Met. Life Ins. Co. v. Huff
| Decision Date | 20 June 1934 |
| Docket Number | 24590 |
| Citation | 128 Ohio St. 469,191 N.E. 761 |
| Parties | Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Huff. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Evidence - Court to direct verdict, when - Negligence - Employer's liability to employee's wife injured riding in husband's automobile.
When at the close of the plaintiff's evidence reasonable minds can reach no conclusion except in favor of the defendant, it is error for the trial court to overrule the defendant's motion for a directed verdict. (Hamden Lodge v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co., 127 Ohio St. 469, approved and followed.)
In the Court of Common Pleas Madelyn Huff filed her action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained on July 27 1931, while she was riding as a passenger in an automobile owned and operated by her husband, who was employed by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company as a collector and solicitor.
During the trial the defendant moved for a directed verdict at the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence. This motion was overruled, and the case was then submitted to the jury resulting in a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. Judgment was entered accordingly.
Upon the prosecution of error proceedings to the Court of Appeals the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas was affirmed.
The case is in this court by reason of the allowance of a motion to certify.
Messrs. Musser, Kimber & Huffman, for plaintiff in error.
Messrs Benner, McGowan & Lombardi, for defendant in error.
The single question now requiring the attention of this court is whether this record contains competent evidence with reference to which reasonable minds might differ, therefore necessitating its submission to the jury.
What proof is there to substantiate the plaintiff's claim that the defendant gave her husband general authority to use an automobile in his work? On page 39 of the printed record Mr Huff said: "It was understood when I took the job I had to use an automobile." Because of its obvious incompetency the court promptly excluded this testimony. However, on page 40 of the record Mr. Huff used the following similar language: No objection to this was made at the moment, but on several subsequent occasions counsel for the defendant requested the court to strike out all testimony as to conversations unless proper authority were shown. These requests were overruled and exceptions duly saved. Clearly, the mere conclusion as to an "understanding" was incompetent, but these conversations involve a still graver error. Apparently some of them were had with a Mr. Kennedy, but most seem to have been with a Mr. Hultberg. A study of the record fails to properly disclose what authority, if any, the defendant had delegated to either man. Huff testified that Kennedy had the title of district manager. He also testified that Hultberg's title was that of assistant manager, but it is to be noted...
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