Metal Mgmt. West Inc. v. State

• Decision Date: 30 September 2010
• Docket Number: No. 09CA0798.,09CA0798.
• Citation: 251 P.3d 1164
• Parties: METAL MANAGEMENT WEST, INC., a Colorado corporation, d/b/a Sims Metal Management, LTD, Plaintiff–Appellant,v.STATE of Colorado; John R. Newsome, District Attorney for the 4th Judicial District of the State of Colorado; City of Colorado Springs, a municipal corporation; Terry Maketa, Sheriff of El Paso County, Colorado; Richard W. Myers, Chief of the Colorado Springs Police Department; and Colonel Mark V. Trostel, Chief of the Colorado State Patrol, Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

251 P.3d 1164

METAL MANAGEMENT WEST, INC., a Colorado corporation, d/b/a Sims Metal Management, LTD, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.STATE of Colorado; John R. Newsome, District Attorney for the 4th Judicial District of the State of Colorado; City of Colorado Springs, a municipal corporation; Terry Maketa, Sheriff of El Paso County, Colorado; Richard W. Myers, Chief of the Colorado Springs Police Department; and Colonel Mark

v. Trostel, Chief of the Colorado State Patrol, Defendants–Appellees.

No. 09CA0798.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. I.

Sept. 30, 2010.

Jurdem, LLC, Scott Jurdem, Keely Ambrose, Boulder, Colorado, for Plaintiff–Appellant.John W. Suthers, Attorney General, Diane Marie Dash, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants–Appellees State of Colorado and Colonel Mark V. Trostel.William H. Louis, County Attorney, Andrew C. Gorgey, First Assistant County Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Defendants–Appellees John R. Newsome and Terry Maketa.Patricia K. Kelly, City Attorney, Emily K. Wilson, Assistant City Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Defendants–Appellees City of Colorado Springs and Richard W. Myers.

Opinion by Judge RICHMAN.

Plaintiff, Metal Management West, Inc., appeals the district court's summary judgment in favor of defendants, the State of Colorado; John R. Newsome, District Attorney for the Fourth Judicial District; the City of Colorado Springs; Terry Maketa, Sheriff of El Paso County; Richard W. Myers, Chief of the Colorado Springs Police Department; and Colonel Mark V. Trostel, Chief of the Colorado State Patrol. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the case with directions.

I. Background

The material facts are not in dispute. Plaintiff purchases scrap metal, including automobiles, in the course of its metal recycling business. Plaintiff's operations are circumscribed by sections 42–4–2202 and 42–5–105, C.R.S.2010, two separate statutes which are intended to deter automobile theft. Defendants, collectively, are law enforcement entities charged with enforcing these statutes in the jurisdiction within which plaintiff operates its business.

Section 42–4–2202 regulates the operation of motor vehicle and auto parts recyclers such as plaintiff by limiting the circumstances under which they may accept motor vehicles for recycling. Specifically, the statute provides, in pertinent part:

(1) No person who is not a licensed motor vehicle dealer shall purchase or otherwise receive a motor vehicle to recycle the vehicle, unless:

(a) The seller or transferor is the owner on the certificate of title, an operator, or a licensed motor vehicle dealer;

(b) The seller or transferor provides a completed bill of sale on a form prescribed by the department of revenue; or

(c) The receiver or purchaser complies with subsection (2) of this section.

(2)(a) A person other than a licensed motor vehicle dealer who purchases or otherwise receives a motor vehicle for the purpose of recycling the vehicle shall keep the vehicle for seven business days before recycling....

(Emphasis added.) The statute also provides that during the seven-day holding period the business must submit the vehicle identification number to a computerized system maintained by the Department of Public Safety to ascertain whether the motor vehicle is stolen. See §§ 42–4–2203 & –2204, C.R.S.2010.¹ Violation of this statute is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine.

The statute contains a definitions section, see § 42–4–2201, C.R.S.2010, but that section does not define the term “motor vehicle,” which is the crux of plaintiff's complaint. However, the term is defined elsewhere in title 42 as follows:

“Motor vehicle” means any self-propelled vehicle that is designed primarily for travel on the public highways and that is generally and commonly used to transport persons and property over the public highways or a low-speed electric vehicle; except that the term does not include low-power scooters, wheelchairs, or vehicles moved solely by human power.

§ 42–1–102(58), C.R.S.2010. The introductory sentence to this definitions provision states that the listed definitions apply “in articles 1 to 4 of this title, unless the context otherwise requires.” § 42–1–102, C.R.S.2010. The statute at issue is found in article 4.

Sections 42–5–101 to –113, C.R.S.2010, are separate but related statutes collectively titled the “Automobile Theft Law.” Section 42–5–105 establishes recordkeeping procedures for entities that buy or sell secondhand motor vehicles or used motor vehicle parts. Referred to as the “daily record” law, it provides, in pertinent part:

(1)(a) It is the duty of every dealer, and of the proprietor of every garage, to keep and maintain in such person's place of business an easily accessible and permanent daily record of all secondhand or used motor vehicle equipment, attachments, accessories, and appurtenances bought, sold, traded, exchanged, dealt in, repaired, or received or disposed of in any manner or way by or through the dealer or proprietor....

(b) The record shall be kept in a good businesslike manner in the form of invoices or in a book by the dealer or proprietor and shall contain the following:

(I) A description of any and all such articles of property of every class or kind sufficient for the ready identification thereof by a peace officer;

...

(IV) The name, address, and a copy of the identification documentation of the driver and the owner of a motor vehicle received for any purpose ...;

(V) The model year, make and style, and engine or vehicle identification number and state registration license number of such motor vehicle if registered....

§ 42–5–105 (emphasis added). Any person violating any provision of this statute is guilty of a misdemeanor. § 42–5–105(4), C.R.S.2010.

This part of article 5 contains its own definition of “motor vehicle”: “any vehicle of whatever description propelled by any power other than muscular except a vehicle running on rails.” § 42–5–101(5), C.R.S.2010. It also contains a definition of “vehicle identification number”: “any identifying number, serial number, engine number, or other distinguishing number or mark, including letters, if any, that is unique to the identity of a given vehicle or component part thereof that was placed on a vehicle or engine by its manufacturer ....” § 42–5–101(11), C.R.S.2010.

According to plaintiff's complaint, its business was negatively affected by the passage of section 42–4–2202, and its employee was criminally cited for failing to comply with the statute after he accepted for recycling “a piece of scrap metal” which defendants considered to be a motor vehicle. Plaintiff describes the piece as a “yellow and white shell of a Chevrolet van ... that had no engine, no transmission, no wheels, no doors, no windows, no seats, no axels, just one fender, and was brought in on a flatbed truck and not under its own power.” Plaintiff concedes that it accepted the piece without complying with the requirements of section 42–4–2202 applicable to “motor vehicles.”

Pursuant to C.R.C.P. 57 and 65(a), plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment concerning sections 42–4–2202 and 42–5–105, as well as injunctive relief. It argued that section 42–4–2202 is unconstitutional, either (1) on its face, because the statute is impermissibly vague or (2) as applied by defendants, because they ignore the statutory definitions of “motor vehicle” in sections 42–1–102(58) and 42–5–101(5), and the piece of scrap metal “does not visibly fit [either definition] as it was clearly not self-propelled or under its own power when it was brought in on the flatbed truck.”

Plaintiff also contends that it is entitled to declaratory relief as to the scope of section 42–5–105, claiming that it is in imminent danger of prosecution based on defendants' stated interpretation of the statute. According to deposition testimony from officers of the Colorado Springs Police Department and the Colorado State Patrol, they intend to prosecute plaintiff under the statute if it fails to record serial or identification numbers of every used motor vehicle part it accepts. Alternatively, plaintiff contends that the statute is unconstitutionally vague if applied as interpreted by defendants.

Both parties moved for summary judgment. By order dated February 25, 2009, the district court granted defendants' motion, concluding that section 42–4–2202 is constitutional because the term “self-propelled vehicle” as used in section 42–1–102(58) is sufficiently clear on its face, and declining to adopt plaintiff's “personal hypertechnical definition of ‘self-propelled.’ ” Although the court purportedly dismissed all of plaintiff's claims, it did not state its reasons for dismissing the claims based on section 42–5–105.

Both parties filed motions to reconsider, but before the motions were decided, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal. Although no motion was filed in this court challenging whether a final judgment had been entered, it is apparent that the appeal was premature as not all of plaintiff's claims had been ruled on. The premature appeal did not divest the district court of jurisdiction. See Musick v. Woznicki, 136 P.3d 244, 246 (Colo.2006).

On May 5, 2009, with a different judge presiding, the district court ruled on the motions to reconsider. The district court concluded that section 42–4–2202 is not impermissibly vague, because people of common intelligence do not have to guess as to the meaning of the term “motor vehicle,” nor are defendants applying section 42–4–2202 in an unconstitutional manner because their interpretation is consistent with the legislature's intent. With regard to plaintiff's challenge to section 42–5–105, the court concluded that since plaintiff has not been charged with violating the statute, there is no case or controversy warranting a legal declaration. It also rejected plaintiff's argument that it did not have to locate and record serial numbers of used...