Mesholam v. Mesholam

• Decision Date: 26 June 2008
• Docket Number: No. 122,122
• Citation: 11 N.Y.3d 24,892 N.E.2d 846
• Parties: Solomon MESHOLAM, Respondent, v. Isabelle Helens MESHOLAM, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

892 N.E.2d 846

11 N.Y.3d 24

Solomon MESHOLAM, Respondent, v. Isabelle Helens MESHOLAM, Appellant.

No. 122

Court of Appeals of New York.

June 26, 2008.

Law Office of Glenn S. Koopersmith, Garden City (Glenn S. Koopersmith of counsel), for appellant.

Charles E. Holster III, Mineola, for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

PIGOTT, J.

The question is whether in this case the commencement of a prior, discontinued divorce action may serve as the valuation date for marital property for purposes of equitable distribution in a later divorce action. We hold that it may not.

The parties were married in 1969. The wife commenced an action for divorce in 1994. The husband answered, but did not counterclaim for divorce. Five years later, following long and contentious pretrial proceedings, the wife moved for permission to discontinue the action. The husband opposed the motion, and cross-moved to amend his answer to assert a counterclaim for divorce. Supreme Court granted the wife's motion to discontinue the action and denied the husband's cross motion.

Almost immediately, the husband commenced this action for divorce and ancillary relief. After finding that the husband was entitled to a divorce on the ground of constructive abandonment, Supreme Court held a bench trial to resolve disputed equitable distribution issues.

Supreme Court held that the husband's pension must be valued as of the commencement date of the present action, rather than the commencement date of the wife's 1994 action. Relying on Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(4)(b), the court reasoned that it was precluded from selecting a valuation date earlier than the commencement of the pending action. The court further observed that there was no evidence of "wrongdoing or ill-motive" in the wife's election to discontinue the prior divorce action. After considering the duration of the marriage and the other statutory factors pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(5)(d), Supreme Court determined that the marital property, including the marital portion of the pension, should be divided equally between the parties.

The Appellate Division modified the judgment of divorce, in part, and otherwise affirmed, holding that Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in valuing the pension as of the commencement date of the present action. The court concluded that the "appropriate date for valuation" was the commencement date of the 1994 action because there was "no evidence that the parties reconciled and continued to receive the benefits of the marital relationship after the prior action was commenced" (25 A.D.3d 670, 671, 809 N.Y.S.2d 131 [2006]).

We now modify the order of the Appellate Division and remit the matter to Supreme Court for further proceedings.

Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(1)(c) defines marital property as all property acquired "during the marriage and before the execution of a separation agreement or the commencement of a matrimonial action." Thus, in the absence of a separation agreement, the commencement date of a matrimonial action demarcates "the termination point for the further accrual of marital property" (Anglin v. Anglin, 80 N.Y.2d 553, 556, 592 N.Y.S.2d 630, 607 N.E.2d 777 [1992]). The definition of marital property "should be construed broadly in order to give effect to the `economic partnership' concept of the marriage relationship recognized in the statute" (Price v. Price, 69 N.Y.2d 8, 15, 511 N.Y.S.2d 219, 503 N.E.2d 684 [1986] [emphasis omitted]). Once property is classified as marital or separate, the trial court has broad discretion to select an "appropriate date for measuring the value of [the] property" (McSparron v. McSparron, 87 N.Y.2d 275, 287, 639 N.Y.S.2d 265, 662 N.E.2d 745 [1995]). However, the valuation date must be between "the date of commencement of the action [and] the date of trial" (Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][4][b]).

In determining whether the commencement of a particular "matrimonial action" terminates the accrual of marital property, we have looked to "the overall legislative intent of the Domestic Relations Law and . . . the particular application of the equitable distribution regime" (Anglin, 80 N.Y.2d at 556, 592 N.Y.S.2d 630, 607 N.E.2d 777). In Anglin, this Court held that the commencement of a separation action does not cut off the accrual of marital property because such an action "does not, ipso facto, terminate the marital economic partnership" (id. at 554, 592 N.Y.S.2d 630, 607 N.E.2d 777). Rather, "[t]he economic partnership should be considered dissolved when a matrimonial action is commenced which seeks `divorce, or the dissolution, annulment or declaration of the nullity of a marriage', i.e., an action in which equitable distribution is available" (id. at 557, 592 N.Y.S.2d 630, 607 N.E.2d 777, quoting Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][5][a]). We observed that this rule "provides internal consistency and compatibility and...