Metal Products Workers U., Local 1645 v. Torrington Co.

• Decision Date: 01 May 1965
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 10624.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: METAL PRODUCTS WORKERS UNION, LOCAL 1645, UAW-AFL-CIO, Petitioner v. The TORRINGTON COMPANY, Respondent.

242 F. Supp. 813

METAL PRODUCTS WORKERS UNION, LOCAL 1645, UAW-AFL-CIO, Petitioner v. The TORRINGTON COMPANY, Respondent.

Civ. No. 10624.

United States District Court D. Connecticut.

May 1, 1965.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Jerome S. Rubenstein, of Rubenstein & Rubenstein, New York City, for petitioner.

Jay S. Siegel, Hartford, Conn., and William J. Larkin, 2d, of Larkin & Pickett, Waterbury, Conn., for respondent.

TIMBERS, Chief Judge.

QUESTION PRESENTED

Respondent's motion for summary judgment, pursuant to Rule 56, Fed.R. Civ.P., presents the question whether this Court should vacate an arbitrator's award that a recall after strike grievance is not arbitrable under the collective bargaining agreement between the parties, the issue of arbitrability having been the only issue expressly submitted by the parties to the arbitrator. The Court holds the arbitrator's award should not be vacated and accordingly grants respondent's motion for summary judgment.

FACTS

Petitioner Metal Products Workers Union, Local 1645, UAW-AFL-CIO (the Union), a labor organization representing employees of respondent The Torrington Company (the Company), petitioned for an order vacating an arbitration award pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement between respondent and petitioner. Respondent moved for summary judgment.

Jurisdiction is based on Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (29

U.S.C. § 185) and through it are invoked the remedies of Section 10 of the United States Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 10).

The facts necessary to a determination of respondent's motion for summary judgment are not in dispute.

The Company and the Union entered into a collective bargaining agreement September 27, 1961. It expired September 27, 1963.

Upon termination of the agreement, the Union called a strike because no new agreement had been reached. The strike lasted until January 18, 1964.

Prior to and during the strike, the Company and the Union entered into negotiations for a new agreement. They arrived at a new agreement January 18, 1964.

At the time the new agreement was reached approximately two thousand employees were still on strike.

January 20, 1964, pursuant to the multi-step grievance procedure of the new agreement,¹ the Union filed a grievance alleging that the Company violated the new agreement by failing to call back to work, following termination of the strike, Michael Chiarito, an employee in the Company's heat treatment department and a member of the Union, in accordance with the seniority provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.

The Chiarito grievance was processed through the grievance procedure, culminating in the rejection of the grievance by the Company March 17, 1964 primarily on the ground that the provision of the agreement governing recall of employees after layoff due to lack of work² did not control the method of recalling employees upon termination of the strike.

The Union, pursuant to Article V, Section 2 of the agreement, appealed the rejection of the Chiarito grievance to the American Arbitration Association April 14, 1964.

The Company, in a letter to the American Arbitration Association dated May 28, 1964, asserted that, because the seniority provisions of the agreement did not control the recall of employees following the strike, the grievance was not arbitrable within the meaning of the arbitration clause of the agreement.³

In accordance with the agreement, John A. Hogan was appointed as arbitrator by the American Arbitration Association pursuant to its Voluntary Labor Arbitration Rules. At a hearing held June 17, 1964, the parties agreed to submit to arbitration only the issue of whether the Chiarito grievance was arbitrable.⁴

June 26, 1964 the arbitrator, after reviewing the evidence and arguments presented by the parties, made the following award:

"Under the facts of this case there is no Contract clause to interpret or apply and, therefore, the matter is not arbitrable."

The award was based on the following findings set forth in the arbitrator's opinion:

"1. The parties, by their understanding and by the practice followed in returning almost 2000 employees since the strike, departed from the recall-after-layoff provisions of the Contract.

"2. That the seniority provisions were not to govern the return of employees was made known to the Union on January 18, 1964 when the Union's suggestions for applying the recall provisions were rejected by the Company.

"3. The Contract has no specific provisions establishing the procedures for returning workers after a strike. Considering this fact along with 1 and 2 above, there is no Contract provision to arbitrate.

"4. The recall provisions, based on job seniority, refer to recall after layoff or transfer in lieu of layoff.

"5. The parties did not provide in their settlement provisions that the recall provisions under layoff conditions were to govern returning employees to work after the strike.

"6. The arbitrator may not by his decision in effect write such a clause into the Contract. Under Article V, 3, the arbitrator `shall have no power to add to * * * the provisions of this Agreement.'

"7. The history of negotiations on this matter, the rejection of the Union's suggestion that the seniority provisions of the Contract be followed, the understanding reached, and the practice followed, add up to the conclusion that the seniority provision of the Contract were sic specifically not to govern the return to work of the strikers. For the purpose of this case, therefore, there is no Contract clause, the application or interpretation of which is arbitrable." (Emphasis is that of arbitrator)

CLAIMS OF THE PARTIES

The Union, in petitioning this Court to vacate the award, alleges that the arbitrator was guilty of misbehavior and exceeded his powers under the collective bargaining agreement in that (i) he interpreted too restrictively the scope of the arbitration clause in the new agreement; (ii) he ignored decisions, including those of the United States Supreme Court, holding similar grievances arbitrable under similarly worded arbitration clauses; (iii) he found relevant to the issue submitted to him "accommodations that may have been made by the parties" subsequent to the filing of the grievance; and (iv) apart from whether the arbitrator exceeded his powers, his award is "flagrantly at variance with declared public policy."

The Company, in moving for summary judgment, alleges that (i) the Union's motion to vacate, having been filed more than 30 days after the Union received notice of the award, is barred by Section 52-420 of the Connecticut General Statutes which provides that motions to vacate arbitration awards must be made within 30 days from the time the party seeking to vacate received notice of the award; (ii) this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the Union's motion to vacate for the reason that the Union, having failed properly to state a claim under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, cannot avail itself of the three month limitation provision in the United States Arbitration Act,⁵ a statute which alone confers no jurisdiction upon this Court; and (iii) there are no valid grounds for setting aside the award.

JURISDICTION AND TIMELINESS OF THE PETITION

The Court rejects the first two claims advanced by the Company in support of its motion for summary judgment.

Where a proceeding turns upon the construction of a collective bargaining agreement in industries affecting commerce and, more specifically, upon the determination of the obligations of the parties to arbitrate disputes arising under the agreement, the courts in this Circuit read expansively the grant of jurisdiction in Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act.⁶ The instant petition to vacate clearly places in controversy the obligation of the Company to arbitrate the Chiarito grievance. Moreover, the Union did not restrict its jurisdictional claim to the United States Arbitration Act,⁷ but expressly asserted jurisdiction pursuant to both Section 301 (a) and the Arbitration Act. The Court sees no reason to depart from the firmly established practice in this Circuit of exercising jurisdiction pursuant to Section 301(a) in actions involving the obligations of parties to arbitrate under a collective bargaining agreement where the remedy sought is one authorized by the Arbitration Act.⁸

It follows that the period of limitation applicable to the instant proceeding is the three month period prescribed by the United States Arbitration Act and not, as the Company urges, the shorter Connecticut period. Although the Arbitration Act itself confers no jurisdiction upon this Court, "it does provide an additional procedure and remedy in the federal courts where jurisdiction already exists."⁹ The Court, having determined that Section 301(a) independently establishes its jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter of the action, finds that procedures authorized by the Arbitration Act, including the three month limitation period, were available to the Union. The petition to vacate is timely.

COURT'S FUNCTION UNDER SECTION 10 OF THE ARBITRATION ACT

The function of this Court in determining whether to vacate an arbitration award is "severely limited."¹⁰ The statute establishing the remedy sought by the Union expressly provides four grounds for setting aside an award;¹¹ only two are urged here by the Union, namely, that the arbitrator was "guilty of * * * misbehavior by which the rights of petitioner have been prejudiced"¹² and that he "exceeded his powers."¹³

The two statutory grounds urged by the Union do not authorize setting aside an award for "erroneous finding of fact or * * * misinterpretation of law,"¹⁴ "insufficiency of supporting facts"¹⁵ or misconstruction of a contract.¹⁶ To warrant vacating the instant award on the statutory grounds asserted, the Union must clearly demonstrate that the arbitrator's award amounted to a ...