Merriman v. Lacefield

• Decision Date: 30 April 1871
• Citation: 51 Tenn. 209
• Parties: David H. Merriman, Adm'r, et als. v. John H. Lacefield, et als.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

51 Tenn. 209

David H. Merriman, Adm'r, et als.

v.John H. Lacefield, et als.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

April Term, 1871.

FROM HARDIN.

Appeal from the Chancery Court at Savannah, JAS. W. DOHERTY, Ch., October Term, 1869.

McDougal & Patterson for complainants, cited as to inadequacy of price, Coffee v. Ruffin, 4 Col., 487; 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., sec. 247; Effect of receipt, Jones v. Wood, 10 Yer., 160; Testimony of widow, Brewer v. Ferguson, 11 Hum., 565; Exemption and Homestead Acts of March 19, 1860, March 12, 1868; Vincent v. Vincent, 1 Heis., 333.

T. P. Bateman for John Lacefield, cited as to competency of widow, 2 Stark. Ev., 400; 1 Greenl. Ev., sec. 242; Fitch v. Hill, 11 Mass., 286; Inadequacy of price, 2 Meigs' Dig., p. 923, sub-sec. 6; 1 Greenl. Ev., secs. 22, 23.

L. H. Broyles for the widow, cited Vincent v. Vincent, 1 Heis., 333, 343, as to exemptions; as to the homestead he cited the Code, 2115; Act of 1868, c. 85, and insisted that the widow was entitled to both dower and the homestead, citing Welsh v. Reis, 5 Ill. R., 477.

NELSON, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.

Robert Lacefield departed this life intestate in Hardin county in the month of June, 1868, leaving a widow, Jane, and four children, who are his heirs at law. Administration on his estate was granted to the complainant, who, together with two of the heirs, filed this bill on the 21st December, 1868, against the widow and John H. and Thomas Lacefield, the latter a minor. It appears that the said Robert Lacefield, previous to his death, executed to his said son, John H., five deeds of conveyance, as follows, viz.: one for two tracts of one hundred and seventy-one acres, and one hundred and ninety-three acres, more or less, dated and registered 22d January, 1859, and purporting to be for the consideration of one hundred dollars; one for three acres, more or less, dated and registered 14th October, 1867, purporting to be for the consideration of ten dollars; one for thirty acres, more or less, bearing date 4th December, 1866, and registered 16th October, 1867, purporting to be for the consideration of four hundred and fifty dollars; one for five tracts, containing in all one hundred and eighty and three-quarter acres, bearing date 24th December, 1867, and registered 27th December, 1867, purporting to be in consideration of five hundred dollars and one for two hundred acres, dated and registered at said last mentioned date, and purporting to have been executed for the consideration of one hundred dollars, all of the lands being situate in Hardin county. The bill charges that the personal assets were amply sufficient to pay the debts; that the said several tracts of land were in fact conveyed as advancements to John H. Lacefield; that the two tracts conveyed in the first deed were worth six hundred dollars, and that the consideration of one hundred dollars was merely nominal; that the other tracts were also conveyed at nominal prices; and, especially, that the said John H. had paid but a small part of the said consideration of five hundred dollars named in one of said deeds; but the deed is erroneously described in the bill as being only for fifty acres. It is further charged that no notes or evidences of debt against the said John H. were found among the papers of the intestate; that the said John H. had free access to them, and in some way received back the notes; that only about seventeen dollars of current money was found on hand at the intestate's death; and that he had paid out little, or no money before his death. The bill also charges that the testator died seized and possessed of a tract containing about one hundred and sixty acres of land, out of which dower had been assigned by the County Court to the widow, and that the said tract is so situated that partition thereof can not be made. The defendants were required in the bill to answer a number of special interrogatories, and the prayer of the bill is, that upon final hearing a decree shall be pronounced directing a sale of the tracts of land, subject to the widow's dower; that an account be taken of all the advancements; that a full and fair settlement of the estate may be had; and that all such other and further relief be granted as may seem just.

John H. Lacefield, in his answer, insists that he paid two hundred dollars for the land conveyed in the first named deed, and that the consideration of one hundred dollars was inserted therein by mistake; that he paid every dollar of the consideration stated in said deed, with the exception of three hundred dollars, the balance due for the lands conveyed in the two last named deeds; and that for this amount he executed three notes, each for one hundred dollars, and severally falling due on the 25th December in the years 1870, 1871 and 1872. He admits that he was indebted to his father in other small amounts, which he specifies, and that certain advancements of no great value were made to him in personal property, which are also described. He states that his aggregate indebtedness to his father was four hundred and twenty-six dollars; that he had remained with his father for more than ten years after he became of age, giving all necessary attention to his person and business; that his father had frequently promised to pay him for what he had done, and in 1868 surrendered the notes to him in consideration of his services, and on the 2d June, 1868, executed a receipt in full, which was written and witnessed by complainant, Merriman. He denies that the lands were given, or advanced to him, and states that he and his father were both solvent, and that all the transactions between them were conducted fairly, and in good faith. In other particulars he also responds fully to the charges in the bill.

Mrs. Lacefield also answered the bill, and as a cross-bill, charged in her answer that the administrator had sold certain property “exempt from execution,” to which she was entitled, and that under the Act of 12th March, 1868, she was entitled to two hundred and fifty dollars' worth of personal property, and a homestead, not exceeding in value one thousand dollars, which were not allowed her, and that part of the allowance for her year's support was withheld by the administrator. She prays that he may be held to account, etc., and for general relief.

The administrator filed an answer to the cross-bill, in which he denies, at length, and in detail, its principal allegations.

An answer was also filed by the guardian ad litem of Thomas Lacefield.

Much evidence was taken in the cause, and the Chancellor pronounced a decree upon the hearing of the bill and cross-bill, in which he declared that the said John H. had paid two hundred dollars for the two first mentioned tracts of land, but that the price was inadequate, and he should account for the real value, to be ascertained by the Master; that the other lands were fully paid for, with the exception of the amounts of said three notes, which were delivered up, upon sufficient consideration, and that said receipt is evidence of a full and final settlement of all claims and dealings between the parties up to the period of its date. An account was also ordered as to the advancements to the other heirs, and as to so much of the personal property exempt from execution, as was converted by the administrator; and it was declared that the widow is entitled to the said sum of two hundred and fifty dollars. The complainants in the original bill, and John H. Lacefield excepted to this decree, and both parties prayed appeals to this Court, which were duly granted. Upon the various propositions submitted in behalf of complainants, we adjudge and declare as follows:

1. That the answers of John H. Lacefield as to the consideration upon which the first deed was executed is directly responsive to the interrogatory propounded in the bill, and that he paid two hundred, instead of one hundred dollars for said two tracts of land. The statement is not disproved by the contradictory declarations of Robert Lacefield, made after the execution of the deed, even if such declarations could be regarded as admissible testimony. But it has been frequently held that such subsequent declarations are inadmissible: 2 Lead. Cases in Eq., 3d Am. Ed., 182, 183, m. To some three of the witnesses he stated that John had not paid for the land, and to some three or four others he stated in substance, that John had paid for it, or that his other children might pay, as John had done; and his declarations, if admissible, are, to say the least, well balanced. Although the proof shows that land was worth considerably more than the amount John paid for it, yet the deed states no other than a pecuniary consideration, and the evidence is not sufficient to establish that the difference in value was intended as an advancement. The answer treats it as a pure business transaction, and is not disproved. In the absence of the proof of fraud, on the part of the bargainee, “a court of equity will not weigh in golden scales” the dealings between parent and child, or declare what both parties intended as a sale, an advancement upon proof merely of inadequacy of consideration. In construing the English statute of distribution, which may be regarded as...