Merrill v. Everett

• Decision Date: 29 January 1936
• Parties: MERRILL v. EVERETT.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

293 Mass. 327

199 N.E. 735

MERRILL

v.EVERETT.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Norfolk.

Jan. 29, 1936.

Fred H. Merrill filed a supplemental first and final account as conservator of John Everett, and from a decree entered in the probate court for the county of Norfolk, John Everett appeals.

Affirmed.

Appeal from Probate Court, Norfolk County; McCoole, Judge.

J. Everett, pro se.

RUGG, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from a decree of a probate court allowing the supplemental first and final account of the conservator of the respondent. The account as presented by the petitioner was allowed except that, in place of the item charging $1,000 for services of the conservator, $700 was allowed. This necessitated a change in the total of Schedule B. and a change in Schedule C.

The respondent requested a finding of material facts, (1) specifying the amount of personal property according to inventory and (2) enumerating seven items in Schedule B or ‘a list of real estate taxes paid as assessed 1932 and 1933.’ Material facts were reported by the trial judge as follows: ‘Mr. Everett is the owner of various parcels of real estate located in various towns throughout the county, most of which was badly in need of repair. In some instances real estate taxes had not been paid for two or three years. Some of the property was not covered by insurance. I find that the conservator ordered many repairs and paid off taxes and insurance. I find that he gave a great deal of his personal efforts and time in this work. I allowed item number 4 of Schedule B. of the account because said Everett's physical condition, brought about by a shock, warranted the employment of a housekeeper and the allowance to Mrs. Everett as shown by item 6 of said Schedule B. I disallowed item 14 of said Schedule B. and allowed the conservator seven hundred dollars for his services instead of one thousand dollars.’

In this there was no error. The aggrieved party has no right to dictate the nature or extent of the material facts to be reported by the trial judge. While the topics to be covered by such report may be embodied in suggestions or requests, they are addressed to sound judicial discretion and noncompliance with them cannot be made the foundation of review. The trial judge knows the facts material to his decision and it is his duty to state those alone. Plumer v. Houghton & Dutton Co., 277 Mass. 209, 214, 215, 178 N.E. 716. As there pointed out, other means are...