Merryfield v. Howard
| Decision Date | 29 March 2023 |
| Docket Number | 21-3255-DDC-KGG |
| Parties | DUSTIN J. MERRYFIELD, Plaintiff, v. LAURA HOWARD, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
Pro se plaintiff Dustin Merryfield[1] is confined involuntarily under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act on the campus of the Larned State Hospital in Larned, Kansas. He brings this lawsuit against Laura Howard (Secretary of the Kansas Department of Aging and Disability Services) and several other individuals who are employed by the Kansas Sexual Predator Treatment Program. Plaintiff asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging various constitutional violations arising from his confinement conditions.
Defendants have filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) (Doc. 23). It seeks judgment against all of plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff has filed a Response opposing defendants' motion (Doc. 25). And defendants have filed a Reply (Doc. 30). For reasons explained below the court grants defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 23).
The following facts come from plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 1). The court accepts them as true and views them in the light most favorable to plaintiff. Atl. Richfield Co. v. Farm Credit Bank of Wichita, 226 F.3d 1138, 1160 (10th Cir. 2000) ().
Since 2000, the State of Kansas has confined plaintiff involuntarily under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act (KSVPA), Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 59-29a01-59-29a27. Doc 1 at 3 (Compl. ¶ C.1.C.2.A.1.). On June 5, 2018, plaintiff transferred from Larned State Hospital to a unit on the Parsons State Hospital campus. Id. (Compl. ¶ C.1.C.2.A.2.). On August 18, 2019, plaintiff returned to Larned State Hospital from Parsons State Hospital. Id. at 4 (Compl. ¶ C.1.C.2.A.3.).
When plaintiff returned to Larned State Hospital, he alleges that he was unable to retain some of his property. Id. (Compl. ¶ C.1.C.2.A.5.). Specifically, plaintiff alleges that he was not allowed to retain the following pieces of property: a laser copier (id. at 13 (Compl. ¶ C.1.C.2.I.1.)); two hot pots (id. (Compl. ¶ C.1.C.2.I.2.)); a Blu-Ray player (id. at 14 (Compl. ¶ C.1.C.2.I.3.)); a small plastic trash can (id. (Compl. ¶ C.1.C.2.I.4.)); a staple puller (id. (Compl. ¶ C.1.C.2.I.5.)); a battery backup (id. at 15 (Compl. ¶ C.1.C.2.I.6.)); a plastic wall clock (id. (Compl. ¶ C.1.C.2.I.7.)); a typewriter (id. (Compl. ¶ C.1.C.2.I.8.)); a humidifier (id. at 16 (Compl. ¶ C.1.C.2.I.9.)); a postal scale (id. (Compl. ¶ C.1.C.2.I.10.)); and a lunch box (id. (Compl. ¶ C.1.C.2.I.11.)).
Plaintiff sought administrative relief based on the facility's refusal to return certain property to him. See id. at 20 (Compl. ¶ C.1.C.2.J.2.); see also id. at 23 (Compl. ¶ D.2.) (“As shown in the facts of this Complaint I did seek administrative relief.”).
On September 7, 2020, plaintiff submitted requests for administrative hearings with the Office of Administrative Hearing (“OAH”) about the staff's refusal to return: (1) the two hot pots; (2) the Blu-Ray player; and (3) the copier. See Doc. 22 at 6 (Parties Stipulation of Agreed Facts ¶ 53).[2] The OAH case number assigned to the case for the hot pots was 21MP0002 HAB. Id. (Parties Stipulation of Agreed Facts ¶ 54). The case number assigned to the case for the Blu-Ray player was 21MP0004 HAB. Id. at 7 (Parties Stipulation of Agreed Facts ¶ 55). The case number assigned to the case for the copier was 21MP0005 HAB. Id. (Parties Stipulation of Agreed Facts ¶ 56).
For case number 21MP0002 HAB, OAH reversed the Hearing Officer's decision and ordered staff to return the hot pots to plaintiff. Id. (Parties Stipulation of Agreed Facts ¶ 57). For case number 21MP0004 HAB, the matter was resolved without a decision by OAH. Id. (Parties Stipulation of Agreed Facts ¶ 58).
For case number 21MP0005 HAB, OAH granted KDADS's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted on August 19, 2021. Id. (Parties Stipulation of Agreed Facts ¶ 59). On October 12, 2021, plaintiff appealed the OAH decision in case number 21MP0005 HAB to Pawnee County District Court in Case No. 21-CV-000028. Id. (Parties Stipulation of Agreed Facts ¶ 60). This case presently is ongoing. Id. (Parties Stipulation of Agreed Facts ¶ 61).
Between November 3, 2019, and July 26, 2020, plaintiff submitted several resident requests asking to purchase various items from vendors. Doc. 1 at 17-18 (Compl. ¶¶ C.1.C.2.I.13.-20.). Larned State Hospital staff denied all or part of plaintiff's requests to purchase these items. Id.
On February 23 and 24, 2021, staff determined that certain pieces of mail addressed to plaintiff were “questionable” and sent the mail to plaintiff's therapist. Id. at 18-19 (Compl. ¶¶ C.1.C.2.I.22.-23.). Several days later, plaintiff spoke with his therapist who reported that she never received the mail. Id. Plaintiff alleges that, to date, the facility can't locate the mail. Id.
On March 8, 2021, plaintiff submitted a request to place an ad on loveaprisoner.com. Id. at 18 (Compl. ¶ C.1.C.2.I.21.); see also Doc. 24-1 (plaintiff's request).[3] The following day, Larned State Hospital staff denied plaintiff's request. Doc. 24-1 at 1 ().
Defendants have attached three Sexual Predator Treatment Program (SPTP) Policies as exhibits to their motion. See Docs. 24-2, 24-3, 24-4.[4] SPTP Policy 5.2 defines the rules and expectations for resident property. See generally Doc. 24-2. It includes a procedure for residents to submit property requests. See id. SPTP Policy 8.3 establishes guidelines and procedures governing resident mail at the facility. See generally Doc. 24-3. SPTP Policy 8.6 defines the procedures governing denial or restriction of a resident's right. See generally Doc. 24-4.
A court evaluates a Rule 12(c) motion under the same standard that governs a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Atl. Richfield Co. v. Farm Credit Bank of Wichita, 226 F.3d 1138, 1160 (10th Cir. 2000). For a complaint to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the pleading “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court must assume that the factual allegations in the complaint are true, but it is “‘not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.'” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555); see also Atl. Richfield, 226 F.3d at 1160 (). And while this pleading standard doesn't require “‘detailed factual allegations,'” it demands more than a “pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action[,]'” which, as the Supreme Court explained, “‘will not do.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings against all of plaintiff's § 1983 claims.[5] Defendants assert at least eight arguments supporting their motion. The court addresses all eight of these arguments, in turn, below.
Defendants argue plaintiff's § 1983 claims against defendant Laura Howard fail because (i) she is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment for claims asserted against her in her official capacity, and (ii) the Complaint alleges no personal participation by her capable of supporting a plausible claim made against her in her individual capacity.
To the extent plaintiff asserts his § 1983 claims against defendant Howard in her official capacity, the Eleventh Amendment bars suits seeking to recover money damages from state actors acting in their official capacities. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997) . However, the immunity conferred by the Eleventh Amendment “is not absolute.” Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Pruitt, 669 F.3d 1159, 1166 (10th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). As our Circuit has explained, three exceptions exist to Eleventh Amendment immunity:
First, a state may consent to suit in federal court. Second, Congress may abrogate a state's sovereign immunity by appropriate legislation when it acts under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, under Ex parte Young, 209...
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