Messmer v. Teacher's Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 19 September 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 90-2557,90-2557 |
| Citation | 588 So.2d 610 |
| Parties | Ann MESSMER, Appellant, v. TEACHER'S INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee. 588 So.2d 610, 16 Fla. L. Week. D2471 |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Robert A. Vostrejs, Jr. and Charlene A. Culbreth, of McClellan, Vostrejs & Batsel, P.A., Ocala, for appellant.
Randall Sutton and Irwin J. Weiner, of Druck & Weiner, Ocala, for appellee.
Messmer appeals from a final summary judgment in favor of Teacher's Insurance Company, which held that Teacher's had fully satisfied the arbitrator's award in a personal injury case. Teacher's had paid in full all of the $54,355 awarded for economic damages (and costs) and twenty percent of the $200,000 noneconomic damages awarded, pursuant to the arbitrator's determination that Teacher's insured (an uninsured motorist) was twenty percent at fault in the automobile accident which injured Messmer. We affirm.
The record discloses that while Messmer was occupying an automobile being driven by her husband, Arthur, they collided with Waldron, driving a pickup truck. Waldron was uninsured. Teacher's had issued a $300,000 policy on the Messmer car for uninsured motorist coverage. The uninsured motorist claim was submitted to arbitration, pursuant to requirements of the policy.
The arbitrators found that Waldron was twenty percent responsible for causing the accident. They also found that Messmer suffered $52,455 in economic damages and $200,000 in non-economic damages. Arthur died shortly after the accident and neither he nor his estate were parties to the arbitration or litigation.
The trial court ruled that pursuant to section 768.81(3), Florida Statutes (1987), Teacher's fully satisfied its (or Waldron's) liability to Messmer. The statute provides in part as follows:
(3) APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES.--In cases to which this section applies, the court shall enter judgment against each party liable on the basis of such party's percentage of fault and not on the basis of the doctrine of joint and several liability; provided that with respect to any party whose percentage of fault equals or exceeds that of a particular claimant, the court shall enter judgment with respect to economic damages against that party on the basis of the doctrine of joint and several liability.
Messmer argues that section 768.81(3) requires apportionment for noneconomic damages only as to the actual parties to the litigation or arbitration. She urges that in a case such as this, where Arthur could not have been held liable because of spousal immunity, 1 the joint tortfeasor who is a party should be held liable for the entire amount of the plaintiff's damages.
Judge McNeal concluded that a proper interpretation of section 768.81(3) militates against Messmer's position in this case. We agree, and adopt his opinion as follows:
Section 768.81(3) provides that the court shall enter judgment against 'each party liable on the basis of such party's percentage of fault and not on the basis of the doctrine of joint and several liability.' The court is of the opinion that the language of the statute supports defendant's contention that a party's percentage of the total fault of all participants in the accident is the operative percentage to be considered. The use of the word 'party' simply describes an entity against whom judgment is to be entered and is not intended as a word of limitation. Had the legislature intended the apportionment computation to be limited to the combined negligence of those who happened to be parties to the proceeding, it would have so stated. The plain meaning of the word percentage is a proportionate share of the whole, and this meaning should apply in the absence of any language altering or limiting the plain meaning. See Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217 (Fla.1984).
Even if the language of the statute were deemed to be ambiguous, this court would look to the legislative intent and purpose of the statute. Deltona Corp. v. Florida Public Service Comm., 220 So.2d 905 (Fla.1969). In light of the policies adopted in Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431 (Fla.1973) and Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 So.2d 386 (Fla.1975), this court is of the opinion that the legislative intent in adopting Sec. 768.81(3) was to implement a system of equating fault with liability, at least as to non-economic damages. The obvious purpose of the statute was to partially abrogate the doctrine of joint and several liability by barring...
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...to bar Mrs. Marin's recovery. The full amount of the judgment was affirmed, and a conflict was certified with Messmer v. Teacher's Ins. Co., 588 So.2d 610 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (carrier liable for damage caused by uninsured motorist who was 20 percent at fault in causing accident with insured......
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