest, is only enlarged to an absolute estate in the second....

To continue reading

Request your trial
1 cases

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT