Merritt v. State

Decision Date18 April 2012
Docket NumberNo. PD–0916–11.,PD–0916–11.
Citation368 S.W.3d 516
PartiesRyan Rashad MERRITT, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas.
CourtTexas Court of Criminal Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Lawrence T. Newman, Houston, for appellant.

John R. Messinger, Asst. State's Atty., Lisa C. McMinn, State's Attorney, Austin, for State.

OPINION

HERVEY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which KELLER, P.J., and MEYERS, PRICE, WOMACK, JOHNSON, KEASLER and COCHRAN, JJ., joined.

A jury found Appellant, Ryan Rashad Merritt, guilty of arson for the burning of an insured and mortgaged vehicle. The trial court assessed his punishment at confinement for ten years and one day. The First Court of Appeals reversed, determining that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction. Merrit v. State, 2011 WL 846229, 2011 Tex.App. LEXIS 1763 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 10, 2011) (mem. op., not designated for publication). We exercised our discretionary review, and we will reverse the court of appeals and affirm the trial court's judgment.

I. FACTS1

On December 17, 2006, Appellant's SUV, a 2006 GMC Yukon Denali, was found abandoned in a field with fire damage to its interior. After an investigation, Appellant was indicted for the offense of arson for the burning of an insured and mortgaged vehicle. Tex. Penal Code § 28.02(a)(2)(B), (C).2 Specifically, Paragraph A of the indictment alleged that Appellant did “start a fire with intent to damage or destroy a vehicle owned by Defendant and/or David Ross, knowing that it was insured against damage or destruction,” and Paragraph B alleged that Appellant did “start a fire with intent to damage or destroy a vehicle owned by Defendant and/or David Ross, knowing that it was subject to a mortgage or other security interest.”

At trial, Matt Cornell, an investigator with the Fort Bend Fire Marshall's Office, testified that he was dispatched to investigate an abandoned vehicle on December 17, 2006. A homeowner had discovered the GMC Yukon Denali and, finding that it was burned inside, contacted the police. Cornell testified that the vehicle's exterior looked to be in good condition. The only indication of a fire was that the windows were darker than normal. There was damage to the driver's side door, which Cornell testified seemed to be “attempted forcible entry.” However, [i]t appeared to actually be more hammered in than pried on,” and the opening was not large enough to allow a tool to get in to lift the lock. Cornell also noted that, although the vehicle's wheels were in place, some lug nuts were missing. He saw no markings where something had been laid underneath the vehicle; nor did he see any tire tracks in front of or behind the SUV or other evidence suggesting a wrecker may have been used to place the vehicle there. He did find three unburned, wooden matches on the ground near the SUV, however.

Inside the vehicle, Cornell discovered three separate burned areas that were not contiguous, thus indicating three separate points of origin. At each point, he found remnants of fine, newspaper-like paper, and he explained that the fire did not spread more because the windows were rolled up, causing the fire to run out of oxygen. Cornell found no damage to the steering column, and the ignition was intact. He also noted that the seats, door panels, glove box, radios, and electronics had been removed. However, there was a “lot of value” remaining with the vehicle, including the tires, headlights, lights, dash, hood, and doors. Cornell explained that this is not common on “burned stolens”[i]t would be very common to find to [sic] this deal either on cinder blocks or on the spare-tire doughnuts.” Cornell opined that the fire was incendiary in nature because he was able to exclude other causes ( i.e., accidental or mechanical causes), there were three points of origin (a “red flag”), and the wheels' lug nuts were missing. Although he was unable to determine what was used to ignite the paper, Cornell believed that the fire was started by someone who had ignited the paper products found in the SUV.

Subsequently, Cornell discovered that the SUV had been reported as stolen, and he contacted the Houston Auto Theft Task Force. He then contacted Appellant, the registered owner, and on January 25, Appellant gave a statement. In that statement, Appellant indicated that he had last seen his SUV on December 16 at around 6:30 p.m. outside of Floyd Houston's apartment. That evening, Appellant had gone over to Houston's apartment, and the two men “hung out” before driving Houston's car to a couple of clubs.3 They stayed out all night, sitting in the club parking lots while drinking and watching people. Returning to Houston's apartment around 5:00 a.m. the next morning, Appellant discovered that his car was missing. Appellant stated that he did not notice any broken glass in the area where his car had been and that he had both sets of the SUV's keys at that time. However, Appellantexplained that, a month prior, he had taken his SUV to a car wash, and his keys were temporarily missing. An individual not associated with the business produced the keys three or four hours after the car was washed. Appellant stated that he did not contact the police regarding this occurrence. Also during the statement, Appellant asserted that he does not use wooden matches because his apartment did not have gas; that his tractor-trailer was stolen six months prior to the incident at issue; and that the second person on the SUV's registration was David Ross, a friend he had met at the mall but with whom he had not spoken in some time.

Cornell further testified that he went to Appellant's apartment complex after obtaining Appellant's statement. The manager informed him that Appellant had had a separate lease on a garage, but he had ended that lease when the SUV was stolen. The manager allowed Cornell to go into the garage, where he found several bags of what appeared to be trash. Inside the bags, he observed a Cartronix envelope,4 the dealer window stickers for the SUV, various receipts, and other items that he “believed to be the contents of the glove box or the inner console” of the SUV.

David Thornsen, a member of the Special Investigations Unit of Allstate Insurance, investigated Appellant's insurance claim for potential fraud. He stated that the estimated total value of the claim was $41,682—$37,182 for the vehicle and $4,500 for the tires and wheels. Thornsen explained that, under the conditions of the insurance policy, an insured agrees to submit to an examination under oath to be recorded by a court reporter. Consequently, on January 2, 2007, he obtained a recorded statement from Appellant. The statement was read into the record. Appellant stated that he had last seen the car on Saturday, December 16. He had parked the SUV at Houston's apartment and locked the doors and windows. Two to three hours later, around 8:30 or 9:00 p.m., the two men left in Houston's car. They stayed out all night, sitting in Houston's car outside of bars. Appellant stated that he did not use any credit cards or make any calls during that time. The men returned to Houston's apartment at 5:30 or 6:00 a.m. and realized that the SUV was no longer there. Appellant did not see any broken glass in the area, and he did not believe it was towed because it had been parked legally in one of Houston's parking spots. At 6:00 or 6:30 a.m., he called the police and reported the SUV missing. He then returned home and watched television. Appellant stated that he had not yet informed his wife about the SUV. Responding to Thornsen's questions, Appellant informed Thornsen that about two weeks after purchasing the SUV, he had paid “close to $5,000” for new rims and tires. And he asserted that he had not been arrested or convicted, filed personal bankruptcy, been subject to a home foreclosure or vehicle repossession, or been sued, and that he did not owe any money currently in collection.

After the recording ended, Appellant decided “in casual conversation” to provide additional information, so Thornsen documented a supplemental recorded statement. In that, Appellant explained that roughly two months prior to the statement, he went to a car wash, and when the wash was finished, the keys were missing. Five hours later a man showed up with the keys. Thornsen testified that he had asked several questions about the keys because “the biggest thing in any vehicle theft is ... to follow the keys.” He explained, “if he has both keys ..., the vehicleis stolen, and all of a sudden the vehicle shows up, and there's no steering column breach or no ignition breach, that means they had to have a key to drive the vehicle. The person has both keys, there's a problem with that.”

Thornsen further testified that he inspected the SUV. He noted that the interior had been burned, but the steering column, dash, and ignition area appeared to be undamaged. Thornsen also noted that the seats, radio, and driver's mirror had been removed. Thornsen followed up with an expert, who informed him that [t]he bottom line is the ignition and the steering column [were] not compromised. You had to use a key to drive the vehicle.” On the exterior, Thornsen noticed there were signs of forced entry on door, but he could not tell if entry was accomplished. Also, some lug nuts were missing from the wheels, and a different set of rims and tires appeared to be on the vehicle. Thornsen commented that the wheels and tires were about 15 inches, much smaller than the 24–inch versions purchased by Appellant. Thorsen opined that “it was pre-planned” to get four matching tires and rims that fit the SUV.

Thornsen also requested that Appellant complete an “Affidavit of Vehicle Theft.” He explained that the affidavit is compared with the recorded statement, the examination under oath, and the physical evidence to determine if there are any inconsistencies. Comparing, Thornsen found several such inconsistencies. For example, Appellant indicated...

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