Merritt v. School District

• Decision Date: 09 May 1891
• Parties: MERRITT v. SCHOOL DISTRICT
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

16 S.W. 287

54 Ark. 468

MERRITT v. SCHOOL DISTRICT

Supreme Court of Arkansas

May 9, 1891

APPEAL from Arkansas Circuit Court, JOHN M. ELLIOTT, Judge.

Appeal from a judgment awarding a mandamus, directed to James H Merritt, county judge of Arkansas county, to allot its proportion of the school fund to School District No. 9 of Jefferson county, which had been detached from Arkansas county. The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion.

Affirmed.

W. H Halliburton for appellant.

1. The county court of Arkansas county had no jurisdiction of the petition School District No. 9 being in Jefferson county. Mansf. Dig., secs. 6175, 6176, 6177.

2. There was no final order or judgment for or against petitioners, and there was nothing for them to appeal from. The appellees were not proper parties to the record, and hence not entitled to appeal. 28 Ark. 479; 36 ib., 578; 47 Ark. 412; 52 id., 99; ib., 343. The clerk had no authority to grant the appeal. Mansf. Dig., sec. 1436; 26 Ark. 415. A remedy is given, by sec. 6180, Mansf. Dig., to the counties and not the school districts.

Gibson & Holt for appellees.

1. The county court had jurisdiction of the subject matter (Mansf Dig, sec. 6172; and appellees had a right to appeal under sec. 1436, ib. Art. 7, sec. 51, const. 1874. The court had done all that could be done; nothing was left for future action, and hence the judgment was final. Section 6180 does not preclude all other remedies.

OPINION

HEMINGWAY, J.

It is unnecessary to consider the point pressed by the appellant, that the school district could not appeal from the order of the county court directing the distribution of the school fund received from the State. As the district, though detached from Arkansas county, ^[*] was included in the enumeration upon which the superintendent apportioned the fund to that county, it was entitled to share therein in the proportion which its children of school age bore to the children included in the enumeration. This was an absolute right, not dependent upon the discretion of any officer or tribunal. It was the duty of the appellant, as county judge, on receiving notice of the amount apportioned to the county, to proceed to apportion the same to the several districts upon whose enumeration the superintendent made his apportionment. The duty was absolute--involved only a matter of mathematical calculation--and in its performance the county judge had no discretion; but he proceeded to discharge it, and by his apportionment excluded the detached district from all participation in the fund, thus, denying a right for which, as we have seen, he was bound to afford a remedy. This entitled the district to seek relief by mandamus in the circuit court.

It is argued that the superintendent was authorized to rectify the wrong in his subsequent apportionment, and this is true. Mansf. Dig., sec. 6180. But the county judge should have averted the wrong to the district, and awarded it the sum due it before the superintendent could make another apportionment. There is no reason why a district should be kept out of its funds for any time on account of a change of county lines, and it is in...