Mereow v. Inhabitants of Norway Vill. Corp.

• Decision Date: 27 November 1919
• Citation: 108 A. 325
• Parties: MEREOW v. INHABITANTS OF NORWAY VILLAGE CORPORATION.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

108 A. 325

MEREOW

v. INHABITANTS OF NORWAY VILLAGE CORPORATION.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Nov. 27, 1919.

Report from Supreme Judicial Court, Oxford County, at Law.

Action by Mark Merrow against the Inhabitants of Norway Village Corporation, resulting in, judgment for plaintiff. On report to the Supreme Judicial Court. Judgment for plaintiff, with costs.

Argued before CORNISH, C. J., and HANSON, PHILBROOK, DUNN, MORRILL, and DEASY, JJ.

Alton C. Wheeler, of South Paris, for plaintiff.

Albert J. Stearns, of Norway, and William W. Gallagher, of Caribou, for defendants.

CORNISH, C. J. On agreed statement. At the May term, 1918, of the Supreme Judicial Court for Oxford county the plaintiff brought this writ of entry, demanding "against the said defendant the possession of the lot of land in Norway Village Corporation which is known as the Fordyce McAllister place," etc. On the second day of the return term the defendants filed a disclaimer of the entire tract and of all interest therein.

At the February term, 1919, the defendants filed a special demurrer to the writ on the ground that the description of the demanded premises was not sufficiently definite and precise, and was not so certain that seisin could be delivered to the sheriff without reference to some description dehors the writ. The Presiding Justice overruled the demurrer and gave judgment for the plaintiff. To this ruling the defendant took exceptions, but did not seasonably perfect them. At the May term, 1919, counsel agreed that the case should not be prejudiced thereby, but that the cause should be reported to the law court upon an agreed statement "to be decided by said law court in like manner and with like results as is provided in the case of appeals, * * * the law court to render such judgment as to the legal rights of the parties require."

The point at issue is the sufficiency of the description in the writ, viz. "the lot of land in Norway Village Corporation which is known as the Fordyce McAllister place."

The criterion as to definiteness in description is fixed by the statute governing real actions. "In such action, the demanded premises shall be clearly described in the declaration, otherwise the court may direct a nonsuit." R. S. c. 109, § 21.

If this should be construed to mean that the premises must be so clearly defined that the officer having the execution in his possession may find them, we think in the case at bar that requisite is met. It is not expected that the officer can identify them, any more than he could identify a stranger whom he is directed to arrest, without inquiry. Willey v. Nichols, 59 Me. 253, 254. On inquiry this lot could be readily found. It is "the" lot, not "a" lot, thereby implying that there is \m\y one. That one is known as the Fordyce McAllister place, and is situated in Norway Village Corporation. This description falls well within the rule followed in Willey v. Nichols, 59 Me. 253, supra, and Bragg v. White, 66 Me. 157.

"If the officer fails to find it, the tenant will receive no harm. We apprehend the fear is that he may find it"—is the trenchant language of Chief Justice Appleton in the case last cited.

If, however, the true test of clearness of description is that...