Metcalf v. Hart
| Citation | 27 P. 900,3 Wyo. 513 |
| Parties | METCALF v. HART |
| Decision Date | 26 October 1891 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming |
Rehearing Denied 3 Wyo. 513 at 562.
Appeal from district court, Johnson county; M. C. SAUFLEY, Judge.
Suit by Ed. D. Metcalf against Juliet W. Hart to enforce the conveyance of real estate, and to enjoin actions of ejectment therefor. Decree for defendant, and complainant appeals. Reversed.
Reversed.
William Ware Peck and Carroll H. Parmelee, for appellee.
This is a suit for specific performance of certain alleged contracts for the conveyance of realty, and to enjoin the holder of the legal title from prosecuting actions of ejectment at law for the possession of such realty. Defendant and appellee, Juliet W. Hart, holds, and since June 28, 1884 has held, the legal title to the property in question. Complainant and appellant, Ed. D. Metcalf, holds, and since an earlier date has held, possession of the same, claiming an equitable right thereto. The property consists of lots 1, 2, and 3, and the northerly 5 feet of lot 4, in block 1, and lot 11, and the southerly 8 feet of lot 12, and the northerly 6 feet of lot 10, in block 18, in the town of Buffalo, Johnson county, Wyo. All of this property was included in a desert land entry made by Verling K. Hart, June 9, 1879. He died intestate, February 17, 1883, having made final proof and payment under his desert-land entry September 27, 1882; and patent for the land was issued in his name, accruing to the benefit of his heirs, January 19, 1884. The legal title of defendant and appellee she derives as widow and one of the heirs of said Verling K. Hart, deceased, and by virtue of proceedings in the probate court of said county of Johnson for the settlement and distribution of the estate of her deceased husband. The other heirs are three minor children of herself and the deceased. The equitable title of complainant and appellant he derives from an alleged promise or agreement made by Verling K. Hart, for the purpose of encouraging the building of a town upon the land included in his desert entry, that upon acquiring title he would sell and convey to each resident who should have improvements upon said land that portion occupied by such improvements at a nominal or small price. Complainant claims that on account of such promise he occupied the land described as in block 1 in the spring of the year 1882, and then and afterwards made valuable improvements upon it. He also claims that the land described as in block 18 was occupied and improved in the summer of 1882 by one William Burgess on account of said promise of said Verling K. Hart, and with his knowledge, and without any objection by him, and that complainant succeeded to the rights of said Burgess by purchase in 1883, and has ever since held possession of this property. After the death of Verling K. Hart, and before the issue of the patent for the land included in his desert entry, a number of the citizens of Buffalo made affidavits and protests against the issuing of the patent. This resulted in an instrument in writing in the form of a contract with the people of the town of Buffalo, dated September 20, 1883, and signed by Juliet W. Hart, who is described in the body of the instrument as administratrix of the estate and guardian of the minor children of Verling K. Hart, deceased, stating terms and conditions upon which she would, upon obtaining a patent from the United States for the land upon which the said town is situated, sell to the parties in possession certain lots within said town. It is to be observed that the plat of this town dividing it into lots, establishing streets and alleys, etc., in fact making it a legal, unincorporated town under the laws of the territory of Wyoming, was not filed in the office of the county clerk till July 29, 1884, more than 10 months after the date of this alleged contract for the disposal of lots in the town. One of the conditions upon which Mrs. Hart so agreed to convey lots on the terms in the said instrument specified was that no further delay should be caused nor any expense incurred on account of affidavits or protests which had already been made, or which might thereafter be made, in opposition to the issuing of a patent by the United States for said land. Complainant claims also under this contract.
Before the commencement of this suit defendant had begun two actions of ejectment against complainant for the possession of the realty described as in block 1 and in block 18, respectively. Complainant asks that defendant be enjoined from further prosecuting said suits, and asks for a decree for the specific performance of said alleged contracts for the conveyance to him of said realty, or, if that be denied, that the value of his improvements be ascertained and allowed to him, and made a lien upon the property. The answer of defendant denies that Verling K. Hart ever promised to sell or convey any portion of the land embraced in his desertland entry upon obtaining patent therefor to settlers making improvements, or to any person or persons for a nominal price, or any price; denies that he ever encouraged or permitted such settlements or improvements to be made on the land; denies that he knew the improvements of complainant or Burgess were made; denies that the instrument of date September 20, 1883, is a contract which may be enforced; denies that the conditions upon which it was to take effect ever came to pass; and asks that she be dismissed, with costs. These, in brief, are substantially the issues made by the pleadings in this suit, and upon which the cause was tried, the evidence taken, and the cause argued and submitted, in the district court.
A preliminary objection to the bill is made by defendant that the other heirs of Verling K. Hart, deceased, should have been made parties defendant; that the claim of complainant is a charge upon the interest of all the heirs in the real estate; and that all should have been joined as defendants, to prevent a multiplicity of suits. It is sufficient to say upon this point that defendant herein alone is claiming the property, and that she alone brought the actions of ejectment against complainant for its possession. Complainant has a right to defend his possession by proper suits when assailed, and it occasions no multiplicity of actions to seek other relief in the same suit or suits.
It is also urged that complainant is chargeable with laches in not bringing his suit sooner, and therefore should not be allowed to prosecute his suit now. The delay is not claimed to have occurred since the commencement of the actions of ejectment by defendant. Any delay prior to that time is chargeable to her at least equally with complainant. Some of the time was occupied with mutual negotiations for settlement, and, besides, complainant was in possession of the property. If wrongfully so, it was incumbent on defendant to put him out of possession without undue delay, at least to as great an extent as it was upon him to perfect his title.
The court below found in favor of defendant; found that the possession of complainant was wrongful and tortious since June 28, 1884; and dismissed his original and amended bills and, among other things, gave judgment against him for costs. So far this is just the relief, and all the relief, sought by defendant in her answers to complainant's original and amended bills, and leaves her at liberty to prosecute her actions of ejectment for the possession of the property, and for damages for its detention, if she so desire, --causes of action which might be joined by the law in force at the time these actions were begun and still in force. And this would seem to be an adjudication upon all of the issues made by the pleadings. But the court below did not stop here. In its decree is embodied an order allowing defendant to file a cross-bill. Accordingly we find a cross-bill of defendant indorsed as filed the same day of the rendering of the decree, December 13, 1889. We also find that the motion for leave to file this cross-bill was made only the day before, and taken under advisement by the court. Under the issues in the cause (for no issue was made, or could have been made, under this cross-bill) all the relief asked for by defendant was "to be hence dismissed, together with her reasonable costs and charges in this behalf incurred and sustained." When the two actions of ejectment were begun, and when this suit was begun, the law practice and chancery practice were separate. The defense in this suit, up to the day before the rendering of the decree, was evidently conducted upon the idea that it was best for defendant's interest not to ask any affirmative relief in this suit, but merely to oppose and defeat complainant's application for a conveyance of the property, and for an injunction; and then proceed to assert her legal title, and to prosecute her actions for possession and damages on the law side of the court, unincumbered by equitable considerations or defenses, --a course which would seem to commend itself to any prudent practitioner. Defendant may have desired a jury trial in those actions, to which either party was entitled, and which would have been specially appropriate in the assessment of damages, rental values, etc. But this cross-bill asks additionally for a judgment and decree against complainant, Ed. D. Metcalf, for the possession of the property, and for $ 9,000 for the use, enjoyment, rents, issues, and profits thereof, and for interest on this sum from March 31, 1887; and the decree contains a finding and judgment in favor of the defendant for the possession of the property, and for the...
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