Merid v. Commonwealth

• Decision Date: 12 May 2020
• Docket Number: Record No. 1145-19-4
• Citation: 72 Va.App. 104,841 S.E.2d 873
• Court: Virginia Court of Appeals
• Parties: Endalkachew MERID v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia

72 Va.App. 104

841 S.E.2d 873

Endalkachew MERID

v.COMMONWEALTH of Virginia

Record No. 1145-19-4

Court of Appeals of Virginia.

MAY 12, 2020

Samuel C. Moore (Law Office of Samuel C. Moore, PLLC, on briefs), for appellant.

Kelsey M. Bulger, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Present: Judges Petty, AtLee and Senior Judge Annunziata

OPINION BY JUDGE WILLIAM G. PETTY

In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court erred in refusing to suppress evidence that police discovered after entering an apartment to prevent an occupant from committing suicide. Because we conclude that the officers’ actions were reasonable and thus did not violate the Fourth Amendment, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I. BACKGROUND

"In reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress, ‘we determine whether the accused has met his burden to show that the trial court’s ruling, when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, was reversible error.’ " Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. App. 53, 56, 774 S.E.2d 469 (2015) (quoting Roberts v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 146, 150, 684 S.E.2d 824 (2009) ).

"[A] defendant’s claim that evidence was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment presents a mixed question of law and fact that we review de novo on appeal." King v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 717, 721, 644 S.E.2d 391 (2007). On appeal, we are "bound by the trial court’s findings of historical fact unless ‘plainly wrong’ or without evidence to support them and we give due weight to the inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers." Cantrell, 65 Va. App. at 56, 774 S.E.2d 469 (quoting McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 198, 487 S.E.2d 259 (1997) (en banc )). "However, we consider de novo whether those facts implicate the Fourth Amendment and, if so, whether the officers unlawfully infringed upon an area protected by the Fourth Amendment." Id. (quoting Hughes v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 447, 454, 524 S.E.2d 155 (2000) (en banc )).

On October 18, 2017, the Alexandria Police Department received a call about Endalkachew Merid. Early that morning Merid texted his brother Asteway, saying that life had been hard for the past nine years, that he had "been struggling, pretending," and that he was going to "join" their deceased mother. The messages ended with the plea "[P]lease forgive me for my weakness."

Unsettled by these messages, Asteway and his wife called Merid’s cell phone. Merid answered but did not speak for long, telling them that he was "sleepy" and "fine." During the next few hours, Asteway tried unsuccessfully to reach Merid on the phone again.

Asteway left work around 3:00 p.m. and went to Merid’s apartment, where he noticed that the car Merid drove was in the apartment parking lot. He tried knocking on the door, and he also tried calling Merid through the intercom. Unable to reach him by any of these means and concerned for Merid’s welfare, Asteway called the police.

Officers Izzi and Matteson came to the apartment in response to Asteway’s phone call. Asteway was "very concerned." Asteway showed Officer Izzi the text messages, explaining that Merid claimed he was going to "join" their deceased mother. He told the officers that he had attempted to reach Merid that day and that he thought Merid was home, because the car Merid drove was in the parking lot. The officers ran the tags on the car and discovered that it was not registered to Merid, and Asteway explained that Merid did not own the car.

The officers began to knock on the apartment door, and they heard a male voice inside saying "something about getting dressed or clothes." Officer Izzi announced that they were police. Asteway also tried to talk to his brother through the closed door. As the officers continued knocking, they heard "some sort of garble, throw up, suction noise," which Officer Izzi described as "very strange" and "alarming." Officer Matteson described the sound as "a gargling sound mixed with some coughing and moaning, like pain." Officer Izzi asked if the occupant was okay. He testified, "[t]hought I heard maybe a yeah. Asked if he needed medics. He said no. Asked him – kept knocking, asking him to come to the door so we could see. Make sure everything’s ok." There was no further response from inside the apartment, except for the strange noise.

The officers unlocked the door with a maintenance key, still announcing their presence and calling for Merid to come to the door. Hearing the "alarming" noise again and unable to open the door because the chain latch was engaged, Officer Izzi "shouldered the door open." The apartment was dark.

Officer Izzi immediately saw that Merid was on the couch, using a large kitchen knife to repeatedly stab himself in the throat. Officer Izzi ran over to the couch, "held [Merid’s] arm down[,] and pried the knife out of his hand." Officer Matteson called for medics, and they both attempted to stop the bleeding until the medics arrived about five minutes later.

When the medics arrived and began administering aid, the officers stepped away a few feet and waited. Officer Izzi recalled that, from his point of view in the dining area, he was able to see the entire apartment but for the bedroom. At that point, the acting sergeant—who was now on-scene—reached his head in the door and "asked if the apartment had been checked for anyone else." Officer Izzi testified,

We had already seen the living room, the dining room, and the kitchen. But to my rear was the bedroom door. So I told him that I would check to ensure that there was no other person or pets or anything like that in the apartment. And I then went and checked the bedroom.

He stepped three or four feet to the bedroom, opened the door, and saw a female body lying on the ground. She was "tied to the chair. Her head was wrapped in plastic .... And there was dried blood pooled on the floor all around her." The body was discovered to be that of June Seals, the owner of the car in the parking lot and the only person listed on the rental agreement. Officer Izzi notified the sergeant and the medics, and he secured the bedroom as a crime scene. Merid was then transported to the hospital. The next persons to enter the room were detectives, who had obtained a search warrant.

Merid was subsequently indicted for the abduction and murder of June Seals, in violation of Code §§ 18.2-47, 18.2-32, and 19.2-221. He moved to "suppress all evidence, and its fruits thereof, recovered on October 18, 2017, through an unlawful search of [his] residence."² The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding the community caretaker exception to the Fourth Amendment applied to the search and the evidence would have been inevitably discovered. Following a jury trial, Merid was convicted of both counts and sentenced to life in prison, plus ten years.

II. ANALYSIS

Merid argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the entry into the apartment and the search of the bedroom violated the Fourth Amendment. We disagree and hold that both the entry into the apartment and the search of the bedroom were justified under the emergency aid exception to the Fourth Amendment.³

A. Initial Entry into the Residence

We first consider the law pertaining to an officer’s initial entry into a residence to render emergency aid. It is well-established that under the Fourth Amendment, "[s]earches and seizures conducted without a warrant are presumptively invalid." Cantrell, 65 Va. App. at 59, 774 S.E.2d 469. However, this " ‘presumption may be overcome in some circumstances’ because the ‘warrant requirement is subject to certain reasonable exceptions.’ " Ross v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 752, 759, 739 S.E.2d 910 (2013) (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 1856, 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011) ); see also Kyer v. Commonwealth, 45 Va. App. 473, 480, 612 S.E.2d 213 (2005) (en banc ) (recognizing that the Fourth Amendment "condemns only ‘unreasonable’ searches and seizures"). Indeed, "reasonableness is always the touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis." Birchfield v. North Dakota, ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2186, 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016).

"One concession to reasonableness" is the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement, which "recognizes the ‘right of the police to enter and investigate’ when someone’s health or physical safety is genuinely threatened." Kyer, 45 Va. App. at 480, 612 S.E.2d 213 (citation omitted). The exception "rests on the commonsense rationale that ‘preservation of human life is paramount to the right of privacy.’ " Id.; see also Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 1947, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006) ("The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency." (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2413-14, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978) )). The emergency aid exception also "takes into account that ‘police owe duties to the public, such as rendering aid to individuals in danger of physical harm, reducing the commission of crimes through patrol and other preventative measures, and providing services on an emergency basis.’ " Ross, 61 Va. App. at 760, 739 S.E.2d 910 (quoting Kyer, 45 Va. App. at 480, 612 S.E.2d 213 ).

Under the emergency aid exception, "law enforcement officers may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury."

Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403, 126 S.Ct. at 1947. This type of exigency⁴ permits entry if the officers have " ‘an objectively reasonable basis for believing’ ... that ‘a person within [the house] is in need of immediate aid.’ " Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 47, 130 S.Ct. 546, 548, 175 L.Ed.2d 410 (2009) (per curiam ) (quoting Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 406, 126 S.Ct. at 1949, and Mincey, 437 U.S. at...