Merritt v. Godfrey
| Decision Date | 10 August 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 3:13cv607/LAC/EMT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
| Parties | LARRY B. MERRITT, Plaintiff, v. SERGEANT GODFREY, et al., Defendants. |
Plaintiff Larry B. Merritt ("Merritt"), an inmate of the Florida Department of Corrections ("FDOC") proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis ("IFP"), commenced this civil rights action by filing a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (doc. 1). Merritt subsequently filed a Third Amended Complaint, which is the operative pleading (doc. 33). This cause is now before the court on a motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Godfrey, Rogers, and Franco, in which those Defendants seek dismissal of Merritt's request for compensatory and punitive damages, his claims for injunctive and declaratory relief, and one of his Eighth Amendment claims (doc. 56).2 Merritt responded in opposition to the motion to dismiss (doc. 59).
The case was referred to the undersigned for the issuance of all preliminary orders and any recommendations to the district court regarding dispositive matters. See N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2(C); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C); and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). For the reasons set forth below, the court recommends that the motion to dismiss be granted in part.
In Merritt's Third Amended Complaint, he alleges that on June 18, 2012, while he was housed at Santa Rosa Correctional Institution ("SRCI"), Defendants Correctional Officer Franco and Correctional Officer Stewart subjected him to excessive force during an escort from his cell to another area of the prison (doc. 33 at 9, 11). Specifically, Merritt alleges while he was in full restraints (handcuffed behind his back, chained at the waist, and shackled with leg irons, with a "black box" over the handcuffs, waist chain, and leg irons), Franco and Stewart forcefully lifted him off his feet, slammed him to the floor, and began to beat him by punching and elbowing him about the upper torso and face, causing injury to his lower back (id. at 11). Merritt alleges Defendant Correctional Officer Rogers was walking ahead of them at the time (id.). He alleges Rogers observed the beating, but failed to intervene (id.). Merritt alleges Defendant Sergeant Godfrey reported to the scene, and Defendant Franco told Godfrey that the use of force was in response to Merritt's biting his (Franco's) hand (id.). Merritt alleges Godfrey ordered Defendant Rogers to place a Special Management Spit Shield on Merritt, without the approval of the medical department, the warden, or the colonel, and despite the officers' knowledge that Merritt suffered from chronic asthma (id.).3 Merritt alleges Godfrey also ordered retrieval of a handheld video camera, and stated on camera, "This is a spontaneous use of force on inmate Merritt who has been discharged from T.C.U., Transitional Care Unit to the Close Management Unit, who attempted to assault staff and force became necessary by escorting officers Franco and Stewart" (id.). Merritt alleges the officers then lifted him to his feet, and Defendants Rogers and Stewart escorted him to the Close Management Dormitory, where he was seen by Nurse Von for a post-use-of-force assessment (id. at 12). Merritt alleges he notified the nurse of his lower back injury, and was provided Ibuprofen and analgesic balm (id.).
Merritt sues Defendants in their individual capacities (see doc. 33 at 1). He claims that the use of force by Defendants Franco and Stewart violated his Eighth Amendment rights, and constituted assault and battery under Florida tort law (id. at 10, 16). Merritt claims that DefendantRogers' failure to intervene in the use of force violated the Eighth Amendment (id. at 16). Merritt claims that the use of the spit shield by Defendants Godfrey and Rogers constituted deliberate indifference to his health, in violation of the Eighth Amendment (id.). Merritt seeks monetary damages and declaratory and injunctive relief (id. at 10, 18-20).
In applying the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, the allegations of the complaint are taken as true and are construed in the light most favorable to Merritt. See Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1393 (11th Cir. 1997). To survive dismissal, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quotation and citation omitted). A claim is plausible on its face where "the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citation omitted). Plausibility means "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. "Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief." Id. (quotation and citation omitted).
The determination of whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citation omitted). The pleader is not entitled to relief "where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct." Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). The court is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Id. at 678 (quotation and citation omitted). And "bare assertions" that "amount to nothing more than a formulaic recitation of the elements" of a claim "are conclusory and not entitled to be assumed true." Id. at 681 (quotation and citation omitted). Stated succinctly:
Pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.
Id. at 679. Finally, consistent with the foregoing precepts, in civil rights cases more than "mere conclusory notice pleading" is required, and a complaint is subject to dismissal "as insufficient where the allegations it contains are vague and conclusory." Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1235 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation and citation omitted).
As previously mentioned, Defendants Franco, Godfrey, and Rogers seek dismissal of one of Merritt's Eighth Amendment claims (i.e., his claim that Defendants Godfrey and Rogers violated the Eighth Amendment by placing a Special Management Spit Shield on him without prior approval, and despite their knowledge that he suffered from asthma) (see doc. 56). Defendants also seek dismissal of Merritt's requests for compensatory and punitive damages, and his claims for injunctive and declaratory relief (id.).
Specific to this claim, Merritt alleges Defendant Godfrey reported to the scene after the use of force by Defendants Franco and Stewart, and Defendant Franco told Godfrey that Merritt had bitten his (Franco's) hand (doc. 33 at 11). Merritt alleges Godfrey ordered Defendant Rogers to place a Special Management Spit Shield on Merritt, without the approval of the medical department, the warden, or the colonel, and despite the officers' knowledge that Merritt suffered from chronic asthma (id.).
Defendants Godfrey and Rogers contend they are entitled to qualified immunity as to this claim (doc. 56 at 7-10). They argue that Merritt's factual allegations do not state a plausible claim of deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and even if his allegations stated a plausible claim, they were not on notice that their conduct was unconstitutional (id.).
Merritt responds that Godfrey and Rogers knew that their conduct violated FDOC policy and was thus illegal (doc. 59 at 5-7). In support of his argument, he submitted a copy of the FDOC's procedure governing use of the spit shield (see doc. 59, Ex. G).
"When properly applied, [qualified immunity] protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, — U.S. —, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085, 179 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). This defense shields government officials performing discretionary acts "from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does notviolate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982). In part, this defense recognizes the problems that government officials like police officers and correctional officers face in performing their jobs in dynamic and sometimes perilous situations. It is also designed to avoid excessive disruption of government services and to provide a direct way to end insubstantial claims on summary judgment. Id.
But the clearly established law requirement serves another purpose. It provides government officials with the ability to anticipate what conduct will give rise to liability for a constitutional violation. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 97 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1987). To that end, when officials are acting within their discretionary capacity, they "can know that they will not be held personally liable as long as their actions are reasonable in light of current American law." Id. As a consequence, "[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Id. at 640. This imposes an objective standard, and that objective standard is "measured by reference to...
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